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ABSTRACT 
The thesis discusses health financing policy, introducing or enhancing direct 
payment for health services in low income countries from a viewpoint of equity 
through theoretical and empirical economic analysis using the case of urban 
Zambia. It analyses equity implications of alternative direct payment 
mechanisms to user fee· voluntary prepayment and pre"purchased discount card. 
These alternative payment mechanisms are compared with the theory of 
consumer's choice in an econometric framework. Two theoretical models: demand 
for alternative payment mechanisms and demand for health services under chosen 
direct payment mechanisms, are elaborated applying expected utility theory and 
the law of demand, respectively. These models illustrate the effects of fee 
schedule, income, perceived health status and perceived quality of care on 
consumer's demand for health services. These demand models also predict the 
theoretical equity implications of alternative payment mechanisms. These 
theoretical explorations are empirically tested with data from the study field. 
Three data sources: household survey focusing on health seeking behaviour, 
records at health facilities, and outpatient questionnaire survey, are used for 
statistical analysis. Consumer's demand model for payment mechanisms is 
estimated with qualitative response logit model. Consumer's demand for health 
services is analysed not only with parametric method but also with non-parametric 
method for categorical data. The results of the statistical analyses support the 
theoretical demand model for health services and the effects of perceived health 
status in consumer's choice of payment mechanisms. Perceived quality of care is 
not found significant in the choice of payment mechanisms. These empirical 
findings suggest positive equity implications of employing voluntary prepayment 
or pre"purchase discount card in environment dominated by user fees even under 
conditions where the improvement of quality of care is difficult. These findings 
contribute to the economic theory of demand for health care, and feed evidence into 
the discussion on health financing policy in low income countries. 
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1.1 CONTEXT 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.1.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH FINANCING POUCY 
Health sector reforms have been pursued in many countries in the world since the 
1980's (OECD, 1994; Berman, 1995) including Sub·Saharan African countries 
(Gilson and Mills, 1995). Financing reforms are key components of health sector 
reforms. One financing reform, the introduction or increase of direct payment by 
health care users, known as "cost-recovery" or "cost-sharing" or "the Bamako 
Initiative", had been adopted in most sub-Saharan African countries by 1994 (Shaw 
and Griffin, 1995; Stierle, 1999), reflecting influential international policy 
initiatives (World Bank, 1987; UNICEF, 1990; Cassels, 1995). Levying fees on 
users of public health care services at the point of utilisation according to a certain 
fee schedule, the policy of user fees, has been a common form of this policy (McPake, 
1993; Creese and Kutzin, 1995). 
However, the introduction or enhancement of direct payment employing user fees 
has been criticised (e.g. Gilson, 1988; Mills, 1997) because it creates a financial 
barrier to health care, which would deter access to health care by the people, 
especially by the poor section of the population. 
23 
Payment mechanisms involving risk sharing have also emerged in health financing 
policy in Sub-Saharan African countries during the 1990's (Shaw and Griffin, 1995). 
Risk sharing is considered to have potential to reduce the deterioration of access to 
health care created by user fees. Alongside user fees, voluntary prepayment and 
social insurance models have been proposed as alternative models of risk sharing 
after the introduction of user fees (which give users an incentive to pay the 
premium of prepayment). Voluntary prepayment is sometimes considered to have 
more potential than the social insurance model since it is applicable to a large 
number of people working in informal sector (McPake, 1995). However, use ofthis 
mechanism has been limited. A recent review shows that there are only eleven 
well documented cases of voluntary prepayment in the Sub-Saharan Mrican region 
(Creese and Bennett, 1997). 
Voluntary prepayment is offered to users as an alternative direct payment option to 
paying user fees at the time of use. The payment of a relatively small premium in 
advance allows users to access health care at a reduced price or free of charge, 
compared to the user fee at the point of utilisation. Voluntary prepayment is 
considered to mitigate the deterioration of access to health care by reducing the 
financial barrier created by user fees. However, the feasibility of such mechanism 
has been questioned by detractors (Creese and Bennett, 1997), since its design can 
be more complicated and its operation can be more difficult compared to those of 
user fees_ This problem becomes greater as the membership widens and the 
benefit package becomes more generous. 
24 
1.1.2 ZAMBIAN HEALTH FINANCING POLICY 
This international context forms the background to the health sector reform 
programme in Zambia, which is the field of this study. The new government in 
1991 replaced a command economy oriented one party rule with a market economy 
oriented democracy. It laid the cornerstone of Zambian health sector reform 
(although some efforts for reforms had been made in the 1980's). The new 
government published a health policy framework paper stating that "Zambians 
must commit themselves to building a health care system that guarantees equity of 
access to cost· effective, quality health care as close to the family as possible". The 
subsequent reforms have followed this paper (Kalumba, 1991). 
In a reversal of the policy of providing free health care to all citizens SInce 
independence, user fees at governmental health facilities were introduced in 1993. 
Since equity in access is clearly stated as one of the key objectives of Zambian 
health reforms, and given the concerns about the financial barriers to health care 
created by user fees, the potential of voluntary prepayment alongside coexisting 
user fees has been widely discussed in the health policy arena. Voluntary 
prepayment has been introduced on several occasions both in urban and rural areas 
since 1993. Although most schemes introduced have been dysfunctional or 
abandoned for several reasons, voluntary prepayment alongside user fees has 
continuously been in operation in two urban districts, Lusaka and Kitwe, which are 
the fields of this study. 
However, In both districts, malfunctions of voluntary prepayment such as 
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mismanagement and abuse are pointed out by one recent review. For example, 
patients present a borrowed prepayment card as their direct payment or pay the 
premium only for the first month and wait for a night to validate their prepayment 
card before consultation every time they fall ill, since the premium is cheaper than 
the user fee for one consultation and 24 hours is required to validate the 
prepayment card. Another subterfuge is to attend several health centres in a row 
for one episode to collect multiple courses of drugs and sell them in a private market, 
since the prepayment card is good for all health centres within a district (Daura et 
aI., 1998). In order to cope with these problems, the "discount card", a third 
payment mechanism was introduced in 1998 as an alternative to voluntary 
prepayment. 
In this payment mechanism, health care users are asked to purchase a discount 
card consisting of several coupons to receive health care services. The users give 
up one coupon in exchange for the diagnosis and treatment of one episode of their 
illness. The price of a discount card is set to be lower per episode than the 
equivalent user fee. This is a new payment mechanism in the context of health 
financing policy in low income countries. Small scale trials of discount card have 
been in operation in these districts since then, and the expansion of this payment 
mechanism is under consideration if these trials are proven to be successful. 
1.1.3 SUMMARY 
In summary, direct payment at government health facilities has become a common 
practice in most Sub'Saharan African countries. Although user fees have been the 
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most prevalent payment mechanism of direct payment, better alternative payment 
mechanisms are sought, due to concerns about the financial barrier and access to 
health care created, especially by the poor section of the population. Voluntary 
prepayment and discount card are regarded as potential alternatives to user fees. 
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY AND OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
1.2.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
An appropriate institutionalization of direct payment, finding a mechanism that 
ensures access to health care, especially by the poor section of the population has 
been one of the health financing policy objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa including 
Zambia. Voluntary prepayment and discount card are alternative payment 
mechanisms to user fees. They are options for this institutionalization. In other 
words, the policy question is whether payment mechanisms such as voluntary 
prepayment or discount card should be promoted in designing direct payment in 
order to increase equity in the health care system. This study aims to provide 
theoretical and empirical evidence to answer that policy question by addressing the 
following research question: 'What are the equity implications of use of voluntary 
prepayment or discount card together with user fees as direct payment 
mechanism?'. 
1.2.2 OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
There are a number of previous studies of the introduction or increase of direct 
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payment in developing countries both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Most 
of them focus on equity consequences of direct payment, especially of user fees. 
Since definitions of equity in the literature often lack clarity (Donaldson and Gerard, 
1993), this study starts from the review of the definitions of equity in health care 
systems in Chapter 2. Then, experiences of direct payment for health care in 
Sub-Saharan Mrican countries are reviewed to specify the research questions of 
this study. There are three research questions on individual behaviours related to 
health care under direct payment policy and equity consequences. An economic 
approach, theoretical modelling and empirical study of demand, is introduced in 
order to answer these research questions. 
Methodological backgrounds of research techniques employed in this study are 
developed through literature reviews in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, before 
establishing the method of this study. In Chapter 3, the development of demand 
models for health care and health insurance applying the utility maximisation 
model is reviewed in order to specify a prototype of the model to be elaborated in the 
theoretical investigation. In Chapter 4, statistical analysis techniques for models 
with limited dependent variables are reviewed in order to establish a base for the 
test of the hypotheses derived from the theoretical investigation. 
The method of this study is described in Chapter 5. A framework of econometric 
study is introduced in order to draw theoretical and empirical findings. The use of 
modelling strategy in the theoretical investigation is discussed. Then, the 
protocols of data collection and analysis in the empirical investigation are described. 
Three data sources are specified: Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998, 
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records at health centres and outpatient questionnaire survey. 
The results are presented from Chapter 6 to Chapter 9. Chapter 6 presents results 
of the theoretical investigation. 1\vo demand models and their implications for 
equity consequences of the alternative payment mechanisms are developed. Then, 
hypotheses to be tested in the empirical investigation are introduced. Chapter 7 
presents results of the analysis of the data from Living Conditions Monitoring 
Survey 1998. It describes health seeking behaviour of the population in each field 
and tests hypotheses derived from the demand models elaborated in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 8 presents results of the analysis ofthe data from records at health centres. 
It constructs a map of health care service users' choice of payment mechanisms at 
health centres along with tests of hypotheses derived from the demand models. 
Chapter 9 presents results of the analysis of the data from the outpatient 
questionnaire survey. It reports results of tests of hypotheses derived from the 
demand models after examining the scales for perceived quality of care. 
Chapter 10 presents the discussion of these results. Results from the tests of 
hypotheses are reviewed. Then, equity consequences are discussed, which are 
followed by policy implications and conclusions. 
Before proceeding to Chapter 2, the field sites of the study are introduced in the last 
section of this introduction chapter. 
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1.3 FIELD SITES OF THE STUDY 
1.3.1 SELECTION OF FIELDS 
'!\vo urban districts, Lusaka and Kitwe in Zambia are taken as the field sites of this 
study. 
Zambia is selected because its health financing policy, especially direct payment 
policy in 1990's, exemplifies the international health financing policy context in 
Sub-Saharan Africa as described in Section 1.1. After the launch of its health 
sector reforms in 1991 following the health policy framework paper (Kalumba, 
1991), which is thought to be a reflection of international policy initiatives (World 
Bank, 1987; UNICEF, 1990), direct payment at public health facilities, 
predominantly in the form of user fees, prevailed nationwide by 1994. 
Although voluntary prepayments are officially regarded as an alternative payment 
mechanism for direct payment in Zambian health financing policy (MOH, 1994), 
Zambia's experiences are as limited as those of the international context. A survey 
on direct payment policy in 1995 that sampled 10 out of 61 districts identified the 
operation of district wide voluntary prepayment schemes in 3 districts including 
Lusaka and Kitwe, and small-scale facility based voluntary prepayment in 5 
districts (Kalyala et al., 1998). In 1997, a mailed survey to all districts on the 
practice of direct payment identified 5 out of 41 responding districts to have 
small-scale facility based voluntary prepayment (Daura et al., 1998). These 5 
facilities were different from the ones identified in the previous survey. Although 
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Lusaka and Kitwe failed to respond to this mailed survey, the authors found the 
operation of district wide voluntary prepayment through their visits to these 
districts. 
Lusaka and Kitwe are the unique known districts that have continuously operated 
voluntary prepayment in Zambia. In addition, these districts have experimented 
with the operation of the discount card. Therefore, they are chosen as field sites 
for this study. 
1.3.2 THE HEALTH SYSTEM IN THE FIELD SITES 
The background of each field site with respect to the social infrastructure, health 
system, and pattern of health care service utilisation is introduced in the following. 
Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. Approximately 10 million 
people live in 753,000 square kilometres. 40% of the population live in urbanized 
areas. GDP per capita is 320 D.S. dollars, which ranks 21st out of 48 Sub'Saharan 
African countries in 1998. Life expectancy at birth is 38.5 years and infant 
mortality ratio is 114 (World Bank, 2000; Esterhuysen, 1998; WHO, 2000). 
Zambia is administratively divided into 9 provinces, comprising 72 districts at the 
time of this study. Lusaka district is the capital and Kitwe district is the third 
largest urbanized district in the country. 
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1.3.2.1 LUSAKA DISTRICT 
Lusaka district is predominantly urban. The estimated population of the district 
is 1,162,465 by the latest census in 1990. A large number of people are in informal 
employment. 
Health care is provided through a three tier public provision system alongside a 
substantial number of private and industrial facilities. 23 health centres managed 
by the district health management team provide primary care to the general public. 
8 among these also provide secondary care, although the differentiation between 
primary care provision and secondary care provision is in process and immature. 
The University Teaching Hospital (UTH) offers tertiary care as well. There is 
market segmentation at UTH: a high cost department, which implies high quality, 
operates separately from a low cost department. The exact number of private 
facilities is difficult to estimate due to the lack of data. The number of industrial 
facilities is limited compared to Kitwe. 
Within this system, a small number of relatively affluent patients have access to the 
high cost department at UTH, private facilities, or industrial facilities owned by 
their employer. Subscription to high cost prepayment is required to attend the 
high cost department. At the time of this study, its premium was K 8,000 (K 4,500 
= £ 1 in 1999) per month per person for diagnosis and treatment at the time of 
illness. Private facilities charge higher fees than either the University Teaching 
Hospital or health centres. 
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The majority of the population have access to health centres but not to the high cost 
department at UTH, private facilities, or industrial facilities. In principle, since 
1996, the low cost department ofUTH has provided care only for patients who have 
been referred by health centres. 
At health centres, user fees were initiated in 1991, and low cost prepayments, which 
are the form of voluntary prepayment targeted in this study, were introduced in 
1993. The trial of pre-purchase discount cards started at two pilot health centres 
in October 1998. Therefore, patients at health centres where the discount cards 
trial is not in operation must choose one from two payment mechanisms, user fees 
or low cost prepayment. Patients where the discount cards trial is in operation 
must choose one from three payment mechanisms, user fees; low cost prepayments, 
or discount cards. Table 1.1 shows the fee schedule at health centres in Lusaka at 
the time of this study. 
At the low cost department of UTH, patients without referrals whether or not they 
had subscribed to low cost prepayment must pay relatively expensive "by-pass user 
fees", K 5,000 per attendance. In practice, even referred patients with low cost 
prepayments needed to pay the same expensive user fees, although they were 
supposed to receive care free of charge at the time of this study. 
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Table 1.1 Fee schedule at health centres in Lusaka 
AGE USER FEES LOW COST PREPAYMENTS DISCOUNT CARDS 
0-5 Exempted Exempted Exempted 
6-15 K 2,500 K 1,500 to enroll K 5,000 for 4 episodes 
K 500 per month 
16 -64 K 5,000 K 2,500 to enroll K 10,000 for 4 episodes 
K 1,000 per month 
65 + Exempted Exempted Exempted 
Governmental facilities enforce exemption policies. Treatment of chronic illnesses 
such as TB, HIVlAIDS, treatment of STDs, treatment of epidemics such as cholera, 
and safe motherhood and family planning services are provided free of charge. In 
addition, children under the age of 5 years and people over the age of 65 years, 
vulnerable individuals who have evidence provided by the social welfare 
department, or people who can indicate that they cannot afford to pay are treated 
free of charge. In practice, evidence by the social welfare department are never 
presented by patients and exemptions are subject to duty sister's discretion. 
1.3.2.2 KITWE DISTRICT 
Kitwe district is also predominantly urban. The estimated population of the 
district is 450,495 according to the latest census in 1990. A large number of people 
are employed in the mining sector. There are also a large number of people who 
are unemployed or working in the informal sector. 
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Health care is provided through two tier public provision system alongside several 
industrial facilities and a few private facilities. 18 health centres managed by the 
district health management team provide primary care to the general public. 
Kitwe Central Hospital (KCH) offers secondary care. There is also market 
segmentation at KCH: a high cost department, offering higher quality services in 
principle, operates separately from a low cost department. 
Within this system, relatively affluent patients have access to the high cost 
department at KCH, industrial facilities owned by their employer such as the 
mining company, or private facilities. Subscription of high cost prepayment is 
required to attend the high cost department. At the time of this study, the 
prepayment consisted ofthe premium, K 8,000 for a family membership for one year, 
and deposit, not less than K 250,000. The cost of care utilised is deducted from the 
deposit. Industrial facilities usually offer care free of charge or at a minimal cost 
for employees and their families. Private facilities charge higher fees than public 
facilities. 
A large proportion of the population had access to health centres but not to the high 
cost department at KCH and industrial facilities as was the case in Lusaka. In 
principle, since 1995, the low cost department of KCH provided tertiary care only 
for patients with referrals from health centres. 
At health centres, user fees were initiated in 1994, and low cost prepayments, the 
form of voluntary prepayment targeted in this study. were introduced in 1995. The 
trial of pre'purchase discount cards started at two pilot health centres in October 
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1998. Therefore, patients at health centres where the discount cards trial is not in 
operation must choose one of two payment mechanisms, user fees or low cost 
prepayments, and patients at health centres where the discount cards trial is in 
operation must choose one from three payment mechanisms; user fees, low cost 
prepayment, or discount cards. Table 1.2 shows the fee schedule at health centres 
in Kitwe at the time of this study. 
At the low cost department of KCH, patients without referrals must pay relatively 
expensive "by·pass user fees", K 2,500 per attendance whether or not they have 
subscribed to low· cost pre·payment. Referred patients with low cost prepayments 
received care free of charge in practice, which was different from Lusaka. 
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Table 1.2 Fee schedule at health centres in Kitwe 
AGE USER FEES LOW COST DISCOUNT 
PREPAYM:ENTS CARDS 
0-5 Exempted Exempted Exempted 
6-15 K 150 to register K 400 per month K 3,000 for 6 
K 250 to consult episodes 
K 250 for 1 course of each 
drug 
Extra for Lab test 
16 - K 150 to register K 800 per month K 5,000 for 6 
64 K 500 to consult episodes 
K 500 for 1 course of each 
drug 
Extra for Lab test 
65 - Exempted Exempted Exempted 
Governmental facilities in Kitwe enforce exemption policies, which are the same as 
in Lusaka. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW I 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a conceptual framework and to specify 
research questions for the study. Since the objective of the study is to consider 
equity consequences of user fees compared with alternative payment mechanisms 
for health care services as specified in Chapter 1, equity in the health care system is 
a research endpoint. There is an agreement among most people that equity is one 
of the important objectives of social policy, but there is much less agreement on the 
appropriate definition of equity (Le Grand et aI., 1992). Therefore, arguments 
about the definition of equity in the health care system are reviewed in the next 
section in order to give an operational definition of equity for the study. Then, in 
section 2.3, experiences of direct payments for health care services in Sub'Saharan 
Africa are reviewed on both theoretical and empirical bases. Finally, in section 2.4, 
research questions are specified. 
2.2 EQUITY IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
As a social policy objective, equity is defined as fairness (Rutherford, 1992). More 
specifically, it is defined as a goal relating the way in which resources should be 
distributed or shared among individuals (Barr, 1997). There is a consensus of 
opinion that health care systems as social institutions should be fair, or equitable 
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(Le Grand et al., 1992), in other words, health or health care should be distributed 
or shared among individuals fairly. However, there is variation in the definition of 
fairness in the health care system within the literature. In order to study the 
performance of health care systems in terms of equity, some reasonable definition of 
equity is needed <Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). In this section, arguments around 
the definition of equity, or fairness, in health care systems are reviewed in order to 
provide an operational definition of equity for the study, and its operational 
indicators are also considered. 
Equity is defined as a principle of distribution of resources by Barr (1997). 
Therefore, before defining equity in the health care system, there are two points 
that need to be clarified: the principle of distribution, and the resources to be 
distributed. Before reviewing principles of distribution, the resources to be 
distributed in the health care system should be defined. There are two types of 
resources discussed regarding equity in the health care system in the literature, 
health and health care <Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). In this section, the 
distribution of health care is reviewed. This is because the health care system is 
primarily distributing health care, although it ultimately tries to achieve 
population health (Abel·Smith, 1994). 
2.2.1 PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTION 
From the point of principle of distribution, there are some basic theories and simple 
criteria to be noted before further discussion on the definitions of equity in the 
health care system. 
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2.2.1.1 POLITICAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Firstly, philosophical arguments on the definition of fairness, known as political 
theories of social justice, underlie the discussion on the definition of equity. There 
are four basic political theories of social justice (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; Barr, 
1997): libertarianism, utilitarianism, Rawlsian arguments, and egalitarianism. 
These are shown in Table 2.1. The relevance of these to the definition of equity in 
the health care system has been discussed in the literature. 
Table 2.1 Political theories of social justice 
THEORY FAIRNESS 
Libertarianism Market mechanism is considered fair. 
Utilitarianism Maximising greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
Rawlsian A basic set of primary social goods are distributed so that the 
arguments position of the least well off in society is maximised. 
Egalitarianism Equal shares of commodities. 
In libertarianism, justice is entirely a matter of the enforcement of private property 
rights (Williams and Cookson, 2000). Libertarians consider that distribution 
through the market mechanism is fair. Some argue that state intervention in the 
market is morally wrong except in very limited circumstances; and others that state 
intervention is wrong because it will reduce total welfare (Barr, 1997). However, 
for the purpose of this study, libertarianism is considered an inadequate 
philosophical foundation, since the market mechanism allows a wide range of 
distribution of goods depending on initial conditions (Ng, 1983). This implies the 
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lack of a consistent principle of distribution. Furthermore, the imperfections of the 
health care market are widely admitted to require some form of state intervention 
(McGuire et al., 1988; Donaldson and Gerard, 1993), at least to a limited degree 
even in some libertarian fora (e.g. Bosanquet, 1999; Booth, 2002). 
In utilitarianism, justice is ultimately a matter of maximising the sum total of 
human happiness (Williams and Cookson, 2000). Utilitarians consider that the 
maximisation of happiness for the greatest number is fair and ignore distributional 
aspects (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). Consequently, utilitarianism lacks a 
principle of distribution (McGuire et al., 1988; Donaldson and Gerard, 1993) and is 
not considered an adequate philosophical foundation of equity in the health care 
system for the purpose of this study. 
According to Rawls' theory of justice (1972), there are two principles of justice. 
Firstly, basic liberties are to be distributed equally and at the maximum level that 
is compatible with everyone else enjoying the same level. Secondly, social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged member of society. Rawlsians consider that a basic set of 
primary social goods should be distributed so that the position of the least well off is 
maximised. This is considered as a potential theory for defining equity in health 
care systems for the purpose of this study (Culyer, 1976; Daniels, 1985), although 
whether health care should be treated as a primary social good is not clear 
(Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). 
Egalitarianism IS about the concern for social, political and economic equality 
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(Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). Egalitarians consider that equality in distribution 
is fair. This is regarded as a starting point of some theoretical discussion on equity 
in the health care system in the literature (McGuire et aI., 1988; Barr, 1997). 
However, it may be judged fair to distribute health care unequally, such that groups 
more likely to be ill should perhaps be given greater access (Donaldson and Gerard, 
1993). 
Thus, Rawlsian arguments and egalitarianism are thought to be potential 
philosophical foundations of equity in the health care system for the purpose of this 
study. 
Fair distribution of health care by Rawlsian and egalitarian arguments are likely to 
be achieved by governmental intervention in the health care market (Donaldson 
and Gerard, 1993; van Doorslaer et aI., 1993). The fact that almost all health care 
systems across different types of society have some portion of public provision or 
funding, which implies non· market rationing of health care, suggests that 
principles other than libertarianism and utilitarianism dominate in collective 
decision making on health care, despite widely differing cultural contexts. For 
example, even the U.S. health system, which is regarded as the most market 
oriented (Folland et aI., 2001), has public provision (Medicare for the low income 
population and Medicaid for the elderly) and wide ranging additional market 
intervention. 
However, typical operational definitions in the literature do not use these principles 
straightforwardly (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). 
42 
2.2.1.2 CRITERIA FOR DISTRIBUTION 
Apart from arguments from the philosophical level, two types of equity criterion are 
also proposed as principles of distribution in the literature: 'full equality' and 
'minimum standard' (Le Grand et al., 1992; Barr, 1997). Full equality is 
interpreted as straightforward operationalization of egalitarian fairness. Equal 
distribution of health care is considered fair. However, this fails to treat unequal 
cases unequally as mentioned before. Minimum standard first assumes a 
distinction between necessary and discretionary health care. Then, equal 
distribution of necessary health care is considered fair. It is argued that the 
principle of minimum standard is evident in many aspects of the health care system 
(Le Grand et al., 1992) such as free primary care for low income groups to ensure 
access to primary care. However, the definition of minimum standard is left 
undefined. Typical operational definitions of equity in the literature do not use 
these principles, either. 
2.2.2 DEFINITIONS OF EQUITY 
2.2.2.1 DEFINITIONS IN THE LITERTURE 
The most commonly proposed definitions of equity in the health care system, 
horizontal equity and vertical equity (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; Darr, 1997), are 
based on other criteria for fairness than those basic principles mentioned above. 
Horizontal equity implies equal treatment of equals and vertical equity, unequal 
treatment of unequals. For example, equal access to health care for the equally ill 
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is considered horizontally equitable; unequal financial contributions to health care 
according to unequal ability to pay are considered vertically equitable. 
In addition, definitions tend to focus on specific aspects of the health care system 
such as provision or financing of health care depending on the policy question of 
interest. Health care financing policy, which is the subject of this study, also has 
effects on both horizontal and vertical equity. Table 2.2 shows typical definitions of 
equity in the health care system from the literature. 
Table 2.2 Definitions of equity in the health care system 
PROVISION FINANCING 
· equal utilisation for equal payment for equal 
HORIZONTAL equal need u tilisa tion 
EQUITY · equal access for equal equal payment for equal ability to 
need pay 
· 
unequal utilisation for . unequal payment according to 
VERTICAL unequal need unequal ability to pay 
EQUITY · unequal access for unequal payment for unequal 
unequal need utilisation 
Horizontal equity in health care provision is typically defined as equal utilisation 
for equal need, or equal access for equal need; for example, equal waiting time for 
patients with similar conditions. Vertical equity in health care provision is defined 
as unequal utilisation for unequal need, or unequal access for unequal need; for 
example, unequal treatment of patients with treatable trivial conditions compared 
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to those with serious conditions. Horizontal equity in health care financing is 
defined as equal payment for equal utilisation, or equal payment for equal ability to 
pay; for example, equal premium of health insurance for equal income group. 
Vertical equity in health care financing is defined as unequal payment according to 
unequal ability to payor unequal payment for unequal utilisation; for example, 
unequal premium of health insurance for unequal income group. Progressive 
pricing according to income is usually considered fair. 
2.2.2.2 NEED, ACCESS, UTILISATION 
However, there are problems around these definitions, especially with regard to 
equity in health care provision. The definition of need, and the distinction between 
utilisation and access should be clarified. 
There are three types of need in health care according to the orientation: expressed 
need, normative need, and comparative need (Luck et aI., 2000). Expressed need 
refers to need revealed in actual demand, which is based on libertarianism rather 
than any philosophy which can adequately provide a basis for the assessment of 
equity. Normative need refers to need defined by professionals such as physicians 
but is often criticised by economists in terms of equity, since it fails to consider the 
costs of meeting needs (Bowling, 2002). Economists view need as comparative, and 
are concerned with marginal met need. They define need as the capacity to benefit 
from health care (Culyer, 1995). This definition has an advantage in defining 
equity in health care provision when taking availability of interventions and 
resources into account, and is considered to be fit for use in this study which is 
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concerned with distribution under scarcity. 
In empirical studies, equity in health care provision is more often defined in terms 
of access than utilisation (McGuire et al., 1987). This is because equal access 
implies equal opportunity to use needed health care. It is considered superior to 
equal utilisation, which does not allow consumer's choice whether to use health care 
or not based on their preference (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). Equal utilisation 
requires equal compliance and the standardization of interventions, which is not 
likely, or necessarily appropriate, in practice (Mooney, 1987; Andersen and Mooney, 
1990). 
2.2.2.3 S~1{ 
In summary, equity in the health care system is usually defined according to the 
principles, equal treatment of equals, and unequal treatment of unequals. Four 
types of equity are usually defined separately depending on the principles of 
fairness and focus of argument. The definition varies within each category. 
2.2.3 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF EQUIIT FOR THIS STUDY 
As specified in the objective ofthis study, the focus on equity is derived from concern 
on the financial barrier to access health care created or increased by direct 
payments, especially for the poor section of the population. This is about equal 
access for equal need, irrespective of income status. Therefore, horizontal equity 
defined as equal access for equal need is taken as the definition of equity in this 
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study. 
However, this definition still has problems in enabling discussion of equity on an 
empirical basis. Access, which implies opportunity to benefit, and need, which 
implies capacity to benefit, are both difficult to observe (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993). 
Therefore, most empirical studies take utilisation as a proxy for access (McPake and 
Kutzin, 1997). This study will also use utilisation as an endpoint indicator. 
2.3 EXPERIENCE OF DIRECT PAYMENT FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
2.3.1 UNDERLYING THEORY OF DIRECT PAYMENTS POLICY 
The policy of the introduction or enhancement of direct payments for health care 
services by users is formed from a notion that one of the fundamental problems of 
the health sector in low income countries is its under provision of care for the 
majority of people. Health care provision systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
considered to be failing in providing health care services to the majority of people 
when they fall ill (e.g. Shaw and Elmendorf, 1994; Streefland et aL, 1995). In an 
underlying theory of direct payments, this under provision is considered to be 
caused by inefficiencies in the way the health system performs, which is 
exacerbated by the shortage of resources. 1\vo types of inefficiencies are 
considered to constitute the core of the problem to be solved by financing policy: 
allocative inefficiency and internal inefficiency (World Bank, 1987). Allocative 
inefficiency is caused by the misallocation of resources to less cost-effective 
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production processes. For example, the allocation of more resources to tertiary 
care and less to primary care may exacerbate allocative inefficiency in low income 
countries since most health problems may be solved by primary care at a lower cost. 
Internal inefficiency occurs when resources are not optimally utilised within a 
production process. For example, without factors of production such as drugs or 
health staff, health services cannot be produced efficiently, then complementary 
resources are wasted. Shortage of resources exacerbates internal inefficiency 
because it may cause the shortage of inputs such as capital or labour. 
Introduction or increase of direct payments intends to solve the under utilisation 
problem through reducing these inefficiencies in three steps (World Bank., 1987; 
Shaw and Griffin, 1995). Firstly, increased resources are to be raised for the 
health sector. Secondly, allocative efficiency is to be increased because resources 
raised will be concentrated at or reallocated to primary level where there is relative 
under· investment; and internal efficiency is to be increased because resources will 
be used to correct imbalanced input mixes. These steps are intended to result in 
increased production of health services at better quality levels. Finally, the 
produced services are to be delivered to the underserved majority of people. This is 
expected to have positive impact on equity in health care provision. 
A number of studies have focused on user fees. These have mainly focused on each 
of the three theoretical steps discussed above: revenue generation, efficiency of 
service prOVISlOl1, and utilisation of health care services. Critics of user fees 
discuss the third step most extensively, the utilisation of health care serVIces. 
Their concerns focus on the accessibility of services for the low income population 
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and the financial barrier created by user fees. In other words, their concern is 
about equity consequences, the main subject of this study. The previous studies 
are reviewed in the following section; firstly on revenue generation and efficiency of 
health care service provision, secondly on utilisation of health care services. 
2.3.2 EVIDENCE ON USER FEES AND REVENUE GENERATION 
Several studies question whether the increase in resources achievable through 
direct payments is sufficient to increase the production of health care services at 
better quality levels (Waddington and Enyimayew, 1989; McPake, 1993). The 
proponents of direct payments argue that revenue should cover as much as 20% of 
the recurrent cost of operating health facilities (World Bank, 1993). However, 
experiences suggest that typically, only around 5% of the recurrent cost is raised 
through user fees (Gilson and Mills., 1995; Kutzin, 1995; Nolan and 1Urbot, 1995), 
although higher rates can be achieved in individual health facilities (Creese and 
Kutzin, 1994; Knippenberg et al., 1990). Contributing factors to this situation are 
low fees, reflecting the low income of the population and the recurrent costs of 
operating user fees collection (McPake et al., 1993; Gilson and Mills., 1995). 
Available information suggests that the resources raised through direct payments 
with user fees are likely to be inadequate to increase the production of health 
services with better quality (Wang'ombe, 1997; Gilson, 1997). These findings are 
one of the reasons why payment mechanisms with risk sharing such as voluntary 
prepayments are proposed as an alternative to user fees (Shaw and Griffin, 1995), 
since collecting premium from non-immediate health service users in addition to 
health service users is thought to be an additional source of revenue. 
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There are relatively few studies on the efficiency of health care service provision in 
the context of user fees (Wang'ombe, 1997; Gilson, 1997), while several ways of 
improving efficiency through behavioural change of providers and consumers are 
suggested (World Bank, 1987). Evidence is limited on provider behaviour. 
Inefficient provider behaviour encouraged by user fees, such as over-prescription of 
drugs to increase revenue has been raised as a concern (McPake et al., 1993). 
Evidence is weak, but experience suggests that direct payments with user fees may 
promote inefficiencies in provider behaviour (Gilson, 1997). There is more 
evidence on behavioural change of consumers, which is more relevant to the subject 
of this study. Some studies find positive impact on efficiency of health seeking 
behaviour resulting from the grading of prices according to the level of facilities 
(Creese and Kutzin, 1995; Gilson, 1997). Faced with a lower price at primary care 
facilities and a higher price at higher care facilities, consumers attend the more 
appropriate level of health facility for their illness and respect the referral system, 
which results in improving efficiency at health system level (Collins et al., 1995). 
However, whether there is any inefficient utilisation to discourage is questioned by 
some who argue that the high travel and time cost of seeking care already 
discourages unnecessary utilisation (Abel·Smith and Rawal, 1992). 
2.3.3 EVIDENCE ON THE UTILISATION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
Previous studies on the utilisation of health care services share a theoretical 
concern on the distribution of benefits from health care under direct payments with 
user fees. The increased cost of care may deter utilisation by the low income group 
more severely compared to the high income group, because the low income group 
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may be more sensitive to financial costs. Any increased production of health 
services at higher quality levels will be enjoyed more by those who use services 
more. If so, the introduction or increase of user fees fails to achieve its intended 
improvement in utilisation among the most severely underserved people. It may 
make the less well off worse off still (Gilson, 1988; Mills, 1997). 
In order to overcome the problem, the counter argument by the proponents of direct 
payments is an adoption ofthe exemption or waiver mechanism that allows the poor 
to receive health services at a reduced price or free of charge (World Bank, 1987; 
Shaw and Griffin, 1995). However, critics question the feasibility of these counter 
measures. They argue that it is difficult to implement the exemption or waiver 
mechanism, because identifying the poor in the field is difficult (Nolan and Thrbat, 
1993; Russell and Gilson, 1995). 
A number of empirical investigations have been reported on the utilisation of health 
care services under user fees. A few studies show an increase in utilisation of 
health care services along with improvement in quality of care after the 
introduction or increase in fees (Litvack and Bodart, 1993; Diop et al., 1995; 
Chawala, 2000). However, these studies are based on experiments, which are 
supported by substantial external inputs. Generalisability of these findings is 
considered to be limited. In contrast, studies that show the deterioration of health 
care service utilisation under user fees have been accumulating. A decrease in 
utilisation is observed in several field studies (e.g. Waddington and Enyimayew, 
1990; Mwabu et aI., 1995). These results are confirmed by one international 
survey of 26 low income countries including 13 Sub-Saharan African countries 
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(Russell and Gilson, 1997). Heavier financial burdens borne by low income groups 
compared to high income groups are found in some field studies (Sauerborn et al., 
1994; Fabricant et al., 1999), and the malfunction of the exemption or waiver 
mechanism is also found (Huber, 1993; Fabricant et al., 1999). This evidence needs 
to be interpreted with caution, since each of these case studies reflects a different 
set of circumstances. However, it can be concluded that the balance of evidence 
points towards deterioration of utilisation under user fees. 
2.3.4 UNDERLYING THEORY OF VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT 
Voluntary prepayment alongside user fees is proposed on the basis that it would 
overcome some shortcomings of user fees. Firstly, the revenue from premium, 
which is collected not only from immediate health service users but also from 
non-immediate users, is potentially larger and more stable than that from user fees 
if the level of premium is set appropriately and coverage is expanded. 
Furthermore, increased resources would have positive impact on the efficiency of 
health service production. Secondly, both health risk and financial risk (Jack, 
1999), borne by the community would be reduced. When falling ill, people who 
paid relatively small amounts in premium in advance could seek health care 
without facing financial difficulties. This would have positive impact on the 
utilisation of health care services. 
2.3.5 EXPERIENCES OF VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT 
Empirical studies on voluntary prepayment in the region are limited, and they 
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mainly discuss its feasibility, since the design and operation of voluntary payments 
with large membership and generous benefits are considered to be more 
complicated than that of user fees. Advocates for such payment mechanisms 
report descriptive evaluations of successful examples (e.g. Stavem and Eklund, 
1995; Arhin, 1995; Criel and Kegels, 1997) or draw lessons from unsuccessful 
examples such that risk selection can be minimised through appropriate design and 
implementation (Noterman et al., 1995). However, most of the examples were 
implemented with relatively intense external support. Therefore, the 
generalisability of these lessons to more typical situations without external support 
is questionable. Reviewing these experiences, critics point to limited population 
coverage, low cost recovery rates, and limited ability to protect the poorest members 
of the society. They question if the theoretical advantages of voluntary 
prepayments alongside user fees against user fees only can be realised in practice 
(Creese and Bennett, 1997). 
The practice of several small facility based voluntary prepayment schemes 
alongside user fees in rural areas and a few district level voluntary prepayment 
schemes are reported in the reviews of direct payments in Zambia (Kalyala et al., 
1998; Daura et al., 1998). The cases other than those of Lusaka and Kitwe are 
reported to be dysfunctional, since a limited number of people use prepayments as 
their payment mechanism. The two cases of Lusaka and Kitwe are studied in 
depth focusing on design and operation, and the problems of these schemes which 
have been discussed above are also reported. 
Theoretically, an extensive coverage, which means a large size of risk pool, IS 
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necessary for the positive impact of voluntary prepayments. For example, if the 
number of subscribers is limited, it is difficult to raise enough resources to realize a 
positive impact on efficiency. In addition, the smaller the number of subscribers, 
the smaller the number of people who benefit from reduced financial barriers to 
health care services when falling ill. However, the prepayments in this context are 
voluntary, not compulsory as under social insurance. Therefore, the success of 
voluntary prepayments is entirely dependent on individual's choices. 
There are two field studies, which suggest people's positive willingness to pay for 
voluntary prepayments using hypothetical questions (Arhin, 1995; Asenso Okyere 
et al., 1997). Studies to date pay insufficient attention to people's preference for 
voluntary payments. Peoples' attitudes toward voluntary payments alongside user 
fees is not well known and hence cannot inform a discussion of the potential of 
voluntary prepayments as an alternative payment mechanism to user fees alone. 
2.3.6 DISCOUNT CARD 
For the first time in low income countries to the author's knowledge, discount cards 
alongside coexisting user fees are applied to the health sector in Lusaka and Kitwe. 
It is hoped that these will overcome some practical shortcomings of voluntary 
prepayment in Zambia, such as abuse of a third person's prepayments, avoiding 
continuous payment of premium, and collecting drugs at several health centres to 
sell, as previously described. These problems can be avoided with the use of 
discount cards. Theoretically, it is a payment mechanism that spreads risk over 
time for an individual. In Zambian design, discount cards can be shared with 
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anybody, which allows a family or a small group of people to share the risk. In this 
sense, the risk sharing function of discount cards stays somewhere in-between user 
fees and voluntary prepayments that spread risk among all subscribers_ The 
financial barrier to health care services when falling ill is also reduced, since those 
who have discount cards do not need cash for their visits to health centres. 
However, its theoretical impact is not yet clear. And the experiences of the trial 
have not been studied to date_ 
2.3.7 SUMMARY 
In summary, the empirical evidence suggests that the introduction or increase of 
direct payments through user fees results in reduced utilisation of health care 
services by the low income population. Voluntary prepayments and discount cards 
alongside user fees are sought as alternative payment mechanisms, on the basis 
that they could reduce the financial barrier to health care services at the time of 
illness. There are several studies of the feasibility of voluntary prepayments. 
However, less attention has been paid to the community attitudes to voluntary 
prepayments. As for discount cards, no studies have been performed either 
theoretical or empirical. 
2.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the international and Zambian contexts mentioned in Chapter 1 and the 
experience of direct payments in health care in the region, an unanswered question 
is whether the institutionalization of voluntary prepayments and discount cards 
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alongside user fees would produce an impact that is more positive for equitable 
access to health care. The overall research question for this study is: 'What are the 
equity implications of use of direct voluntary prepayment or discount card together 
with user fees as direct payment mechanism?' In order to answer this question 
comprehensively, careful observations of the responses of people both in the 
community and in the health sector, and their implications for equity and efficiency 
are needed. 
In addressing the research question, the approach taken is to seek to understand 
people's utilisation of health care under the three payment mechanisms, narrowing 
the endpoint down to horizontal equity in health care provision. Equity 
consequences of alternative payment mechanisms can be discussed, once this is 
understood. 
Within this context, individuals make two choices in utilizing health care services: 
a choice as to whether to seek health care or not, and a choice as to which payment 
mechanism to use. Taking the characteristics of voluntary prepayments and 
discount cards into account, people are assumed to make these choices at two 
different points of time. They make the choice of seeking health care services 
when they are ill, and they make the choice of payment mechanism before they fall 
ill. Therefore, it is necessary to understand both choices in order to understand 
utilisation of health care under the three payment mechanisms. 
Three further specific questions; two of them concerning people's choice related to 
health care services and the other concerning the endpoint of this study, equity, are 
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derived from the following arguments. 
Firstly, how do people seek health care under each payment mechanism? In other 
words, is people's access to health care facilitated by the institution of voluntary 
prepayment or discount cards relative to user fees alone? Observing the effect of 
removing or reducing the financial barrier at the point of utilisation provides 
information on each alternative mechanism's potential effect on access to health 
care. 
Secondly, how do people choose alternative payment mechanisms? In other words, 
do people choose to pay for health care in advance through voluntary prepayments 
or discount cards instead of paying user fees, and if so, what factors influence the 
choice? Understanding the way people make choices informs each mechanism's 
potential performance. 
Thirdly, is equity in health care provision improved through the institutionalization 
of voluntary prepayments or discount cards? Combining the answers to the above 
two questions produce a theory and evidence on the distribution of benefits that 
illustrates equity consequences. 
Exploring these three questions informs the debate on health care financing in the 
region and the policy options in organising payment mechanisms. 
The analytic approach to address these research questions is straightforward. 
Economics techniques for theoretical modelling and empirical study of demand are 
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employed since the utilisation of health care and the voluntary choice of alternative 
payment mechanisms are the 'demand', or consumer's choice, in economic terms. 
In the following chapters, the method for economic analysis of demand to answer 
these research questions is developed. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 11 
ECONOMIC THEORY 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the groundwork for a theoretical 
approach to address the research questions specified in Chapter 2, especially the 
second one; "how do people choose alternative payment mechanisms?" through 
literature review. In the literature, some developments of demand models in the 
health sector through application of basic economic theories of demand are found, 
which provide a foundation for the theoretical investigation in this study. 
Therefore, these developments are reviewed in order to specify a prototype of the 
demand model for this study. 
In the next section, basic economic theories, or demand models, are briefly reviewed 
as a starting point, before reviewing application of these basic models to demand in 
the health sector. In 3.3, major commodities in the health sector; health care and 
health insurance, which are also the subjects of this study, are defined and the scope 
of this review is limited. In 3.4, the developments of demand models in the health 
sector are reviewed. The relevance of the reviewed models for this study is also 
examined. In the final section, the prototype of the demand model for this study is 
specified. 
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3.2 BASIC ECONOMIC THEORIES OF DEMAND 
Two basic theories, or demand models, underlie theoretical economic models of 
demand in the health sector reviewed in this chapter: the utility maximisation 
model and the expected utility maximisation model. In this section, these basic 
models are specified and defined as a starting point of the review. 
3.2.1 UTILITY MAXIMISATION MODEL 
In demanding commodities, a consumer makes choices: what, how much, or when to 
purchase. The theory of choice is a basic economic theory, which seeks to explain 
these choices (e.g. Varian, 1992; Parkin and King, 1995). In this theory, a 
consumer is assumed to demand a commodity at a given price in the market based 
on his/her taste within hislher resource constraint, that is, a budget or income, in 
order to maximise hislher utility, that is, the benefit or satisfaction he/she gains 
from the consumption of the commodity. Therefore, this is also called the utility 
maximisation model. 
Taste is the view of a consumer on the relative merits of two or several commodities, 
which contribute to determine utilities. In applying the utility maximisation 
model for demand for a specific commodity in a specific context, factors other than 
price and resource constraint, which are thought of as determining consumer's 
choices, are incorporated on an assumption that these factors comprise taste 
(Nicholson, 1997). 
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3.2.2 EXPECTED UTIUTY MAXIMISATION MODEL 
The utility maximisation model assumes that a consumer making choices is certain 
about the outcome of any choice (Estrin and Laidler, 1995). In general, the model 
is not suitable for dealing with uncertain outcomes. However, there is a type of 
uncertainty described as risk for which all outcomes can be listed and the 
probability of incurring each outcome can be assigned. The expected utility 
maximisation model is an extension of the utility maximisation model to deal with 
choices in face of risk by incorporating probabilities. Although this model requires 
cardinal measurability of differences in utility which contradicts conventional 
neoclassical economics, this is a commonly used basic model for choices in the face of 
risk (Estrin and Laidler, 1995). 
In the expected utility maximisation model, a consumer is assumed to demand a 
commodity at a given price in the market based on his/her taste within his/her 
resource constraint in order to maximise his/her expected utility taking 
probabilities of uncertain event occurrences into account. 
3.2.3 SUMMARY 
Application of these basic models to specific contexts makes it possible to analyse 
factors around consumer's choice and the effects of these factors on the choice. 
Demand functions can be reduced from the utility maximisation models, in which 
quantity demanded is determined by relevant factors. And the nature of demand 
such as marginal effects of factors, or elasticities, are predicted. 
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In summary, there are two basic demand models in economics: the utility 
maximisation model and the expected utility maximisation model. The latter is an 
extension of the former in order to deal with consumer's choices when facing risk. 
3.3 SCOPE OF THIS REVIEW 
3.3.1 COMMODITIES IN THE HEALTH SECTOR 
In the context of the health sector, these basic models have been applied to 
consumer's demand for two types of commodities: health care and health insurance, 
both of which are the subjects of this study. Although both health care and health 
insurance imply diverse commodities in the real world, for this review, health care 
is defined as the diagnosis and treatment provided by professionals at health 
facilities, and health insurance is defined as the entitlement to receive health care 
in exchange for premium paid in advance. Voluntary prepayment in this study is 
an example of health insurance as introduced in Chapter 1. 
Under the second specific research question, the choice a consumer faces in the 
context is whether to subscribe to voluntary prepayment, or to purchase discount 
cards, or to obtain neither in face of both health and financial risk. Therefore, the 
other type of commodity, a discount card, is also under consideration. Since this is 
a new payment mechanism in the health sector, there is no experience of application 
of the theories of demand to discount cards in the literature. Therefore, this 
review does not cite any literature on demand for discount cards. 
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However, the choice of discount card allows a consumer future utilisation of health 
care to some extent, which is essentially regarded as obtaining entitlement to 
receive health care. This has some similarity to the choice of health insurance. 
To this extent, demand models for health insurance reviewed may have implications 
for the modelling of demand for discount cards, too. 
3.3.2 TYPES OF DEMAND MODELS 
Development of application of basic demand models to demand for health care has 
occurred in the economic literature. However, there are relatively limited 
examples of application to demand for health insurance. Health insurance is often 
incorporated as a price modifying factor in demand models for health care. In 
these studies, health care is usually a research endpoint and researchers try to 
develop a single comprehensive model of demand for health care. This is probably 
because health insurance is often organized as social insurance, which is 
compulsory and not sold in the market (Normand and Weber, 1994) . consumers do 
not choose whether to subscribe or not. Examples of demand models for health 
insurance are largely found in the U.S. where marketed private health insurance, 
for which consumers make choices, plays a major role in health care financing. 
However, even in this literature, models of consumer choices are fewer in number 
than those of employer choices, reflecting the dominance of employer decision 
making in the US market (Strombom et al., 2002). 
The purpose of this review is to specify a prototype of the model to answer the 
second research question, in which the choice of payment mechanism is featured. 
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Therefore, application to demand for health insurance is reviewed. However, this 
is relatively limited as the groundwork for the theoretical investigation in this study 
as mentioned above. 
Since consumers are assumed to subscribe to health insurance in order to consume 
health care, demand for health insurance is a derived demand from the demand for 
health care. Therefore, factors which constitute taste in the models of demand for 
health care are expected to be largely common to those in the models of demand for 
health insurance. Therefore, application of the basic models of demand for health 
care is also expected to be informative and these are reviewed in the next section. 
3.4 THEORETICAL MODELS OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE 
In this section, applications of the utility maximisation model and the expected 
utility maximisation model to demand for health care and demand for health 
insurance are reviewed. 
Developments of these demand models have occurred across two dimensions. One 
dimension is the assumption concerning the way consumers gain utility from the 
consumption of health care and health insurance, which fundamentally refers to the 
nature of these commodities. The other dimension is the incorporation of variables, 
which are intuitively important in determining consumer taste. 
In the following, demand models for health care are classified into four groups 
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according to these dimensions. The demand models for health insurance are 
reviewed separately as a fifth group. Algebraic presentations of the models are 
shown in Appendix 1. Assumptions and treatment of factors incorporated in the 
reviewed models are examined focusing on their relevance to the modelling of 
demand in order to answer the second research question ofthis study. 
3.4.1 SIMPLE UTILITY MAXIMISATION MODEL 
The first group of the five may be called the Simple Utility Maximisation Model. 
Health care is regarded as a consumption good in the models in this group. It is 
assumed that consumers gain utility directly from the consumption of health care. 
The more they consume health care, the more they are satisfied. It can be said 
that this is a straightforward application of the utility maximisation model to 
health care. 
Joseph (1971) developed one of the prototypes of this group. He incorporated the 
price of health care, the price of other goods, and income to his model, all of which 
are conventional variables incorporated in the utility maximisation model for 
consumption goods. 
Acton (1975) made one of the influential extensions of Joseph's model introducing 
time price. He noticed the time consuming nature of receiving health care and 
considered that the resources a consumer has to give up when demanding health 
care is not only cash but also time. His model assumes that time price plays an 
important role in rationing as well as cash price. This assumption is used in a 
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number of following models. 
In these models, consumer demand for health care relies on its own price, the price 
of other goods, income and consumer tastes. Elasticities may behave as for any 
ordinary consumption good, that is, negative price elasticity, and positive income 
elasticity if health care is a 'normal' good. 
In order to answer the second specific research question, three critical points need 
to be examined in considering the prototype of the model. 
The first point is the way consumers gain utility. In these applied models, health 
care is assumed as a consumption good, which means these models do not explicitly 
reflect the fact that the consumption of health care is often not enjoyable, and that 
consumers who consider themselves healthy enough refrain from consuming health 
care. Therefore, this assumption is a substantial simplification regarding demand 
for health care, and different assumptions are made in the models in the following 
groupS. 
However, since the choice of voluntary prepayment or discount card over user fees is 
considered to provide entitlement to receive health care, the choice has to be 
understood as related to the associated entitled quantities of health care. It is 
plausible that consumers gain more satisfaction through an entitlement to a greater 
quantity of health care. This suggests that modelling health care as a consumer 
good may not be inappropriate. 
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The second critical point is the treatment of price. Price is a conventional factor in 
the utility maximisation model and thought of as influential to the choice of 
payment mechanism in this study as well. In Joseph's model, price is defined as 
an unit cost of health care and compared with prices of other goods. In this study, 
the "prices" of alternative payment mechanisms, defined as the costs of choosing 
payment mechanisms according to the fee schedule, are not comparable 
straightforwardly, since it is difficult to formulate the cost per unit of entitlement 
obtainable by paying premium, purchasing discount cards, or choosing user fees. 
For the comparison of price factors in the modelling of this study, comparison of unit 
cost of health care depending on the choice of payment mechanisms may be useful, 
assuming that demand for alternative payment mechanisms is a derived demand 
for health care. 
Time price is featured in Acton's model. Time price may be influential in the choice 
of alternative payment mechanisms in this study. For example, time cost related 
to the choice of payment mechanisms may be higher when choosing voluntary 
prepayment than user fees, if it is necessary to travel to pay the premium on a 
monthly basis, for example. The time price of each choice can be complicated 
depending on arrangements for payment in practice. The price comparison in 
terms of cash price is already complicated as above mentioned. It may be wise to 
take the simpler approach of Joseph than to attempt to model the complications 
introduced by Acton's approach, and to disregard time price, in order to make the 
demand model more operational. 
The third critical point is the treatment of income. The prediction of these models 
67 
is that income elasticity is positive on the assumption that health care is a normal 
good. This is insufficiently powerful in explaining the effect of income level on 
choice since one of the endpoints of this study is the distribution of health care 
among people with different levels of income. An alternative approach is needed. 
3.4.2 HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION MODEL 
The second group of models consists of Household Production Models. What 
makes this group different from the first group is the approach taken in the 
underlying theory of consumer choice. Household production theory, initiated by 
Becker (Secker, 1965) assumes that consumers are involved in production as well as 
in consumption activities, and that they gain utility from fundamental commodities 
produced at home when they consume goods and services. In these models, health 
is regarded as such a fundamental commodity. Health care is regarded as an input 
to household production as well. 
Holtsman and Olsen (1976) undertook the first application of household production 
theory to health care focused on dental care. In their model, households were 
assumed to gain utility not directly from the consumption of dental care but from 
the dental hygiene produced at home using inputs of market goods and personal 
time. Dental care is regarded as one of the inputs obtained in the market. Dental 
hygiene is regarded as an endogenous variable with a production function, which is 
produced at home, and increases utility. The predicted effects of variables in this 
model are similar to those of Acton's model, although the approach taken is 
different. 
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Heller (1982) extended this model in the context of the demand for health in Malaysia. 
In his health production function, health is assumed to be produced with preventive 
health services, which are separated from curative health services, and a composite 
of other goods and services. In addition, the form of production function is 
assumed to differ among individuals depending on their age, the hygienic quality of 
their home environment, and the virulence of disease agents in their community. 
In his utility function, utility is assumed to derive from the consumption of 
preventive health services, the discretionary purchase of medical care, and a 
composite of other goods and services. Discretionary health care is separated from 
necessary curative health care through the introduction of a health need function. 
This model is innovative in three respects compared with Holtsman and Olsen's 
model. Firstly, Heller incorporated several variables into his model, which he 
considered important to explain demand. Some of them are especially important 
in the context of developing countries. For example, preventive services, age, 
hygienic quality of home environment, and virulence of disease agents in the 
community were incorporated. Secondly, he defined health need, which was an 
intuitively important variable, as an inverse function of health status and 
incorporated this explicitly into his model. Thirdly, he divided curative health care 
into necessary and discretionary components, and assumed that households gain 
utility from discretionary health care. Among his wide range of predictions, one 
interesting result on the effect of price is that demand for necessary health care may 
not decrease even when price increases. This is derived fro111 the separation of 
necessary health care from discretionary health care. 
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The assumptions based on the household production theory and the treatment of 
various incorporated factors in Heller's model are to be examined in considering the 
prototype of the model to answer the second specific research question of this study. 
The assumption that consumers gain utility from health produced at home can be 
used for theoretical modelling of this study, because it is reasonable to assume that 
the demand for alternative payment mechanisms is a derived demand from health 
care, which is in turn a derived demand from health, a fundamental commodity. 
However, this assumption of two tier derivation of demand may make the 
theoretical model too complicated to be operational. Assumptions concerning the 
way consumers gain utility similar to the ones in the Simple Utility Maximisation 
Models may work better in explaining consumer choice among alternative payment 
mechanisms. 
However, introduction ofthe health production function is informative from another 
point of view. Quality of care, which is featured in previous studies on cost 
recovery policy in Sub'Saharan Africa as reviewed in Chapter 2, can be interpreted 
as a level of productivity of health care to produce health. This interpretation may 
be useful for the way quality of care is treated. 
The variety of factors incorporated according to the context of health care in 
developing countries, as in Heller's model, can provide a basis for identifying factors 
to be incorporated into the model of this study. For example, health status is 
considered influential in the choice of alternative payment mechanism in this study, 
since risk is regarded as one of the reasons why consumers choose to subscribe to 
insurance in the literature (e.g. Varian, 1992; Parkin and King, 1995) and the 
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health risk of consumers is assumed to be associated with their health status. The 
way Heller incorporates health status may be informative for the modelling in this 
study. 
3.4.3 HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL 
The third group of models is based on the Human Capital or Grossman Model 
(Grossman, 1972). Grossman applied Becker's approach to the theory of consumer 
behaviour, human capital theory (Becker, 1964), to health care. 
Becker, dealing with demand for education, suggested that education embodied in a 
human is a type of capital because it can increase income in the future. 
Accordingly, Grossman assumes that the individual owns a stock of health capital 
and derives utility over a lifetime from his stock of good health. Health care is 
regarded as an investment good as well as a consumption good. 
The model explains consumer choice between investment in health and in other 
utility increasing arguments within his/her discounted lifetime income. Two 
sub, models are reduced with further assumptions; health care being regarded as 
purely an investment good or purely a consumption good. Based on these models, 
Grossman suggests a positive relationship between demand for health care and age, 
wage rates and education. 
This model is an elegant application of human capital theory to health care. 
However, it is important to distinguish the nature of economic phenomenon 
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modelled from those in previous models in the first and second groups. This model 
illustrates the individual's health care consumption pattern over a life time rather 
than individual's choice of health care consumption at a given point in time and in a 
given market condition, which is the context of this study. Therefore, the human 
capital model is not considered to be helpful for this study. 
3.4.4 DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL 
The fourth group, Discrete Choice Models, explain consumer choice among 
alternative methods of obtaining health care. Consumers are assumed to choose 
an alternative, which brings them the highest utility. When assessing utilities 
from each alternative, they are assumed to take price, budget, social, demographic 
and biological variables into account. 
Akin et al. (1985) initiated this group of models in the context of the Philippines. 
Social, demographic and biological control variables were considered important in 
explaining demand for health care in a developing country context. The 
assumption of discrete choice was justified on the basis that most people in 
developing countries were considered to have limited alternatives. Although this 
model incorporates various variables, which are intuitively important, it does not 
predict their effect without further assumptions. In the context of developing 
countries, a number of studies use models within this group (e.g. Bolduc et aI., 1996; 
Tembon, 1996). 
This approach IS considered helpful in formulating the modelling in this study 
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which is concerned with a limited number of payment mechanism options (three). 
It is considered a reasonable approximation to the process of choice of payment 
mechanisms that three independent utility functions are compared and the one 
yielding the greatest utility is chosen. 
However, this type of model is not informative as to how various factors, which are 
intuitively influential in the demand for health care affect the choice, since 
variables in the utility function are treated in a linear form. No theory of the role 
of variable interaction in explaining choice is associated with this approach. This 
type of model is rather a conceptual framework for empirical analysis based on 
quantitative data, and not theoretically operational. Since the modelling for the 
second research question aims to present an explanation for the way consumers 
choose alternative payment mechanisms through not only the empirical but also the 
theoretical investigation, the treatments of variables in the Discrete Choice Model 
reviewed here are thought of as insufficient. 
3.4.5 MODELS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 
As mentioned above, there are relatively few models of demand for health insurance. 
In this section, two types of models are reviewed. The first type of model aims to 
explain the consumer's subscription to insurance including health insurance in 
preference to paying user fees. The second type provides specifications of the 
statistical model in empirical analysis based on quantitative data regarding 
demand for health insurance. 
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An example of the first type is developed by Pauly (1968). He sought to explain 
demand for insurance in general including health insurance using the expected 
utility model. In this model, the consumer is assumed to gain utility from expected 
wealth. Expected wealth depends on loss, probability ofloss, coverage of insurance, 
and premium. It predicts more insurance is consumed with more expected wealth. 
This model essentially describes the choice of payment mechanism for risky events 
applying the expected utility maximisation model. There are two critical points to 
be examined in this model in considering the prototype for the modelling of this 
study. 
Firstly, it assumes that expected utility derives from wealth. This assumption 
allows a description of the resource constraint and a formulation of uncertainty in 
resource utilisation in the expected utility maximisation model. Since health 
insurance is a form of insurance in the context of the health sector, this is applicable 
to the modelling of this study. 
Secondly, it illustrates the influence of premium on the choice by associating with 
expected wealth. This treatment is considered useful, since the variables which 
relate to the price of voluntary prepayment and discount card can be treated in a 
similar way. 
Similar models of the demand for health insurance are described in text books of 
micro economics or health economics (e.g. Parkin and King, 1995; Heshmat 2000. 
These are considered to follow Pauly rather than constituting separate models. 
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In these models, the consumer faces the choice of insurance or a gamble, and gains 
utility from the expected value of the outcome. He/she is assumed to know the 
monetary values associated with the outcome of risky events, and to calculate 
expected values associated with hislher choice, summing up the products of each 
outcome's probability of occurrence and its value. This model may be called the 
Expected Value Model. 
In this model, the choice of purchasing insurance is made by comparing expected 
utility associated with the probability of occurrence of an event with negative utility 
consequences, and a certain utility associated with wealth net of an insurance 
premium. When the expected value and certain value are equal, the expected 
value is called the certainty equivalent. 
Forms of individual utility function depending on attitudes toward risk are also 
considered in this model. A risk averse consumer is assumed to have a utility 
function representing diminishing marginal utility of wealth; a risk neutral 
consumer is assumed to have a utility function without diminishing marginal utility 
of wealth; and a risk loving consumer is assumed to have a utility function with 
increasing marginal utility of wealth. 
The model explains that a risk averse consumer may purchase insurance even when 
expected value is less than the certainty equivalent, since certainty is valuable to 
him/her. Phelps (1997) formulated this difference between the certainty 
equivalent and the expected value by defining as the risk premium, which can be 
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interpreted as the cost of uncertainty borne by the insurer. 
There is one critical point to be examined in this model in considering the prototype 
for the modelling of this study which is that it may be helpful to model the 
consumer's attitude toward risk by formulating alternative utility functions. When 
expressing a utility function in an equation form, use of the risk premium as a term 
is likely to be helpful. 
A different type of model is exemplified by Holmer (1984). In this model, 
households pick one insurance plan from optional plans available in the market. 
They are assumed to choose one plan and spend their remaining income on other 
goods in order to maximise their utility. Although these models are developed 
independently from the Discrete Choice Model reviewed in the previous section, the 
basic frameworks are similar. Holmer concentrates on the specification of this 
choice framework into a statistical model for the purpose of empirical analysis 
rather than seeking to explain how utility derives from the interaction of various 
factors. In this sense, this model has the same problem as Akin's model (1985). 
Holmer selects variables which could relate to utility through literature review of 
empirical studies and intuition, and applies regression analysis straightforwardly 
for these variables without consideration of theoretical relationships among utility 
and these variables. Therefore, this model is thought of as useful only as an 
example to guide the empirical rather than theoretical work of this study, similar to 
Discrete Choice Model, which is considered helpful in formulating the modelling of a 
limited number of payment mechanism options (three). 
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Holmer's model is followed by several studies of empirical estimation of demand 
functions; some focus on the effect of price on consumer's choice (Short and Taylor, 
1989; Royality and Solomon, 1999; Strombom et al., 2002) and recently others on 
the significance of quality (e.g. Chernew and Scanlon, 1998; Rarris et al., 2002). 
3.5 PROTOTYPE OF THE MODEL FOR THIS STUDY 
In this section, the prototype of a theoretical model addressing the second research 
question is specified based on the literature review in previous sections. Three 
points are discussed: formulation of choice of three alternatives, basic model, source 
of utility, and consumer's attitude toward risk. 
Firstly, since the second specific research question focuses on choosing one option 
out of three independent payment mechanisms, the comparison framework seen in 
Akin's model (1985) and Holmer's model (1984) is taken as a prototype. However, 
these models lack theoretical underpinnings, as discussed above. In this study, it 
is preferred to develop more detailed hypotheses concerning the interaction of 
variables in consumers' utility functions to guide the selection of variables for 
empirical analysis. 
Secondly, the choice of payment mechanism in this study is a choice in the face of 
risk. The expected utility maximisation model, as developed by Pauly for health 
insurance (1968) is considered a useful basic model for this study. The expected 
utility function of each payment mechanism is formulated by adding variables 
related to financial arrangements and factors related to tastes to this model. 
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Thirdly, wealth is considered an important factor as a source of utility m 
subscribing to insurance as described in Pauly's model (1968). In addition, as 
demand for health insurance is considered a derived demand from demand for 
health care, and demand for health care is considered a derived demand from 
demand for health, the quantity of health care obtainable and the health status 
after consuming health care are considered to be important factors as a source of 
utility in subscribing to health insurance or purchasing discount cards. This is 
consistent with the notion that health insurance reduces two types of risk, financial 
risk and health risk. 
Finally, consumer attitude toward risk is relevant to the choice of purchasing health 
insurance. The concept of risk premium employed by Phelps is useful in order to 
incorporate this factor into the model in this study. 
Based on these discussions, the theoretical model addressing the second specific 
research question is elaborated in Chapter 6, after more detailed discussion 
identifying variables that represent important factors in Chapter 5. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 4 
UTERATURE REVIEW III 
STATISTICAL MODEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the groundwork for the empirical 
investigation of how people choose alternative payment mechanisms, through 
literature review. In the empirical investigation of this study, a theoretical 
demand model elaborated from those specified in the section 3.5 will be tested using 
regression analysis and the data collected. There are various statistical models or 
ways of quantification in regression analysis. The model to be developed will 
employ the utility maximisation model as a basis and will use the discrete choice 
formulation. These two steps in the model building process lay the foundations for 
the regression analysis. 
This chapter starts by reviewing the idea that underlies the regression analysis of 
the utility maximisation model. Then, the relevance of the discrete choice 
formulation to specify the statistical model is reviewed. This is followed by 
consideration of the introduction of use ofthe qualitative response model in section 
4.3. Qualitative response models for binary choice, (the probit and logit models), 
and their expansions to multinomial choice are reviewed in section 4.4. Finally, 
the choice of the logit formulation is justified in section 4.5. 
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4.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND THE UTILITY MAXIMISATION MODEL 
Regression analysis is a statistical technique that attempts to "explain" movements 
in one variable, the dependent variable, as a function of the movements in a set of 
other variables, called the independent (or explanatory) variables, through the 
quantification of a single equation (Studenmund, 1996). In order to empirically 
analyze economic phenomena using observed data, regression analysis is usually 
employed, since most economic propositions (though not an) can be expressed in 
such single equation functional forms (Studenmund, 1996). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the consumer's choice of alternative payment 
mechanisms will be theoretically modelled based on a basic economic theory of 
consumer's choice, that is, the utility maximisation model. In principle, the utility 
maximisation model is transformed into a single equation for the purpose of 
regression analysis in the following way (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
The utility maximisation model in a general form, which models consumer's choice 
of consumption of n items within his/her income, is formulated as below (Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980): 
Maximise U(q) 
Subject to: 
where U = utility function 
P = (pl,p2, ... ,pn) 
Pk = price of each item 
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qk = quantity of each item 
x= income 
This model explains that a consumer chooses to consume each item in a way which 
maximises hislher utility within hislher income. 
This formulation is transformed into a single equation, which 1S called the 
Marshallian demand function (after Marshall, 1920): 
( k = 1, 2, ... , n ) 
This equation can be interpreted as follows: the quantity of each item demanded is a 
function of income and the price of each item under consideration. In empirically 
examining this equation with regression analysis, the quantity of each item 
demanded is a dependent variable and income and the price of each item are 
independent variables. When quantities demanded are observed under various 
sets of income and prices, an empirical demand function can be estimated by 
regression analysis through the quantification of this equation. 
4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR QUALITATIVE RESPONSE 
Although the use of regression analysis is introduced and the underlying idea of 
applying regression analysis for the utility maximisation model is clarified in the 
previous section, an appropriate statistical model needs to be chosen in the 
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quantification of the equation accordingly, and there are many alternatives to 
quantify the same equation (Studenmund, 1996). The demand model chosen uses 
the discrete choice formulation. 
An important characteristic of the discrete choice formulation in considering 
quantification approaches is that this formulation models the consumer's 
qualitative response rather than quantitative response. In other words, the 
consumer's choice modelled is not how much a payment mechanism is used but 
which payment mechanism is chosen, consistent with the consumer choice observed 
being not the quantities of payment mechanisms demanded but choice among 
available alternative payment mechanism options. 
In economics, it is often the case that the economic phenomenon to be modelled 
involves qualitative response rather than quantitative response (Maddala, 1983, 
Greene, 1997). For example, participation in the labour market and decision 
making in relation to the purchase of expensive durable goods are examples of 
qualitative responses. The data observed from these choices are categories the 
subject belongs to. In applying regression analysis to these economic phenomena, 
the dependent variable is always discrete and limited. The more conventional 
quantification used for regression analysis, the linear regression model, assumes a 
continuous dependent variable. This is usually not fit for dealing with a discrete 
and limited dependent variable (Greene, 1997), and another approach to regression 
analysis, the qualitative response model, is often employed (Amemiya, 1985; 
Maddala, 1983). Since the choice modelled and observed in the second research 
question, the choice of one payment mechanism among three alternatives is discrete 
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and limited, a qualitative response model is employed in the empirical analysis of 
this study. 
4.4 QUALITATIVE RESPONSE MODELS 
There are several types of qualitative response models in regression analysis. 
These models can be classified into two groups according to the number of responses 
(Amemiya, 1994). Binary response models apply when the number of qualitative 
responses is limited to two; multinomial response models, when the number of 
qualitative responses is three or more. Since under the second research question, 
two alternative payment mechanisms are available to those using health centres 
outside the discount card trial, and three alternative payment mechanisms are 
available to those using health centres inside the discount card trial, qualitative 
response models for both binary response and multinomial response are reviewed 
for the empirical analysis of this study in the following. 
4.4.1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR BINARY RESPONSE 
This section considers the choice between two options, for example, "A" or "B". In 
order to describe consumer's qualitative response in regression analysis, dummy 
variables are usually used (Greene, 1997). For example, when Y is used to describe 
the dependent variable, let "0" represent the choice of "A", and "1" to represent the 
choice of "B". In analyzing this binary response, especially the choice of "B" 
instead of "A", the probability ofY being "1" is examined coupled with independent 
variables which are thought to have impacts on the movement of this probability. 
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For example, in the case of choosing whether or not to purchase expensive durable 
goods, the choice of purchase is described as "1", otherwise "0". In the context of 
this study, the choice of voluntary prepayment as opposed to user fees outside the 
discount card trial is the probability to be examined. 
In the quantification of qualitative response models for binary choice, let vector Xi 
be a set of variables, which are considered to have impacts on the probability of the 
i th individual's choice, Yi; and let vector a be a set of parameters, which reflects the 
impact of changes in Xi on the probability. The probabilities of Yi being" 1" or "0" 
are written as a function F* of Xi as below: 
Prob (Yi = 11 X) = F*( X , a) 
Prob (Yi = 0 1 Xi) = 1 . F*( X, a) 
The problem of the quantification of regression analysis here is choosing a 
functional form of F*. One of the simplest candidates associated with conventional 
linear regression models is a linear probability model as below: 
F*(X, a) = a'X 
However, this formulation allows the value of F*( Xi , a) to be more than one or less 
than zero depending on the value of .(\~. This is inconsistent with the definition of 
probability, which is no less than 0 and no more than 1. In order to overcome the 
shortcomings of choosing a simpler linear equation, assumptions such as 
interpreting the out of range values of F*( X, a) as 1 or 0 have been made in the 
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past (e.g. Fisher 1936; Ladd, 1966). But these statistical models are rarely used 
these days, since the fitness of the model around F*( X , a) being 1 or 0 is bad 
(Maddala, 1983; Mukherjee et aI., 1998). In other words, squeezing the out of 
range values into 1 or 0 is too crude as an approximation. 
Most current and commonly used regression analysis for qualitative response and 
binary choice is built on an additional assumption (Maddala, 1983; Amemiya, 1985), 
the index function approach (Greene, 1997). This assumes that the outcome of a 
discrete choice reflects an underlying regression by the introduction of a 
hypothetical factor Y\, which determines the ith individual's choice whether Yi 
equals 1 or O. In the underlying regression, Y*i is an unobservable continuous 
variable, but is assumed to be written as the sum of systematically determined 
components depending on X ,of which part is a:Y;, and an error term, of which a 
component is £i, similar to conventional linear regression models. This is written 
Y\ = a~Y;+ £i 
Then, Yi is assumed to be determined by the sign ofY\ as below: 
Yi = 1 ifY*; > 0 
Yi = 0 otherwise 
In this formulation, Yi is called the index function. 
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This formulation can be explained with an example. In the case of purchasing 
expensive durable goods, the consumer's choice is the result of his/her calculation of 
marginal benefit and marginal cost when spending hislher income on the durable 
good or on other goods. However, net benefit is unobservable in principle, and 
what is observable is whether the good is purchased or not. Therefore, Y\ is 
defined as the difference between benefit and cost, so that the sign of Y\ 
corresponds to the observation of whether the goods are purchased or not, since a 
consumer purchases the goods when benefit exceeds cost. 
Alternatively, this equation can be directly induced from the discussion of utility 
(Greene, 1997). Suppose that VOi and Vii represent the ith individual's utilities 
between the two choices, the choice of "A" and the choice of "B", respectively. An 
individual chooses "B" instead of "A", when the utility of choosing "B" is more than 
the utility of choosing "A", which is written as below: 
Vii> VUi 
\Vhen Vii and VOi are assumed to be written as the sum of a systematically 
determined component, of which a~Y;, is part and an error term, of which a 
component is £i, and Y\ is defined as the difference between Vti and VOi. Then, Y\ 
is written as: 
Y\ = a~Y; + £i 
And the sign of Y\ corresponds to the observation of whether the goods are 
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purchased or not, since a consumer purchases the goods when utility of purchase 
exceeds utility of spending hislher income on other goods. 
With this formulation, the probability ofYi being "1" is written as below: 
Prob (Yi = 11 X) = Prob (Y*i > 0 ) 
= Prob (Ei> - aX) 
A statistical model for binary choice is developed on top of this formulation with 
assumptions regarding the error term, Ei. Suppose Ei is subject to proper, 
continuous probability distribution defined over the real line, and let F be the 
cumulative probability distribution function of - Ei. The probability is written as: 
Prob (Yi = 11 Xi) = F (a X) 
With this formulation, the probability stays within the 0-1 interval, overcoming the 
shortcomings of the linear regression model as below: 
lim Prob (Yi = 11 X) = 1 
a'Xj4cC 
lim Prob (Yi = 11 X) = 0 
a'Xi --+-00 
1\vo alternative probability distributions for the error term are commonly used in 
empirical analysis of qualitative response under binary choice: standard normal 
distribution and logistic distribution (Greene, 1997; Amemiya, 19!.H), although 
other distributions have been suggested (AId rich and Nelson, 1984). The 
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statistical model assuming standard normal distribution is usually called the probit 
model (Finney, 1971); and logistic distribution, the logit model <Ashton, 1972). 
These two models are reviewed in the following. 
In the pro bit model, the error term Ei is assumed to be subject to standard normal 
distribution. Since standard normal distribution is symmetric with a mean of 0, 
the cumulative probability distribution function of - Ei and Ei are similar. Therefore, 
the cumulative probability distribution of the standard normal distribution function 
<l>(Z) is assumed as F, and the probability ofYi being "1" can be written as below: 
The standard normal distribution is an intuitively reasonable assumption because 
it is often used for describing error terms in other regression models. 
In the logit model, the error term Ei is assumed to be subject to logistic distribution. 
Since logistic distribution is also symmetric with a mean of 0, the cumulative 
probability distribution function of - Ei and Ei are similar. Therefore, the 
cumulative probability distribution of logistic distribution function A(z) is assumed 
as F, and the probability ofYi being "1" can be written as below: 
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e= 
A(z) = 
1 +e= 
Prob (Yi = 11 xd = F ( a X) 
=A(aX) 
Logistic distribution is used because it has mathematical convenience in that the 
distribution function is expressed in a relatively simple form, and the logarithm of 
the ratio of Prob (Yi = 11 X) and Prob (Yi = 0 1 X) is a linear function of X . The 
latter is written as below: 
log {Prob (Yi = 11 X) / Prob (Yi = 0 1 X)} = a~· X 
Since there are two commonly used statistical models for binary response: probit 
model and logit model, a researcher needs to choose the appropriate one in carrying 
out hislher empirical analysis. However, in comparing standard normal 
distribution and logistic distribution, there is only a slight difference in the tails of 
the distributions. Both distributions tend to bring out similar probabilities on the 
real line, and the results from regression analysis are likely to be similar as well. 
Although Amemiya (1985) discusses the comparison between probit model and logit 
models for binary response in detail, there is no general guide on how to choose from 
these models when analysing a particular data set (Greene, 1997). In practice, a 
researcher may choose the probit model, giving greater weight to the use of the 
normal distribution as in conventional regression models, or the logit model giving 
greater weight to mathematical convenience CAmemiya, 1993). 
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These models include unknown parameters, a, so that they need to be estimated 
using observed data drawn from samples. These estimations are usually based on 
the method of maximum likelihood (Greene, 1997). The joint probability or 
likelihood function is written with function F, as below: 
L(a) = n F(Xi'a) n {l-F(Xi'a)} 
Yi=1 Yi=O 
Most statistical software currently used in econometrics is equipped to estimate a 
with this likelihood function. This is one of the reasons why the linear probability 
function is now rarely used (Greene 1997). 
It is important to note that the parameters of the probit model and logit model are 
not the marginal effects as in conventional linear regression models when 
interpreting the estimated models. Let Xk be the kth element of the vector of 
independent variables 4Y, and let Uk be the kth element of a. Then, the derivative of 
the probabilities given by the linear probability model, probit model, and logit 
model are written as below: 
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X'a 
_a_ A(X' a) = _e __ u 
aX
k 
(1 + eX'a)2 k 
= A(X'a){l-A(X'a)} 
The derivative of the probabilities given by the linear probability model is a 
constant and the estimated parameter Uk represents the marginal effect ofXk, while 
the values of those derivatives given by probit model and logit model vary 
depending on the values of .. ,\'; and the parameter Uk does not represent the marginal 
effect of Xk. Therefore, marginal effects in probit model and logit model need to be 
calculated according to the values of independent variables. It is useful to 
calculate slope parameters or derivatives by means of independent variables or 
some appropriate level of independent variables in interpreting the estimated 
variables (Greene, 1997). Logit model is mathematically convenient for this 
purpose, since the derivative is written only with the estimated function as above 
described. 
The maximum likelihood estimators of probit and logit models are not unbiased 
estimators in general, but consistent estimators in general. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to know the exact distribution of estimators uk ' but their asymptotic 
distributions are normal by the nature of maximum likelihood estimators, 
Therefore, the t-test is applicable in the same manner as conventional linear 
regression analysis, This is the case with slope parameters as well. 
4.4.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR MULTINOMIAL RESPONSE 
The qualitative response models for binary response can be expanded in the case of 
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multinomial response. In this section, multinomial probit and logit models, which 
are straightforward expansions of probit and logit models are reviewed. 
Ternary choice, that is, the choice among three, can be modelled in a similar manner 
as by the probit model reviewed in the previous section (Thurstone, 1927). Ternary 
choice is described with dummy variables. For example, when Y is used for 
describing the dependent variable in regression analysis, let "0" represent the 
choice of "A", "1" the choice of "B", and "2" the choice of "C". The probabilities of Y 
being "0", "1", or "2" are examined coupled with independent variables, which are 
considered to have impact on the movement of these probabilities. For example, in 
the case of choosing transportation between London and Edinburgh, the choice of 
car is described "0", train "1", and plane "2". In the context of this study, the 
ternary choice in question is determined by the probability of choosing either user 
fees, voluntary prepayment, or discount card at health centres where both 
voluntary prepayment and discount card are available. 
In expanding the probit model for ternary choice, let UiO be the ith individual's utility 
of choosing "A", UI "B", and Ui2 "C", respectively. Then, the condition of the ith 
individual's choice is written as: 
Yi = 0, when UIO > UI and Uo > U2 
Yi = 1, when Ul > Uu and UI > Ui2 
Yi = 2. when Uz > Uo and U2 > UI 
Additionally. suppose that the ith individual's utility of choosing option j is written 
92 
as a sum of systematically determined components depending on independent 
variables ~lij and error term Eij, this is written as: 
U;j = ~ij + Eij 
The choice depends solely on the relative size of Vij. Let U*ij be the difference 
between Uij and U i~, which is written as: 
where Vij = ~ij • ~iO, E*ij = Eij • EiO 
Then, the condition of the ith individual's choice is written with U*ij as: 
Yi = 0, when 0 > U*il and 0 > U*i2 
Yi = 1, when U*il > 0 and U*il > U*i2 
Yi = 2, when U*i2 > 0 and U*i2 > U*il 
In the quantification of the probit model for ternary choice, the error terms (E*il, 
E*i2) are assumed to be subject to bivariate normal distribution. This formulation 
can be expanded for the qualitative response model for multinomial choice 
assuming that error terms are subject to multivariate normal distribution, 
Through the use of multivariate normal distribution in this formulation, error 
terms are consistent with a popular assumption in the conventional regression 
model, which makes this formulation natural and understandable, the computation 
of multiple integral is required in estimating parameters with this formulation. 
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For example, let !(f.l, d be joint probability function Of(f.*il, f.*i2). The probability 
ofYi being 1 in the case of ternary choice is written as below: 
co Vil-V,.,+€I 
Pil = J{ Jf(£I'£2)d£2}d£1 
Due to the difficulty in the computation of the multiple integral, the multinomial 
probit model is rarely used in empirical studies. 
The log it model reviewed in the previous chapter can be expanded to ternary choice 
in a relatively simple manner (McFadden, 1974). Suppose that the ith individual's 
utility of choosing option j is written as a sum of systematically determined 
components depending on independent variables ~lij and error term Eij, this is the 
same as the case of mu ltinomia I probit model, which is written as: 
Vij= ~ij+ Eij 
Then, the multinomial logit model is formulated assuming the error terms Eij are 
independent and their cumulative distribution function is type I extreme-value 
distribution or log Weibull distribution ofz, which is written as: 
exp(-exp( -z» 
For example, the probability ofYi being 1 in the case of ternary choice is written as 
below: 
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Pil = Prob (HI> UiO, ViI> Ui2 ) 
= Prob ( tit + ~il - ~iO > EiO, Eil + ~il - ~li2 > Ei2 ) 
ao £1 -Pil-P;O £1-11;1-#;2 
= Jf(el ){ Jf(eo)deo} { Jf(e2)de2}de l 
2 
= exp(~il)/ I exp('uij) 
j=O 
2 
= exp(~il- ~iO)/Iexp{,Uij - JliO) 
j=O 
Estimating parameters under multinomial logit is mathematically convenient 
which makes the multinomial logit model more often used in empirical studies 
(Maddala, 1984). This formulation can also be expanded to the qualitative 
response model for multinomial choice. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In order to empirically analyze the economic phenomenon under consideration, that 
is, the consumer's choice of alternative direct payment mechanisms, regression 
analysis is employed in this study. A theoretical model which explains the choice 
based on utility maximisation is transformed into a single equation, the 
Marshallian demand function for the purpose of regression analysis as described in 
section 4.2. The method for quantifying this equation is determined by the 
formulation of a theoretical model, which is the discrete choice model. The 
qualitative response model, which is a statistical model, is useful and often used for 
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quantifying discrete choice. In the quantification of the qualitative response under 
binary choice, there are two commonly used statistical models: probit model and 
logit model. In principle, these two models are interchangeable in empirical 
analysis, since both tend to produce similar results from the same observed data set. 
A researcher can choose either according to hislher emphasis on the consistency 
with conventional linear regression models III formulation, or mathematical 
convenience. Both models can be expanded to the estimation of multinomial 
response. However, the multinomial probit model presents difficulty in the 
estimation of parameters, while the multinomiallogit model is operational in this 
computation, due to its mathematical convenience. 
The empirical analysis of this study involves ternary choice among direct payment 
mechanisms, so the logit and multinomial logit models will be employed in 
analysing the data collected through the surveys. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHOD 
STUDY DESIGN 
5.1 FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
In order to answer three research questions specified in Chapter 2, this study 
employs the framework of econometrics. Econometric study aims to elaborate a 
theoretical model explaining economic phenomena, by reference to evidence from 
observed data. Therefore, the study consists of two investigations: theoretical 
investigation, or modelling, and empirical investigation, or data collection and 
analysis. Policy implications are drawn from both theoretical and empirical 
findings. 
In this study, two theoretical demand models are elaborated that correspond to the 
first and second specific research questions: "how do people seek health care under 
each payment mechanism?" and "how do people choose alternative payment 
mechanisms?". Then, theoretical equity implications, responding to the third 
specific research question, are drawn from the combination of these demand models. 
Supporting evidence for these theoretical models and implications are sought from 
the analysis of data collected in the field. 
In the next section, the strategy for theoretical modelling is described. This starts 
with an explanation of methodological ground, followed by the strategy taken in this 
study. In section 5.3, background theory for modelling is introduced and factors to 
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be modelled are specified. The specification of factors is preparation for both 
theoretical investigation and empirical investigation. In 5.4 the strategy for data 
collection is described. The variables to be collected are specified based on the 
specification of factors in the previous section, and three data sources are identified. 
In section 5.5, the protocols for data collection are described. After reference to the 
use of Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998 data, methods of collecting data 
from records and conducting outpatient questionnaire survey at health centres are 
described. Finally, in 5.6, the strategy for the data analysis is described. 
5.2 STRATEGY FOR THEORETICAL MODELLING 
There are two strategies of theoretical modelling in econometrics: traditional 
modelling and modern modelling (Mukherjee et al., 1998). In the following, both 
strategies are briefly compared. 
The point in distinguishing two strategies is the role of data III modelling. 
Theoretical modelling and data analysis are not independent. In traditional 
modelling, a specific to general approach, the theoretical model is supposed to guide 
the empirical analysis of data, and the model is tested by the data. The use of data 
is limited to the test of hypotheses generated by theoretical considerations. In 
principle, once the model fails the test, researchers are expected to restart 
theoretical modelling again and test all over again with brand new data. 
In modern modelling, on the contrary. the data is supposed to guide the refinements 
of the theoretical model in addition to hypothesis testing. Modern modelling has 
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several variations such as general to specific modelling (Charemza and Deadman, 
1992), exploratory data analysis (Tu key, 1977), or fragility or sensitivity analysis 
(Leamer, 1983). In general to specific approach, researchers first develop the 
model, which covers the hypothesis based on opposing theories. Then, the model is 
refined through testing. In exploratory data analysis, researchers focus on the 
behaviour of residuals (error terms in the statistical mode!), to explore hidden 
relationships. In fragility or sensitivity analysis, the model is tested with changes 
made in assumptions. The common characteristic of modern modelling in contrast 
to traditional modelling is the attitude; learning from data through modelling. 
Traditional modelling may be more scientifically sound in traditional terms. If 
there are rival theories to account for a phenomenon, tests with data may offer 
judgement without bias. However, it is difficult and costly to obtain new data sets 
to test each model in practice. Therefore, researchers tend to make ad hoc 
modifications to theoretical models behind the scenes until they succeed in tests. 
From this point of view, traditional modelling came under increasing 
methodological attack in the 1970's (Morgan, 1990). 
The approach of traditional modelling as a method of science including economics 
was also criticised in terms of epistemology. It was deemed based deeply on 
falsification theory (Popper 1957; Lakatos 1978), which is attacked by, for example, 
Feyerabend (1993), arguing that science neither had developed nor should be 
developed by falsification. As a result, scope for the theory of science was 
broadened. Guba and Lincoln (1994), for example, made distinction between 
positivism paradigm and post·positivism paradigm. While the former requires 
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rigorous hypothesis testing like traditional modelling, the latter allows interpretive 
inquiry as far as the objectivity of the investigator is kept. This epistemological 
position justifies the approach of modern modelling. 
In modern modelling, how data have been allowed to modify the model is explicitly 
discussed. '!\vo researchers with the same data set do not necessarily come to the 
same conclusion. This is particularly the case with non-experimental data. The 
data analysis involves interpretative or simplifying searches rather than hypothesis 
testing. Even when modification processes are explicitly discussed, there is a 
danger of being caught up in a circular argument. Using the data to improve the 
model and subsequently using the model to draw inferences from the data can be a 
series of ad hoc modifications with the potential to introduce bias. The problem of 
how much modification following data analysis is appropriate remains unsolved. 
Generally speaking, appropriateness depends on the nature of the economic 
phenomenon under consideration. If the phenomenon can be modelled based on 
relatively conventional theory, theory and empirical examples can provide guidance 
such as formal statistical inference. If a set of vague ideas is under consideration, 
the study is likely to involve exploratory empirical work to the point that a 
theoretical explanation is induced. 
In this study, a modern strategy, specifically, general to specific approach is taken, 
since the availability of data in developing countries including the fie Id of this study 
is by no means abundant. The study uses non-experimental survey data, which 
requires interpretative search. The study's theoretical models are elaborated 
based on both conventional and other relevant pre'existing models which guide the 
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use of data. The models which guide the exploration of the second specific research 
question have been presented in Chapter 3, and will also be discussed in the next 
section which summarises the conventional theories both for the first and second 
specific research questions. 
Although the use of the modern modelling strategy is explicitly noted here, the 
chapters of this thesis separate theoretical and empirical investigation for the 
purpose of legibility. Chapter 6 presents theoretical models that result from taking 
a general to specific approach; and Chapters 7 to 9 present empirical results 
involving interpretative searches. 
5.3 BACKGROUND THEORY FOR MODELLING AND FACTORS TO BE 
MODELLED 
In this section, the starting points for the theoretical modelling of two demand 
models are summarised in order to give explicit guidance to the use of data in the 
modelling of this study avoiding over-guidance by the data. The factors to be 
modelled in two theoretical models are then specified based on the literature 
reviews of Chapters 2 and 3. This provides preparation for both theoretical and 
empirical investigation. 
5.3.1 DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT 
MECHANISMS 
For the first specific research question, the demand for health care under 
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alternative payment mechanisms, the relationship between two factors will be 
modelled. These are, quantity of health care demanded and the financial barrier 
faced by the consumer under each payment mechanism at the point of utilisation. 
Financial barrier is interpreted as price, the opportunity cost of obtaining service. 
The difference in quantity of health care demanded between a consumer with or 
without insurance is modelled in the literature applying the law of demand (e.g. 
Jacobs, 1996; Folland et al., 1997), explaining the effect of insurance on quantity 
demanded or 'consumer moral hazard' (Pauly, 1968). Consumer moral hazard 
refers to the consumer's greater consumption of health care resulting from reduced 
cost at the point of service utilisation due to insurance subscription. Although this 
concept is generally used to explain the market failure of private (voluntary) 
insurance in the theoretical modelling of this study in Chapter 6, it is interpreted 
differently here, following the assumption that under'utilisation is more prevalent 
than over'utilisation in this context, which was introduced in Chapter 2. The 
model is expanded to model the demand for health care under alternative payment 
mechanisms. 
5.3.2 DEMAND FOR ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MECHANISMS 
For the second research question, the demand for alternative payment mechanisms, 
the consumer's choice of one payment mechanism will be modelled. The 
groundwork for this modelling is presented in Chapter 3, the theory of choice, which 
derives demand functions by examining a model of the consumer's utility 
maximising behaviour coupled with a description of underlying economic constraint. 
This utility maximisation model is regarded as a conventional theory to account for 
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demand in the literature (Varian, 1992; Nicholson, 1997). In addition, in order to 
illustrate consumer choice under uncertain conditions, the expected utility 
maximisation model, which is an expansion of the utility maximisation model 
incorporating probability, will be used (Varian, 1992; Nicholson, 1997; Chap man 
and Sonnenberg, 2000). This is also regarded as a conventional theory accounting 
for choice made in facing risky events, that is, falling ill. Additionally, the theory of 
'adverse selection' (Pauly, 1986) will be used to explain the market failure of private 
(voluntary) insurance. Under adverse selection, high risk consumers have higher 
tendency to subscribe. Again, this is a conventional theory accounting for the 
choice under consideration, although its implications are interpreted differently 
given the under-utilisation assumption. These models are expanded to model the 
demand for alternative payment mechanisms in this study. 
Three factors, which are considered to affect consumer preferences, and one factor, 
which is considered as the consumer's constraint, are incorporated in this model 
based on the literature reviews in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
Voluntary prepayments are a kind of health insurance and discount cards also have 
risk reducing properties, as argued in Chapter 3. Theoretically, the reason why a 
consumer chooses to purchase insurance is to reduce risk. In the case of health 
insurance, two types of risks, financial risk and health risk, are reduced if a 
consumer purchases insurance (Jack, 1999). Therefore, price, which determines 
financial cost, and health status of the consumer, which determines health risk, are 
incorporated in the model. 
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The price is defined as the financial cost of obtaining a health service under each 
payment mechanism, since the choice of payment mechanism is considered a 
derived demand from the demand for health services. Moreover, this is further 
operationalised to mean the financial cost paid to health centres (excluding costs of 
transport, for example), which reflects the financial barrier to health services 
associated with direct payments. 
Health status IS defined as the consumer's perception of needing health care 
services in the future, since a consumer assesses hislher own health risk based on 
hislher perception of health status not on absolute, or professionally assessed, 
health status. Moreover, this is further operationalised to mean the expected 
number of attendances at health centres in the future, on the assumption that the 
consumer is concerned about the number of episodes of common acute ailments 
treatable at primary care facilities such as health centres. 
In addition to these, variables quality of care is incorporated in the theoretical 
modelling, since it is found to affect consumer's utilisation of health care services 
under direct payments with user fees significantly (Litvack and Bodart, 1993; Diop 
et aI., 1995; Chawla, 2000), and it is found to affect the coverage of voluntary 
prepayments in the population (Creese and Bennett, 1997) in empirical studies. 
Quality of care is defined as the consumer's perception of the level of quality of 
health services he/she will receive in the future, since the consumer is considered to 
assess quality of care based on his/her perception when choosing a payment 
mechanism, not on perfect information, or professionally assessed quality of care. 
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Wealth, defined as the stock of consumer assets in monetary terms, is incorporated 
as a constraint. Wealth, rather than income, is used because a consumer is 
considered to derive satisfaction from assets, and because health care expenses can 
potentially affect the amount of consumer assets, not just the level of hislher income 
(Jacobs, 1996). Health care expenditure in low "income settings may have direct 
impact on asset holding and will not always be absorbed in reduced current 
expenditures on other goods or services (Russell, 1996) 
5.4 VARIABLES TO BE COLLECTED AND DATA SOURCES 
The target of data collection is quantitative data, which enables the test of 
theoretical models as well as the empirical discussion of equity consequences. In 
the next sub"section, the variables to be collected are specified followed by the 
discussion of the factors to be modelled in the previous section, and data sources are 
identified. 
5.4.1 VARIABLES TO BE COLLECTED 
In the model of the demand for health care, factors such as quantity of health care 
and different financial barrier faced by a consumer with each payment mechanism 
at the point of utilisation, are incorporated as discussed in section 5.3. In the 
model of the demand for alternative payment mechanisms, four factors are 
incorporated as discussed in section 5.3: price, defined as financial cost payable to 
the health centre, perceived health status, defined as expected frequency of health 
centre attendance, perceived quality of care, and wealth. Utilisation indicators, 
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especially focusing on two categories of population groups: income and choice of 
payment mechanism, are used in order to discuss equity consequences as discussed 
in section 2.2. 
Data on six variables, which represent the following factors: choice of payment 
mechanism, utilisation, financial cost of health centre visit, wealth, expected 
frequency of attendance at health centre, and perceived quality of care, should be 
collected for the purpose of empirical analysis of the two theoretical models. 
Income and choice of payment mechanism should be collected for the purpose of the 
discussion of equity consequences focusing on two categories of population groups. 
Both wealth and income represent economic status of a consumer. Since wealth is 
usually difficult to measure in empirical investigation, income is collected and used 
as a proxy for wealth in the data collection. 
5.4.2 DATA SOURCES 
For the collection ofthese variables, three data sources are used in this study. These 
enable the compilation of the needed variables at the needed levels of analysis. 
5.4.2.1 LMNG CONDITIONS MONITORING SURVEY 1998 
The first source is the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998 (LCMS98). This 
is a nation wide sample household survey carried out by the Central Statistical 
Office of Zambia, which aims to monitor the effects of government policies on 
households and individuals. The access to health care by households and 
106 
individuals, especially by economically disadvantaged groups is one of the featured 
areas of investigation in this survey. The data set for the two districts of the study, 
Lusaka and Kitwe, are available in this survey. LCMS98 is the best data available 
but it has limitations. It lacks two of the six variables needed. Expected 
frequency of attendance at health centre and perceived quality of care are not 
surveyed. Additionally, with regard to choice of payment mechanism, choice of 
discount cards is not surveyed because the sample was too small in this nation wide 
sample survey, to include a large enough number of people who had paid using 
discount cards in the small scale trial. 
In spite of missing choice of discount cards, LCMS98 allows an appropriate test of 
the model of the demand for health care under alternative payment mechanisms 
with regard to two prevailing payment mechanisms: user fees and voluntary 
prepayments. Taking the small scale of the discount card trial into account, it 
allows reasonable discussion ofthe equity consequences of these two major payment 
mechanisms. However, it is limited in testing the model of the demand for 
alternative payment mechanisms due to the lack of variables representing expected 
frequency of attendance at health centre and perceived quality of care. In addition 
to these analyses which are closely related to the research questions, LCMS98 
allows a general description of health care utilisation in the study context including 
utilisation at health facilities other than health centres. This demonstrates the 
picture of health care utilisation described in Chapter 1 and provides background 
for the discussion of equity at a district level. 
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5.4.2.2 RECORDS AT HEALTH CENTRES 
The second source is the records at health centres. Specifically, outpatient 
registers and outpatient books are useful for the empirical investigation. In 
particular, data on the choice of discount cards are available at trial health centres. 
This complements the limitation of LCMS98. However, these records also have 
limitations. They lack the variables wealth, expected frequency of health centre 
attendance, and perceived quality of care. 
The records at health centres allow a limited test of the model of the demand for 
health care under alternative payment mechanisms. The limitation stems from 
the bias of the outpatient population in the general population. Those who were 
healthy enough to keep away from health centres during the observation period 
relevant to this study are not observable in health centre records. Therefore, 
caution is needed in interpreting the results. The records are also limited in 
testing the model of the demand for alternative payment mechanism due to the lack 
of variables representing wealth, expected frequency of health centre attendance 
and perceived quality of care. However, the records allow the construction of a 
picture of payment mechanism choice at health centres and a comparison among 
health centres. This provides background for empirical discussion of the equity 
consequences of alternative payment mechanisms. 
Another point to be noted is that the standard of record keeping practice at each 
health centre limits the feasibility of data collection and the accuracy of the data. 
This point needs careful handling in the design and implementation of the data 
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collection, as well as the analysis and interpretation of the data. For example, the 
selection of sample health centres is inevitably based on record availability rather 
than random sampling. Awareness of bias due to this sampling is needed in 
interpreting the results. If there is a systematic difference in record keeping 
practice among sampled health centres, other systematic differences may also 
apply. 
The variables, expected frequency of attendance at health centre and perceived 
quality of care, are not obtainable either in the LCMS98 or health centre records. 
Therefore, these two data sources do not allow an appropriate test of the model of 
the demand for alternative payment mechanisms. A third data source was sought 
to complement the shortcomings of the previous two sources. 
5.4.2.3 OUTPATIENT QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
In order to collect variables which represent consumer perceptions like expected 
frequency of attendance at health centre and perceived quality of care, it is needed 
to ask consumers. For this purpose, carrying out a cross sectional household 
survey in the relevant community would be one possible way. However, using this 
method, respondents' actual decisions regarding alternative payment mechanisms 
will be hypothetical or separated from perceptions at the time of questioning for the 
majority of the respondents, since most of them will not be attending health centres 
at the time of the survey. Hence, data collected by this method may bias analysis 
of the relationship between perceptions and choice of payment mechanism. 
Limiting the question to a recent episode of health care utilisation or organising a 
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follow up study targeting the incidence of clinical episodes can overcome the 
shortcomings, but this results in the exclusion of a large number of observations 
from the core of the analysis dealing with the respondent's illness episode. These 
are not considered to be optimal approaches. Therefore, households in the relevant 
communities are not taken as the data source for this study. 
Another potential data source is outpatients at health centres. The data from 
them are more appropriate for the analysis of the relationship between perceptions 
and choice of payment mechanism because outpatients are actually making a 
decision on health care utilisation and choosing from alternative payment 
mechanisms at the time of the survey, and all data from the respondents can be 
included in the analysis. Outpatients are considered to be an appropriate data 
source for this purpose. Nevertheless, this data source, like the health centre 
records, is biased in excluding non health centre users in the general population. 
Non-attending people with illness are not reflected in the data from outpatients. It 
is impossible to analyse the decision whether to attend at a health centre or not 
when falling ill. In this sense, an outpatient survey is limited in testing the model 
of the demand for health care under alternative payment mechanisms. However, 
LCMS98 and the records at health centres complement the shortcomings. 
Therefore, an outpatient survey was conducted to provide the third data source. 
The combination of these three data sources is considered to allow a reasonable 
level of empirical analysis and discussion. 
Table 5.1 shows the relationship between the variables and data sources. 
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Table 5.1 Matrix of needed variables and data sources 
DATA LIVING RECORDS OUTPATIENTS 
SOURCE & CONDITIONS AT 
INFOR- MONITORING HEALTH 
FACTOR MANT SURVEY 1998 CENTRES 
VARIABLE households outpatients outpatients 
UTILISATION use available available available 
user fee available available available 
PAYMENT 
prepayment available available available 
MECHANISMS 
discount card not available available available 
PRICE financial cost available available available 
Income available not available 
INCOME 
available 
FREQUE Cy perceived not available 
OF health status not available available 
ATTEND NCE 
QU LITY OF perceived not available 
not available 
CARE quality of care available 
111 
5.5 PROTOCOLS OF DATA COLLECTION 
5.5.1 LIVING CONDITIONS MONITORING SURVEY 1998 
The Central Statistical Office allows access to the LCMS98 data set and supporting 
documents to the public for the purpose of research under certain conditions. The 
use of these for this study was applied for, following the established procedures, and 
approved. The outline of the survey is presented in Appendix 2. The data from 
the sample in two districts, Lusaka and Kitwe, are used in the analysis. 
5.5.2 SAMPUNG OF HEALTH CENTRES FOR SURVEYS AND RECORDS 
The sampling method of health centres was structured sampling based on three 
criteria. The first required that the sampling enabled comparisons among the 
three payment mechanisms. The second sought to contrast experience in different 
sizes of health centres. Daura et al. (1998) concluded that small health centres 
tended to decrease the misuse of the prepayment scheme by patients, and it was 
therefore sought to control for this variable. The third criterion was the level of 
record keeping practice. Although guidelines for record keepers and the provided 
outpatient registry book required the recording of items, which enabled the test of 
models and the discussion of equity consequences, this was not always completed. 
Well kept records were needed and it was desirable that the outpatient survey was 
conducted at the same sites from which records were collected to maximise the 
potential to cross reference across data sources. 
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Although the sampling of health centres according to record availability violated the 
principles of random sampling, it was inevitable in the fields of this study. 
Therefore, health centres were sampled with non random sampling and these three 
criteria, and each sampled health centre was treated as an independent case, in 
order to maximise the power of the tests of the two demand models. Caution is 
needed in discussing the evidence of equity implications based on the data from the 
records. 
In relation to the first criterion, discount cards were sold at two pilot health centres, 
one large and one small, in each district, and eight health centres in total were 
intended to be sampled: one large health centre out of trial, one small health centre 
out of trial, one large health centre in trial, and one small health centre in trial in 
each district. 
Preliminary visits to examine the record keeping practice and the stage of the 
discount card trial were made at all 23 health centres in Lusaka and 18 health 
centres in Kitwe. According to the two criteria of record keeping practice and 
ability to compare three payment mechanisms, four health centres in Lusaka and 
three health centres in Kitwe were screened as candidates. Table 4.2 shows these 
health centres. 
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Table 5.2 Sampling of health centres 
DISTRICT 
Lu aka 
Kitwe 
HEALTH 
CE TRE 
Chipata 
Chawama 
SIZE RECORD 
KEEPING 
PRACTICE 
Large Nov 98 to Mar 99 
New registration 
only 
Large Oct 98 to Sep 99 
New registration 
only 
Matero Reference Large Irregular 
Kabwata 
Chimwemwe 
Iwekera 
Co etco 
Small Nov 98 to Oct 99 
Every episode 
Large Dec 98 to Nov 99 
Every episode 
Small Oct 98 to Sep 99 
Every episode 
Small Dec 98 to ov!:l9 
Every episodes 
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DISCOUNT CARD 
TRIAL 
No involvement 
Started in October 1998. 
Discount cards were 
continuously sold 
alongside low cost 
prepayment at the time 
ofsurv~ 
Started in November 
HJ98. Discontinued in 
August 1999 due to lack 
of supply of cards from 
the district. 
Started in October 1998. 
Discontinued and 
replaced by Matero 
Reference Clinc by 
management decision in 
November 1998. 
Started in November 
1998. Discontinued in 
J anuary 1999 due to 
complaints from people 
in community. 
S tarted in November 
1998. Discount cards 
were continuously sold at 
the time of survey. Low 
cost prepayments were 
sold only to pregnant 
women. 
No involvement 
The outpatient new attendance registry book was the primary data source in the 
data collection from the records at health centres. All outpatients with a new 
episode were supposed to be registered in this record book in principle. The items 
to be recorded were: outpatient card number, date, name & address, origin code 
(representing the distance from home to the health centre), age, sex, fee paid 
(representing the choice of payment mechanism), diagnosis, treatment given, 
dosage, whether or not referred, and remarks. From these, seven items: outpatient 
card number, date, origin code, age, sex, fee paid, diagnosis, were intended to be 
collected for one year beginning from the autumn of 1998, when this style of 
recording and the trials of discount cards had been launched. 
The records of the choice of payment mechanism were examined to exclude those 
health centres whose record keeping practice was inadequate for the study's 
purpose. Good record keeping was found at two health centres, Chawama and 
Kabwata in Lusaka, and three health centres, Chimwemwe, Mwekera, and Cosetco 
in Kitwe. These were identified as possible candidates. Other health centre 
records were interrupted or were incorrectly coded, which meant choice of 
mechanism was not differentiated in the records. Chipata maintained good 
records only for six months, then failed to record choice of payment mechanism due 
to lack of supply of a blank outpatient new attendance registry book from the 
district health management team. However, this was the second best record 
keeping practice in Lusaka and Chipata was identified as a possible candidate for 
the sampling of a large health centre out of the discount card trial. 
As for the stage of the discount cards trial, only one health centre in each district 
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was still selling discount cards at the time of the survey. In Lusaka, the trial 
started at one large health centre, Chawama, and one small health centre, Kabwata. 
The sale of discount cards at Kabwata discontinued in a month due to 
administrative decision. Matero Reference, a large health centre, started sales of 
discount cards at that time, but it was discontinued after ten months due to lack of 
supply of cards from the district. Therefore, only Chawama, a large health centre, 
continued to sell discount cards at the time ofthe survey. This centre sold discount 
cards alongside low cost prepayment. 
In Kitwe, the trial started at one large health centre, Chimwemwe, and one small 
health centre, Mwekera. The sale of discount cards at Chimwemwe discontinued 
after three months following complaints from people in the community. Therefore, 
only Mwekera, a small health centre, was continuing the sale of discount cards at 
the time of the survey. They sold low cost prepayment only to pregnant woman 
and discount cards only to other patients. 
Matero Reference is selected as a possible candidate because of its involvement with 
the discount cards trial. However, it failed to keep records of the choice of payment 
mechanism in the outpatient new attendance registry book. 
The four initial pilot health centres for the discount cards trial, Chawama and 
Kabwata in Lusaka, and Chimwemwe and Mwekera in Kitwe, had good record 
keeping practice. This is not a coincidence because the level of record keeping 
practice was taken into account in selecting pilot health centres for the discount 
cards trial for the purpose of evaluation. 
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Based on these observations in the preliminary visits, health centres for the data 
collection were sampled. 
Among the health centres which were not part of the discount cards trial, but which 
offer outpatients a choice of payment mechanism between user fees and voluntary 
prepayments, one large health centre and one small health centre were sampled in 
each district, instead of four health centres in total as planned. Chipata from 
seven large health centres and Kabwata from fifteen small health centres were 
sampled in Lusaka, and Chimwemwe from seven large health centres and Cosetco 
from eleven small health centres were sampled in Kitwe. 
1\vo health centres, Kabwata in Lusaka and Chimwemwe in Kitwe, were not health 
centres outside the discount cards trial in a strict sense. They were involved in the 
trial at the beginning. However, they were sampled as health centres outside the 
trial because they discontinued the sale of discounted cards within a couple of 
months, and other health centres had been excluded because they lacked the 
records of the choice of payment mechanism, and were out of the trial at the time of 
the outpatient survey. In addition, the records of discount card sales in the early 
months were considered informative. 
1\vo health centres with discount card trial, Chawama, a large health centre in 
Lusaka, and l\lwekera, a small health centre in Kitwe, were sampled instead of the 
four health centres initially planned. It is to be noted that these two health 
centres apply different rules to the sale of discount cards. Discounted cards were 
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sold alongside low cost prepayment at Chawama; discount cards were not sold for 
outpatients unless pregnant in Mwekera. Attention should be paid to this 
difference in analysing and interpreting the data. 
Within these six sampled health centres, there was a significant variation in the 
record keeping rules applied to the outpatient new attendance registry book. All 
outpatients with a new episode were supposed to be registered in this record book in 
principle. However, at two large health centres in Lusaka, Chawama and Chipata, 
similar data were not available. Only outpatients who attended the health centre 
for the first time were recorded at these health centres, and other episodes after this 
were not recorded. 
The omission of recording the episode after the first one at these health centres 
made it impossible to analyse the frequency of attendance, which would be used as a 
proxy for expected frequency of attendance and indicator of utilisation. Therefore, 
individual patients' outpatient books, which recorded every consultation, were 
additionally surveyed at Chawama, which allowed the comparison among the three 
alternative payment mechanisms. 
In order to obtain the number of attendances during the year after registration, 
adult paying outpatients were sampled from the records of the outpatient new 
attendance registry book from October to December 1998. In this period, 70 
patients chose discount cards; 2,524 patients chose low cost prepayments; 657 
patients chose user fees. 70 patients using each of low cost prepayment and user 
fees were randomly sampled for comparison with those who chose discount cards. 
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The number of episodes these 210 patients had in the following twelve months were 
collected from individuals' outpatient books. 
5.5.3 OUTPATIENT QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
The outpatient questionnaire survey was also carried out at the six sampled health 
centres. The questionnaire, which is shown in Appendix 3, was designed to 
measure outpatients' expected frequency of attendance at health centres and their 
perceived quality of care along with their choice of alternative payment mechanism 
and backgrounds. 
In measuring the expected frequency of attendance, the question was asked 
straightforwardly. This question is simple enough to be answered by the 
respondents since most of the health problems treated at the health centres are 
common ailments at primary care level and the fee schedule was based on fee for 
episode in principle. It will be seen that responses accorded with expectations in 
statistical analyses, suggesting that on average, reasonable information was 
obtained. 
In measuring the perceived quality of care, a battery of questions was asked, taking 
the multidimensional nature of quality of care into account (Donabedian, 1980). 
Each question in the battery was designed to refer to one of six concrete dimensions 
of individuals' perceptions of quality of care which were identified in an earlier 
study of quality of care in Lusaka, through qualitative research (Ruwe et al., 1996). 
These six dimensions were: behaviour of health staff, technical care provided, 
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convenience of health services, organisational aspects, medicine availability and 
quality, and structural aspects of the health centre. 
The questionnaire was initially tested with local volunteers in Lusaka. Then, a 
pilot survey was carried out at Ndeke, a large health centre in Kitwe, before the 
survey at six health centres. The questionnaire was administered by trained 
nurses from different health centres attended by the researcher. 
The number of outpatients surveyed was determined based on a statistical sample 
size calculation predicated on the detection of difference in one variable of interest, 
that was, the difference in the choice of alternative payment mechanisms between 
income groups. According to the preliminary analysis of the outpatient new 
attendance registry book at three health centres in Lusaka, about 75 percent of 
outpatients chose voluntary prepayments as their payment mechanism. Assume 
the detection of a 30 percent difference such that 90 percent of the upper half of 
outpatients in the income distribution, and 60 percent of the lower half chose 
voluntary prepayments, 96 outpatients were needed for the two-tailed test of 
proportion at each health centre (Fleiss, 1980). 
In order to reduce potential bias through seasonal change of outpatients' 
characteristics, the survey was carried out in two phases, in dry season and in rainy 
season, although all responses from each health centre were combined in one 
analysis. Therefore, around 50 outpatients were questioned at each health centre 
in one season. Outpatients from 16 to 64 years old who were supposed to pay fully 
were targeted and those who were being exempted from payment such as attending 
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after hours or suffering from too severe conditions were not questioned. All eligible 
respondents from all outpatients were screened at the registry, which was the first 
contact point, and asked to proceed to an interview room which provided privacy, 
either before or after the consultation between 8:00 am and 5:00 pm. The number 
of outpatients who rejected the questioning was also recorded. The survey at each 
health centre in each season continued up to the end of the day when the responses 
amounted to around 50. In Lusaka, it took one day to reach the sample size since 
the number of outpatients treated was large. However, in Kitwe, it took two days 
even at the large health centre and about two weeks at small health centres. 
Outpatients aged between 6 and 15 years were also questioned at the same time. 
In this case, when the patient was accompanied by a carer who was responsible for 
the payment, the carer was questioned. 
5.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
The quantitative data sets collected from three data sources were analysed 
separately. 
Lusaka and Kitwe data were separately extracted from the nationwide data in the 
LCl\lS98. Health care related variables such as health episode, mode of health 
care obtained, and method of payments were extracted as well as background 
variables such as household income and household size. Since there are two levels 
of questions: one to be answered at household level and the other at individual level, 
two sets of samples: a household data set and an individual data set were prepared 
for each district. 
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'!\vo types of statistical analysis were carried out: descriptive analysis and 
statistical test. In the descriptive analysis, individual consumer samples' health 
episodes were cross tabulated by coping behaviour, health facilities, and the choice 
of payment mechanism in order to describe the health care utilisation pattern in 
each district. This was to develop a foundation for all the following data analysis 
and discussion. 
Statistical tests of derived hypotheses from the model of demand for health care 
under alternative payment mechanisms and the model of demand for alternative 
payment mechanisms were carried out. Since this data set was not designed for 
these tests, interpretive analysis was carried out, in which variables or sets of 
variables were interpreted in relation to the hypotheses. In testing the hypotheses 
from the model of demand for health care under alternative payment mechanisms, 
stratified cross tabulation was made to estimate odds ratios of seeking health care 
at health facilities by payment method. In testing the model of demand for 
alternative payment mechanisms, a logit model was estimated using available 
variables as discussed in Chapter 4. 
From data from the records at health centres, descriptive analysis of the detailed 
health care utilisation pattern at the sample health centre level, and statistical 
tests of outpatient frequency of attendance were carried out. The description of 
health care utilisation provides a foundation for the analysis and discussion of data 
from the outpatient questionnaire survey. 
122 
In order to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical models developed, an 
index, outpatient frequency of attendances, was calculated from the data from the 
records at health centres. This index is relevant both to utilisation in the model of 
demand for health care under alternative payment mechanisms and health status 
in the model of demand for alternative payment mechanisms. Therefore, 
interpretation is made during the analysis. In comparing frequency of attendances 
by payment method, one-way analysis of variance is used. 
The outpatient questionnaire survey was mainly designed to test hypotheses 
derived from the model of demand for alternative payment mechanisms. Mter 
univariate analysis and bivariate analysis, logit models were estimated. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 1 
RESULTS OF THEORETICAL INVESTIGATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of theoretical investigation. Two demand models, 
which illustrate the consumer's behaviour regarding health care at governmental 
health centres in the study field and the equity consequences of them, are described. 
These two models are to answer the first and second research questions and equity 
consequences, the third question, specified in Chapter 2. Then the hypotheses are 
deduced for empirical investigation. 
6.1.1 PAYMENT MECHANISMS UNDER CONSIDERATION 
Based on the health system in the study field introduced in Chapter 1, the payment 
arrangement at governmental health centres to be modelled is detailed as below. 
Three payment mechanisms - user fees, low· cost prepayments (a form of voluntary 
prepayments) and discount cards - are in operation as the methods of direct 
payment. With user fees, a certain level of flat fee per diagnosis and treatment is 
payable. The prepayments are a kind of insurance with a specified monthly 
premium for free diagnoses and treatments at the time of utilisation. Once an 
individual subscribes to prepayments, he/she is supposed to pay the premmm 
continuously. A discount card comprises coupons for diagnosis and treatment, the 
price of which is set lower than the equivalent costs payable with user fees. A 
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coupon can be used whenever the holder falls ill. Each coupon in the discount card 
covers all diagnosis and treatment for one episode of illness. An individual does not 
need to pay any additional charges for follow-up consultations and treatments for 
each episode. 
Subscription to prepayments or the purchase of discount cards are encouraged by 
the government, with the intention of changing the major method of direct 
payments from user fees to these two alternative payment mechanisms. One 
reason for this is that these two methods are believed to facilitate the utilisation of 
health care, compared with user fees. Therefore, a model of the health care 
utilisation under the alternative payment mechanisms is firstly developed below to 
illustrate this effect; this is to answer the first research question. Then, another 
model of the demand for alternative payment mechanisms, which describes the 
consumer's choice of alternative payment mechanisms, is elaborated, and will 
answer the second research question. Finally, the impact on equity of the 
alternative payment mechanisms is discussed using the two demand models 
developed, which is to answer the third research question. 
The list of variables in these models is shown in Appendix 4. 
6.2 MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
PAYMENT MECHANISMS: UTILISATION MODEL 
In order to answer the first research question on how people seek health care under 
each payment mechanism, a demand model, called the utilisation model hereafter, 
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is elaborated in this section. This model is to illustrate the relationship between 
the quantity of health care demanded and financial barriers to health care under 
alternative payment mechanisms, extending a basic demand model for health care 
under insurance described in the literature (e.g. Jacobs, 1996; Folland et al., 1997), 
as specified in Chapter 5. 
6.2.1 CONTEXT 
The economic phenomenon to be modelled in this section is as detailed below. A 
consumer at a health centre is asked to pay for the cost of hislher utilisation of 
health care with one of three direct payment mechanisms: user fees, voluntary 
prepayments, or discount cards, although voluntary prepayments should have been 
subscribed to in advance, and discount cards will need to be purchased unless any 
unused coupons are held. Payment mechanisms such as voluntary prepayments or 
discount cards modify the market for health care at the point of health care 
utilisation. Once a consumer chooses one of these two payment mechanisms at a 
health centre, hislher health seeking behaviour, or the expression of hislher demand 
for health care, will change from that if he/she chooses user fees. The fundamental 
difference a consumer faces is the price signal. Under voluntary prepayments, the 
payments at the time of health care utilisation are removed. Under discount cards, 
the transfer of a coupon replaces the payments at the time of utilisation. In other 
words, financial barriers to health care at the point of utilisation vary according to 
the choice of payment method. These changes affect the consumer's notion about 
the cost at the point of health care utilisation. The ways in which a consumer's 
behaviour responds to these changes are to be modelled. 
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6.2.2 DEMAND CURVE FOR HEALTH CARE 
The demand for health care by a consumer is modelled initially. He/she is assumed 
to be a price taker, that is, to express hislher demand according to the price in the 
market, ceteris paribus. He/she is assumed to consider non· cash costs of health 
care, such as travel, a cost as welL The law of demand is good, which means the 
demand curve is assumed to be downward sloping. Thus, he/she consumes a large 
amount of health care when the price is low; a small amount of health care when the 
price is high, ceteris paribus. 
A demand curve with these assumptions is illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
Price 
user fee 
Cpre 
non cash cost 1 
D" 
O~--~--~----~--------~-------Qusr' Qusr Qusr" Quantity 
Figure 6.1 Demand curve for health care 
Under user fees, a consumer with demand curve D faces the total price oeusr, 
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which consists of a user fee CpreCusr and non· cash cost OCpre. The quantity 
demanded is determined at the point U on the demand curve. Therefore, OQusr is 
demanded. 
The demand curve is assumed to shift according to factors other than price. For 
example, a consumer with high health status may have demand curve D'. The 
quantity demanded is determined at the point U' on the demand curve D'. 
Therefore, OQusr' is demanded, which is less than OQusr. On the contrary, a 
consumer with low health status may have demand curve D". The quantity 
demanded, OQusr", is determined at the point of U", which is more than OQusr. 
Factors such as the consumer's income or perceived quality of health care are 
demand shifters as welL 
6.2.3 UTILISATION UNDER VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT AND DISCOUNT 
CARD 
The demand for health care under voluntary prepayments and discount cards is 
explained with Figure 6.2. 
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Cusr 
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Figure 6.2 Demand curve for health care under alternative payment mechanisms 
A consumer has a demand curve D. When he/she subscribes to prepayments, 
he/she is not asked to pay cash at the point of utilisation since he/she has already 
paid the premium as the cost for health care in advance. The cost he/she faces this 
time is the nOll"cash cost OCpre only. The quantity demanded is determined at 
point P on the demand curve. Therefore, OQpre is demanded. Since OQpre is 
larger than OQusr, the utilisation is facilitated by the subscription of prepayments, 
ceteris paribus. The level of increase in the quantity demanded, QusrQpre, is 
determined by the shape of the demand curve. 
The demand for health care under discount cards is also explained with Figure 6.2. 
A consumer with a discount card is not asked to pay cash at the point of utilisation, 
but is asked to give up one coupon in the discount card in exchange for receiving 
health care. This accompanies opportunity cost, the value of each coupon, which is 
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not less than zero. And it is not more than a user fee since he/she chooses to pay a 
user fee if the value of one coupon is more than a user fee. Let CpreCdis be the 
value of one coupon. When he/she faces the total cost OCdis, which consists of the 
value of a coupon CpreCdis and non'cash cost OCpre, the quantity demanded is 
determined at the point D on the demand curve. Therefore, OQdis is demanded. 
Point C can locate on the demand curve between U and P depending on the value of 
one coupon, and OQdis is not less than OQusr and not more than OQpre. Since 
OQdis is larger than OQusr, the utilisation is facilitated by the purchase of discount 
cards in advance as opposed to user fees, ceteris paribus. The level of increase in 
the quantity demanded, QusrQdis, is determined by the value of each coupon and 
the shape of the demand curve. 
The value of one coupon is an essential element of the above discussion. Yet, a 
consumer may put various values on each coupon in a discount card. Some may 
value each coupon as the quotient of the cost of one card divided by the number of 
coupons included. If they have time preference, they value the first coupon more 
than the last one. The value of each coupon may diminish toward the last one in 
the card. Others may value the coupons toward the last one more than the former, 
since finishing them leads to the need to purchase a new discount card. However, 
the most important point is that the range of the value is not less than zero and not 
more than a user fee regardless of the consumer's valuation. Therefore, it can be 
said that the level of the effect of discount cards on utilisation increase is not more 
than that of voluntary prepayments. 
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6.3 MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MECHANISMS: 
CHOICE MODEL 
In order to answer the second research question how people choose alternative 
payment mechanisms, a demand model, called the choice model hereafter, is 
elaborated in this section. This model is to illustrate the relationships among 
factors such as price, income, perceived health status and perceived quality of care 
based on a utility maximisation model following the prototype specified in Chapter 
3 and the brief discussion in Chapter 5. 
6.3.1 CONTEXT 
The economic phenomenon to be modelled in this section is as detailed below. A 
consumer seeking health care at a health centre is asked to pay the cost of health 
care provision. Three types of payment mechanisms are offered at health centres: 
user fees, voluntary prepayments, and discount cards. The choice of voluntary 
prepayments is only allowed before seeking health care. This implies that a 
consumer chooses user fees or discount cards as a payment mechanism before 
falling ill unless choosing voluntary prepayment. '!\vo consumer choices, of health 
care utilisation and of choice of alternative payment mechanisms, occur separately 
in terms of timing. This is the reason why the first and the second research 
questions are separated in this study. 
Factors such as pnce, income, perceived health status and perceived quality of 
health care are considered to be influential to this choice, as discussed in Chapter 3 
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and Chapter 5. However, little is known about the way that an individual chooses 
voluntary prepayments, or discount cards instead of user fees. It is this choice of 
alternative payment mechanisms at health centres that is to be modelled. 
To simplify the argument, two sub-models of the demand for two alternatives, the 
choice between voluntary prepayments and user fees and the choice between 
discount cards and user fees, are developed first. These sub-models are to 
illustrate the reasons why a consumer may choose two alternatives other than user 
fees. Then, a general model of the demand for alternative payment mechanisms, 
which illustrates the choice among the three, is elaborated. 
6.3_2 SUB-MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR PREPAYMENT 
Consumer's choice of payment mechanism between user fees and prepayments is 
modelled according to the prototype specified in Chapter 3 in the following. 
6.3.2.1 APPLICATION OF UTILITY MAXIMISATION MODEL 
The utility maximisation model is applied to this context. The general form of 
utility maximisation model is written, which has been introduced in Chapter 4, as 
below. 
l\Iaximise U(q) 
Subject to: 
where U = utility function 
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P = (pI,p2, ... ,pJ 
Pk = price of each item 
qk = quantity of each item 
x = income 
In this formulation, a consumer is assumed to gain more utility from more 
consumption of various items of commodities. He/she consumes a set of quantities 
of the items at market prices, which produce the maximum utility with hislher 
income. 
In applying this model for a specific context, it is useful to specify the items that a 
consumer gets utility from, the way that a consumer gets utility from the 
consumption of each item, and the way that a consumer maximises their utility. 
A consumer faces a choice between prepayments and user fees in this study context. 
He/she is assumed to be concerned about the consumption of other items of 
commodities as well. The items that a consumer gets utility from may be written 
in a form of utility function as below: 
where 
u = U( qp, qu, qo) 
qp = quantity of prepayments 
qu = quantity of user fees 
qo = quantity of other items 
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However, this formulation is not operational. It is impossible to interpret the 
meaning of the quantity of prepayment and quantity of user fees. These are not 
quantifiable commodities but a qualitatively chosen payment mechanism. In order 
to address this problem, the concept of derived demand reviewed in Chapter 3 is 
useful. The choice of alternative payment mechanisms is assumed to be derived 
from demand for health care. Therefore, a consumer is assumed to get utility from 
the consumption of health care, and the choice of payment mechanism determines 
the cost of health care. With this argument, the utility function with resource 
constraint can be rewritten as below: 
u = U( qh, qo) 
Subject to: 
where qh = quantity of health care 
Ch = cost of health care depending on the choice of payment 
mechanism 
po = price of other item 
With this formulation, it is possible to interpret the meaning of the consumption 
and the quantities of items as independent variables in the utility function. 
In considering the way that a consumer gets utility from each item, it is possible to 
assume a consumer gets more utility from more consumption of health care as well 
as the other goods in a similar way to that used in the Simple Utility Maximisation 
110del reviewed in Chapter 3. In other words, health care can be assumed a 
consumption good. However, it is useful to put further assumptions on the way a 
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consumer consumes health care in this context. It can be assumed that a 
consumer does not demand health care unless he/she falls ill, because receiving 
health care such as that provided at primary health care facilities is useless for 
healthy people. In addition, health care is often not enjoyable for patients. It is 
plausible to consider that the greater consumption of health care does not always 
bring greater satisfaction to a patient/consumer. Instead, he/she receives utility 
from recovering health from illness. This assumption is equivalent to the concept 
of derived demand, that demand for health care is derived from demand for health. 
With this argument, a consumer can be assumed to get utility from his/her health. 
He/she becomes most satisfied when health care cures his/her illness. If health 
care is not effective enough for the patient to recover his/her health fully, the utility 
he/she gets from health becomes lower. Then the utility function with resource 
constraint can be rewritten as below: 
Subject to: Ch + poqo = X 
where H = health 
The formulation taken in Pauly's model of the demand for insurance, reviewed in 
Chapter 3, can be added to this formulation in order to take the characteristics of 
choice between prepayments and user fees into account. In Pauly's model, a 
consumer is assumed to maximise expected utility using his/her knowledge of 
probability of loss from risky events for a time period. In the context of 
prepayments, or health insurance, the risky event insured is illness episodes, of 
\vhich occurrence is random. Therefore, a consumer is assumed to know his/her 
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probability of falling ill for a time period. He/she is also assumed to have demand 
for health care when falling ill in order to recover his/her health. Then, the utility 
function with resource constraint can be rewritten as expected utility function with 
resource constraint as below: 
EU = EU( H(qh), qo) 
Subject to: Ch + poqo = X 
where EU = expected utility 
Ch = expected cost of health care to maintain health 
depending on the choice of payment mechanism 
for a time period 
A consumer is assumed to know the expected cost of health care, based on expected 
use of health care, based on the probability of falling ill and the fee schedule of 
alternative payment mechanisms. 
With this formulation, it is possible to specify the way that a consumer maximises 
hislher expected utility by making a choice between prepayment and user fees. A 
consumer gets utility from two sources: health and the consumption of other goods. 
Regarding health, as already assumed, he/she knows his/her probable amount of 
consumption of health care. He/she gains expected utility from recovered health 
by health care consumption. What he/she does by choosing a payment mechanism 
is to determine the cost of health care according to a fixed fee schedule. As for the 
consumption of other goods, he/she can increase his/her expected utility by 
increasing the quantity of consumption. Since the price of the other goods is fixed, 
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increasing the allocation of resources for the consumption of the other goods 
increases his/her expected utility. Therefore, in order to maximise expected utility, 
he/she chooses a payment mechanism which lowers the cost of health care. 
This expected utility maximisation behaviour also describes how a consumer makes 
the decision of whether to subscribe to prepayments or not in order to maximise 
resources for the consumption of other goods. The Discrete Choice Model reviewed 
in Chapter 3 is applicable to this expected utility maximising behaviour. 
Assuming that wealth is a resource constraint of a consumer, he/she maximises the 
expected wealth that can be used for consuming other goods for a time period in 
choosing a payment mechanism. The formulation is transformed into the expected 
utility maximisation model as below: 
maximise 
subject to 
where 
EU = EU( EWalt ) 
TCH ~ IW 
EU = expected utility 
EW = expected wealth 
TCH = total cost of health care depending on the choice of 
payment mechanism 
IW = initial wealth 
alt = ( usr, pre ) 
'usr' stands for the choice of user fees 
'pre' stands for the choice of voluntary prepayments 
This model is similar to a typical simple explanation for the demand for insurance 
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and health insurance seen in many economics textbooks, and is reviewed as the 
Expected Value Model in Chapter 3 (e.g. Parkin and King, 1995; McPake et al., 
2002). In these models, expected monetary values depending on the choice of 
payment mechanisms are compared with the utility function that assumes 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth. 
6.3.2.2 EXPECTED WEALTH WITH PREPAYMENTS AND USER FEES 
In order to investigate the effects of various factors on payment method choice, 
expected wealth expressed in monetary values for each choice is further modelled in 
the following. 
Expected wealth with user fees, EWusr, is written with an operationalisation of the 
consumer's estimation of health risk into the expected number of illnesses he/she 
will suffer in a time period. Since a user fee is set as a flat rate for the diagnosis 
and treatment of one illness episode, the cost of health care depends only on 
numbers of episodes. On the contrary, expected wealth with voluntary 
prepayments, EWpre, is written with the premium of voluntary prepayments for a 
time period. 
EWusr = IW . n *F / ( 1 + t ) 
EWpre = IW· R 
given relationship 
where 
n = n( HS) 
R = premium of prepayment for a time period 
n = expected number of episodes he/she has 
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during a time period 
F = user fee 
t = private time preference rate 
HS = current health status 
With user fees, he/she pays the fees for n episodes from his/her initial wealth. The 
user fees paid are discounted with a time preference rate with a further assumption 
that they are paid at the end of the time period, as shown in the first equation. 
With voluntary prepayment, he/she pays the premium, R, for a time period from 
hislher initial wealth at the beginning of the time period and may receive the 
compensation in the form offree diagnoses and treatments. No further payment is 
needed, as shown in the second equation. 
The condition for the choice of voluntary prepayment is written with sign analysis 
of the expected utility as below. 
~EU = EU( EWpre ) - EU( EWusr ) > 0 
In order to examine this condition, the form of utility function needs to be specified. 
In the Expected Value Model, a consumer is considered to purchase insurance not 
solely based on the amount of expected wealth corresponding to the payment 
mechanism. A consumer may choose prepayments instead of user fees even when 
EWpre is smaller than EWusr according to their utility function. 
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This choice can be explained by the consumer's attitude to risk. EWpre represents 
certain value of expected wealth once he/she chooses prepayment at the beginning 
of the time period, and EWusr represents uncertain value of expected wealth 
reflecting the uncertainty of the number of episodes at the end of the time period. 
He/she knows only a probable number of episodes not an exact number when 
making the choice. If a consumer prefers certainty to uncertainty, he/she chooses 
prepayments instead of user fees, even when EWpre is smaller than EWusr. 
Phelps' model reviewed in Chapter 3 formulated this consumer's attitude to risk 
into the choice of payment mechanism, introducing a concept of risk premium. The 
risk premium is defined as a cost of transferring risk from a consumer to the health 
care provider paid by a consumer. Applying this concept for the context of this 
study, the expected utility function is written with the definition of a variable which 
represents the consumer's risk premium as below: 
EU = EUalt 
given relationship EUusr = EWusr 
EUpre = EWpre + Apre 
where Apre = a consumer's risk premium corresponding to the 
choice of prepayment 
Apre is assumed to be positive if a consumer is risk averse, negative if risk loving, 
and zero if risk neutral. 
Then, the condition for the choice of voluntary prepayment is transformed into the 
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sign analysis of expected utility as below. 
AEU = ( EWpre + Apre ) . EWusr > 0 
This condition is written as: 
( IW . R + Apre) . { IW . n *F I ( 1 + t ) } > 0 
It is reduced to: 
R . Apre < n*F I ( 1 + t ) 
This means that voluntary prepayment is preferred when the premium payable 
minus the risk premium is less than the expected user fees payable with time 
discounting. In other words, he/she chooses alternative payment mechanisms 
based on R, F, n, t and Apre. Voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred with 
lower R, higher F, higher n, lower t and higher Apre. Since n is a function of 
current health status, the choice of alternative payment mechanisms depends on 
HS. Voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred with low health status. 
6.3.2.3 INCOME 
The income factor is incorporated through an argument on the relevance of time 
preference as below. The conditions of the choice of voluntary prepayment above 
suggest that strong time preference leads to a preference for user fees. This is 
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simply interpreted that payment in advance is not preferred by a consumer with 
strong time preference. Yet, the more insightful point here is the consideration of 
determinants of time preference. Although there are several determinants of time 
preference rate such as interest rate or culture, the level of income is one of the 
essential factors in the context of the study field. This is because 69.2 percent of 
the population in Zambia is in poverty, which is defined as experiencing scarcities 
and deficiencies in the consumption of commodities needed for healthy living (CSO, 
1997). People with low income may not be able to pay for health care in advance, 
rather only purchasing commodities of immediate need. It is likely that there is an 
association between strong time preference and low income. People in poverty find 
difficulty in saving money or subscribing to insurance in preparation for future loss, 
as opposed to people with relatively high income (World Bank, 1990). In such case, 
user fees are more likely preferred by people with low income. 
6.3.2.4 PERCEIVED QUALITY OF CARE 
The modelling so far fails in incorporating another factor to be modelled, that is, 
perceived quality of care. This is done through a relaxation of an assumption 
above that through the consumption of health care, a consumer will recover their 
health after illness. 
Additionally, a consumer is assumed to be uncertain about the effectiveness of 
health care to maintain health. In other words, he/she sometimes doubts the 
recovery of health from illness by the diagnosis and treatment provided at health 
centres. In a sense, he/she is assumed to face the risk of unavailability of 
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appropriate health care to maintain hislher health. This assumption reflects the 
context of primary care at health centres in the field and in the region, such that 
consumers sometimes experience drug shortage when they fall ill; for example, 
appropriate drugs for infectious diseases, a common health problem there, are not 
always assured. And consumer's perception of quality of care largely depends on 
drug availability in the field and in the region, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
According to this assumption, the assumption on consumer's health-care-seeking 
behaviour that he/she consumes health care as possible as he/she can in order to 
maintain health with the least cost changes into the following. A consumer who 
perceived the quality of care to be low seeks health care at health centres only when 
he/she thinks he/she can receive effective health care. He/she refrains from 
seeking care when he/she thinks appropriate health care is not available at health 
centres at the time of illness, since the cost of ineffective health care in such cases is 
thought of as unnecessary. 
Taking this assumption of perceived quality of care into account, EWusr is reformed 
as below. 
EWusr' = IW - q*n*F / ( 1+ t) 
given relationship 
where 
Q = QC q) 
q = probability of receiving appropriate health care 
Q = perceived quality of care 
A consumer assesses the probability of receiving appropriate health care for his/her 
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illness, which also determines hislher perceived quality of care. Then, he/she 
estimates the financial cost of receiving appropriate health care according to the fee 
schedule. 
On the contrary, EWpre is not affected by the consumer's perceived quality of care, 
since the financial cost ofthe voluntary prepayment premium is unconnected to the 
number oftimes health care accessed. 
Therefore, with the incorporation of quality of care, the condition of the choice is 
written as below: 
~EU = (EWpre + Apre) - EWusr' 
= ( IW - R + Apre ) - { IW - q*n*F / ( 1 + t) } > 0 
This condition is reduced to: 
R +-Apre < q*n*F / ( 1 + t) 
This means that voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred with higher q. 
Since perceived quality of care is a function of q, the choice of alternative payment 
mechanisms associates with Q. Voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred 
with higher perceived quality of care. In other words, user fees are more likely 
preferred with lower perceived quality of care. 
This modelling has an interesting implication for the relationship between 
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consumer's attitude against risk and their choice of payment mechanism. 
Voluntary prepayments are primarily considered as a risk-reducing payment 
mechanism. The choice of voluntary prepayments reduces health risk and 
financial risk, since the payment of premium, R, assures no additional cost for 
health care to maintain health in the future. Therefore, voluntary prepayments 
are supposed to be preferred by a risk averse consumer with higher positive Apre. 
On the contrary, choosing user fees is accompanied by health risk and financial risk. 
This is because the expected number of illness episodes in the time period, n, is a 
stochastic variable, so that the actual number of episodes experienced by the end of 
the time period may turn out to be more than n, and the cost of obtaining health 
care to maintain health may amount to an unaffordable level. This is often 
explained by diminishing marginal utility of wealth as discussed previously. Yet, 
regarding the risk of unavailability of appropriate health care, which is incurred 
where there is low perceived quality of care, the choice of user fees reduces this risk. 
Therefore, a risk averse consumer may prefer user fees if he/she perceives quality of 
care to be unpredictable or low. 
6.3.2.5 SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the predictions of this sub, model are: 1) In terms of price factor, the 
relative price of a payment premium and a user fee has an effect on the choice - a 
low premium in comparison to the user fee leads to a preference for voluntary 
prepayment; 2) In terms of income, high income leads to a preference for voluntary 
prepayment; 3) In terms of perceived health status, low perceived health status 
leads to a preference for voluntary prepayment; and 4) In terms of perceived quality 
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of health care, high perceived quality of care leads to a preference for voluntary 
prepayment. 
6.3.3 SUB-MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR DISCOUNT CARDS 
This sub-model is developed in a similar way. The choice of a consumer between 
paying user fees at each illness episode and purchasing discount cards in advance is 
modelled in this section. 
He/she is assumed to need to make this choice in advance in order to harmonize 
with the sub-model of choice between prepayments and user fees elaborated in the 
previous section. He/she is assumed to be able to estimate the risk of illness in the 
time period according to the self assessment of hislher current health status. 
He/she is also assumed to purchase discount cards at a point in the beginning of the 
time period in accordance with the characteristic of advance payment corresponding 
to discount cards. He/she seeks health care at health centres to maintain health if 
he/she thinks he/she is able to receive appropriate health care. Otherwise, he/she 
refrains from seeking for health care. 
He/she is assumed a utility maximiser with resource constraint. His/her expected 
utility is assumed to be derived from the level of expected wealth. These 
assumptions are exactly the same as for the previous sub-model. 
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6.3.3.1 EXPECTED WEALTH WITH DISCOUNT CARDS AND USER FEES 
Expected wealth with user fees, EWusr, is written the same as in the previous 
sub-model. Expected wealth with discount cards, EW dis, is written with expected 
number of discount cards purchased at the beginning of the time period. 
EWusr = IW - q*n*F / ( 1 + t ) 
EWdis = IW - k*m*d*F 
given relationships 
where 
q*n ~ k*m 
k = expected number of discount cards purchased 
m = number of coupons in one discount card 
d = discount rate for the price of discount card 
'dis' stands for the choice of discount cards 
With user fees, he/she pays user fees for q*n visits from his/her initial wealth. 
With discount cards, he/she pays k*m*d*F from his/her initial wealth to obtain k*m 
coupons to cover the cost of health care for q*n episodes at the beginning of the time 
period. 
The relationship shows that the number of coupons in purchased discount cards, 
k*m, covers q*n visits. 
The condition for the choice of discount cards IS written with sIgn analysis of 
expected utility function as below. 
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AEU = EU( EWdis) - EU( EWusr) > 0 
The form of utility function needs to be specified_ In order to create a general 
model of demand for three payment mechanisms later on by combining this 
sub-model with the sub-model on choice of prepayment described previously, the 
relevance of Phelps' formulation of expected utility function, employing the concept 
of risk premium used in the other sub-model, needs to be examined. 
In Chapter 1, it is intuitively discussed that discount cards as a payment 
mechanism have a function of spreading risk for a person over a time period. 
However, the risk premium defined in Phelps' formulation is the cost of transferring 
risk from a consumer to a health care provider. In the case of discount cards, the 
health care provider bears no risk because they provide a limited amount of health 
care in exchange for the already paid coupon. In this sense, there is no risk 
premium corresponding to discount cards. 
In terms of certainty of expected wealth value, EWdis represents uncertain value of 
expected wealth reflecting uncertainty of the number of episodes at the end of the 
time period. This also indicates that risk is still held by a consumer with discount 
cards. 
However, it is useful to examme the situation where a consumer may choose 
discount cards even when EWdis is smaller than EWusr. Since discount cards as a 
payment mechanism are essentially a "discount" on user fees, EW dis tends to be 
larger than EWusr when a relatively large number of visits is expected. Only 
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when a consumer expects to hold a number of unused coupons at the end ofthe time 
period may EWdis be smaller than EWusr. Regarding this situation, it can be 
assumed that if a consumer is risk averse in terms of cash payment accompanying 
an illness episode, he/she may choose discount cards even when EWdis is smaller 
than EWusr. By purchasing discount cards, he/she transforms the risk of cash 
payment into the risk of giving up coupons. In this sense, discount cards reduce 
the level of financial risk to some extent, although they do not remove the risk 
totally due to uncertainty around the expected number of illness episodes, and the 
risk of having unused coupons left do exit. 
Therefore, if the definition of risk premium is expanded as the cost of reducing 
financial risk, there may be a risk premium related to the choice of discount cards in 
a limited situation. A financially risk averse consumer may choose discount cards, 
paying the difference between EWdis and EWusr in order to reduce his/her financial 
risk. 
There is another characteristic of discount cards that needs to be examined in order 
to specify utility function. There may be several unused coupons left at the end of 
the time period. A consumer is likely to get utility from the possession of unused 
coupons in addition to health and the consumption of other goods. 
Therefore, the expected utility function is written as below: 
EU = EUalt 
given relationship EUusr = E\Vusr 
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where 
EUdis = (EWdis + Adis, Bdis) 
Adis = a consumer's risk premium corresponding 
to the choice of discount cards 
Bdis = unused coupons in the last card 
Adis is assumed to be positive if a consumer is financially risk averse, negative if 
financially risk loving, and zero if financially risk neutral. 
It is possible to write the monetary value of the unused coupons in order to make a 
comparison of utilities depending on the choice available. The expected number of 
unused coupons in the last discount card at the end of the time period is estimated 
from the expected number of times health care will be sought in the time period, the 
arrangement of discount cards such as discount rate against the user fees payable, 
and the number of coupons in one discount card. Bdis is written assuming the 
value of unused coupons attached by a consumer as below. 
Bdis = { ( k*m . q*n )*V / ( 1 + t) } 
given relationships 
where 
O~V~F 
v = value of one unused coupon by a consumer 
The relationship shows that the value of one coupon is not less than 0 and not more 
than F, as discussed in 6.2.3. 
The condition of purchasing discount cards is equivalent to the condition below. 
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~EU = ( EW dis + Adis + Bdis ) - EWusr > 0 
This condition is written as: 
[IW-k*m*d*F+{(k*m-q*n)*V/(l + t)}] + Adis - {IW-q*n*F/(l + t)} > 0 
This is reduced to: 
k*m*d*F - {( k*m - q*n) * V I ( 1 + t)} - Adis < q*n*F I ( 1 + t) 
This means that discount cards are preferred when the cost of discount cards minus 
the value of unused coupons with time discounting minus risk premium 
corresponding to the choice of discount card is less than expected user fees payable 
with time discounting. In other words, a consumer chooses alternative payment 
mechanisms based on k, m, d, F, q, n, V, t and Adis. In order to interpret this 
complicated inequality, analysis is done according to the size ofk and V. 
The factor k (number of discount cards purchased) relates to a consumer's health 
status, since k is a function of n. When k is large, i.e. a consumer needs a large 
number of discount cards to seek health care in order to maintain health, the value 
of unused coupons can be considered much smaller than the cost of discount cards. 
Then, the number of unused coupons can be approximated to 0, which means k*m 
equals q*n. In such case, the condition is approximated to: 
k*m*d*F - Adis < q*n*F I ( 1 + t) 
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This is transformed further to: 
d - Adisl k*m < 1/ ( 1 + t) 
Since k is assumed to be large and there is no room for Adis because k is large, this 
is approximated further to: 
d < 1/(1+t) 
This means that the choice by a consumer depends on d and t. Discount cards are 
more likely preferred with large discount and weak time preference. The relevance 
of other factors is negligible. 
As the number of purchased discount cards, k, decreases, which implies a 
consumer's health status is correspondingly getting higher, the relevance of the 
value of unused coupons is considered to increase. For example, when k equals 1, 
which means that a consumer expects not to use up one discount card within the 
time period, the condition is written as: 
m*d*F - { ( m - q*n ) * V I ( 1 + t) } - Adis < q*n*F / ( 1 + t) 
Since V is not less than 0 and not more than F, the cases of three representative 
levels of V - 0, the lowest possible; F. the highest possible; and d*F. a representative 
of intermediate valuation - are analysed in order to interpret this inequality. 
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These three levels of V give reasonable illustration of the effect of variOUS 
valuations of V in interpreting the effects of other variables on the choice of two 
alternative payment mechanisms. 
When V equals 0, the condition is: 
m*d*F . Adis < q*n*F / ( 1 + t) 
This is transformed to: 
F{ m*d . q*n / ( 1 + t)} < Adis 
This means that the choice by a consumer depends on F, m, d, q, n, t and the 
consumer's attitude towards risk. Discount cards are more likely preferred if there 
is a small user fee, small number of coupons in one discount card, large discount, 
high perceived quality of care, large number of illness episodes anticipated, weak 
time preference, and higher risk aversion. This is also interpreted with regard to 
q*n that discount cards are more likely preferred when the number of unused 
coupons decreases. 
When V equals F, the condition is: 
m*d*F' {( m . q*n) * F / ( 1 + t)} . Adis < q*n*F / ( 1 + t) 
This is transformed further to: 
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F*m { d - 1/(1 +t) } < Adis 
This means that the choice by a consumer depends on F, m, d, t and consumer's 
attitude towards risk. Discount cards are more likely preferred with small user fee, 
small number of coupons in one discount card, large discount, weak time preference, 
and higher risk aversion. The relevance of other factors is negligible. 
When V equals d*F, the condition is: 
m*d*F - { ( m - q*n) *d* F / ( 1 + t ) } - Adis < q*n*F / ( 1 + t ) 
This is transformed further to: 
F{ t *m*d - q*n{ 1- d)} < Adis 
or 
F{ m*d - q*n( d - 1- m*d/q*n )/( 1 + t)} <Adis 
or 
F/( 1+ t){ d*q*n{ m*t/q*n + 1) -q*n} < Adis 
These means that the choice by a consumer depends on F, m, q, n, t, d and 
consumer's attitude to risk. Discount cards are more likely preferred if there is a 
small user fee, small number of coupons in one discount card, high perceived quality 
of care, large number of illness episodes anticipated, weak time preference, large 
discount and higher risk aversion. This is also interpreted with regard to q*n that 
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discount cards are more likely preferred when the number of unused coupons 
decreases. These effects are the same as in the case oflow valuation ofV. 
In summary, when a consumer's health status is low and he/she needs a large 
number of discount cards to access health care to maintain health in the time period, 
discount cards are more likely preferred if there is a large discount and weak time 
preference, which implies high income assuming the association between strong 
time preference and low income. The relevance of other factors is negligible. The 
same preference is good when a consumer's health status is relatively high, for 
example, he/she needs one discount card to access health care in order to maintain 
health in the time period, and he/she values an unused coupon highly, close to a 
user fee. The interpretation of this is that a consumer who expects to have a larger 
number of health care visits will enjoy the discount, and that a consumer who 
regards the value of unused coupons as similar to cash for user fees will enjoy the 
discount from user fees on discount cards. 
When a consumer's health status is relatively high - for example, he/she needs one 
discount card for seeking health care to maintain health in the time period and 
he/she values an unused coupon from low, close to none, to intermediate - discount 
cards are more likely preferred ifthere is a small number of coupons in one discount 
card, large discount, high perceived quality of care, large number of illness episodes 
anticipated (implying a small number of unused coupons), and weak time 
preference (implying high income). This is interpreted as: a consumer who can 
afford one discount card in advance and is likely to use up most of the coupons 
(which implies that he/she seeks health care several times, close to the number of 
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coupons in one discount card, and that hislher perception of quality of care is high) 
enjoys the discount from user fees on discount cards. 
As for the relevance of the relationship between consumer's attitude to risk and the 
choice of payment mechanism, choosing discount cards is thought of as reducing 
health risk and financial risk and the risk of health care unavailability. Holding 
unused coupons assures no additional cost from health care to maintain health, and 
it is possible to refrain from seeking care and keep coupons unused when 
appropriate care is unavailable. Therefore, a risk averse consumer is supposed to 
prefer discount cards. Yet, the level of coverage of the risk of health care 
unavailability by discount cards is not attractive to a consumer with relatively high 
health status and low to intermediate valuation of V. He/she is more likely to 
choose user fees when hislher perception of quality of care is low, since advance 
payment for unused coupons is thought of as costly. In this sense, a risk averse 
consumer may prefer user fees in terms of the risk of the unavailability of health 
care. 
6.3.3.2 SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the predictions of this sub· model are as follows. In terms of price 
factor, the relative price of a discount card and a user fee has an effect on the choice. 
A large discount rate and small number of coupons in one discount card lead to a 
preference for discount cards. In terms of income, high income leads to a 
preference for discount cards when perceived health status is high. In terms of 
perceived health status, low health status leads to a preference for discount cards. 
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In terms of perceived quality of care, high perceived quality of care leads to a 
preference for discount cards when perceived health status is high and the 
valuation of unused coupons is low to intermediate. 
6.3.4 GENERAL MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT 
MECHANISMS 
A general model for alternative payment mechanisms is developed in a similar way. 
The choice made by a consumer between paying user fees each time he/she falls ill, 
subscribing to voluntary prepayments in advance and purchasing discount cards in 
advance is modelled here based on the sub-models developed above. Whatever 
concerns he/she has around the choice, it is assumed that he/she chooses one of the 
alternative payment mechanisms in order to maintain health through the 
consumption of health care. He/she is assumed to be a utility mximiser with 
resource constraint. What he/she is going to maximise in the decision making is 
assumed to be the expected utility, which is exactly the same as in the previous 
sub' models. The model is written as follows: 
maximise 
subject to 
given relationship 
EU = EU( EWalt, Aalt, Balt) 
TCH ~ IW 
EWusr = IW - q*p*F / ( 1 + t ) 
EWpre = IW - R 
EWdis = IW - k*m*d*F 
EUusr = EWusr 
EUpre = EWpre + Apre 
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where 
EUdis = EWdis + Adis + Bdis 
Ausr=O 
Apre = constant 
Adis = constant 
Busr= 0 
Bpre = 0 
Bdis = (k*m"q*n)*V/(1 + t) 
n = n( HS) 
q=q(Q) 
alt = ( usr, pre, dis ) 
The arguments about the comparisons between user fees and voluntary 
prepayments, and between user fees and discount cards are the same as in the 
previous sub"sections. A comparison between voluntary prepayments and discount 
cards is presented hereafter. 
The condition for the choice of voluntary prepayment is written with sign analysis 
of expected utility function as below. 
~EU = EU( EWpre, Apre, Bpre ) " EU( EWalt, Adis, Bdis ) > 0 
Applying the form of expected utility function specified above, the condition above is 
equivalent to the condition below: 
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~EW = (EWpre + Apre) - (EWdis + Adis + Bdis) > 0 
This condition is written as: 
(IW - R + Apre ) - [ IW - k*m*d*F + Adis + {( k*m . q*n )*V / ( 1 + t )} ] > 0 
This is transformed into: 
R . Apre < k*m*d*F - { ( k*m-q*n )*V / ( 1 + t) } . Adis 
This means that prepayment is preferred when the premium payable minus the 
risk premium is less than the cost of discount cards minus the value of unused 
coupons with time discounting minus the risk premium. In other words, he/she 
chooses alternative payment mechanisms based on R, k, m, d, F, q, n, V, t, Adis and 
Apre. In order to interpret this complicated inequality, analysis is done according 
to the size ofk and V, which is the same as the analysis in the previous sub-section. 
The relevance of k is the level of health status, since k is a function of health status. 
When k is large, that is, a consumer needs a large number of discount cards to 
access health care to maintain health, the value of unused coupons can be 
considered much smaller than the cost of discount cards. Then, the number of 
unused coupons can be approximated to 0, which means k*m equals q*n. In such 
case, the condition is approximated to: 
R - k*m*d*F < Apre· Adis 
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Since R is a constant and k is assumed to be large, R is likely to be less than 
k*m*d*F. Therefore, voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred with low 
perceived health status. The choice also depends on R, m, d, F, Adis and Apre as 
well. Voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred with low premium, large 
number of coupons in one discount card, small discount, and higher user fee. Since 
the effect of risk reduction by prepayments is perfect and that by discount cards is 
partial according to the definition, I Apre I is larger than I Adis I, voluntary 
prepayments are more likely preferred with risk aversion. 
As the number of purchased discount cards, k, decreases, the relevance of the value 
of unused coupons is considered to increase. For example, when k equals 1, which 
means that a consumer expects not to use up one discount card within the time 
period, the condition is written as below: 
R - m*d*F + (m-q*n )*V / ( 1 + t) < Apre - Adis 
Since V is not less than 0 and not more than F, the cases of three representative 
levels of V - 0, the lowest possible; F, the highest possible; and d*F, a representative 
of intermediate valuation - are analysed in order to interpret this inequality. 
These three levels of V give reasonable illustration of the effect of various 
valuations of V in interpreting the effects of other variables on the choice of two 
alternative payment mechanisms. 
When V equals 0, the condition is: 
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R 0 m*d*F < Apre - Adis 
Since m*d*F is the price of one discount card, this is interpreted to indicate that 
voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred when the premium is lower and 
when the price of one discount card is highero The choice also depends on R, m, d, F, 
Adis and Apre as well. Voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred with low 
premium, large number of coupons in one discount card, small discount, high user 
fee and risk aversion. 
When V equals F, the condition is: 
R 0 m*d*F + { ( moq*n )*F / ( 1 + t) } < Apre - Adis 
This is transformed further to: 
R 0 F{ m*d 0 ( m 0 q*n )/( 1 + t) } < Apre - Adis 
or 
R - F[ m{ d( 1 + t) on + q*n ];( 1+ t ) < Apre - Adis 
This means that the choice by a consumer depends on R, F, d, q, n, t, Adis, Apre and 
m. Voluntary prepayments are more likely preferred with low premium, high user 
fee, small discount, high perceived quality of care, larger number of anticipated 
illness episodes, weak time preference, and risk aversion. The relevance of the 
number of coupons in one discount card is not clear, and depends on d and t. 
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When V equals d*F, the condition is: 
R - m*d*F + {( m-q*n )*d*F / ( 1 + t)} < Apre -Adis 
This is transformed further to: 
R - d*F{ m - ( m - q*n )/( 1 + t ) } < Apre - Adis 
or 
R - d*F( m*t - q*n )/( 1+ t) < Apre - Adis 
This means that the choice by a consumer depends on R, d, F, q, n, t, Apre, Adis and 
m. Voluntary prepayments are more likely preferred when there is a low premium, 
low discount rate, high user fees, high perceived quality of care, large number of 
illness episodes anticipated, weak time preference, risk aversion, and a large 
number of coupons in one discount card. These effects are the same as the case of 
large k and high valuation of V. 
In summary, when a consumer's health status is low and he/she needs a large 
number of discount cards for seeking health care to maintain health in the time 
period, voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred. This is interpreted that a 
consumer who will likely need to access health care a large number oftimes prefers 
voluntary prepayment regardless of the other factors. 
\\-'hen a consumer's health status is relatively high, for example, helshe needs one 
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discount card for seeking health care to maintain health in the time period, and 
he/she places a low value on an unused coupon (close to 0), voluntary prepayment is 
preferred with a low premium, large number of coupons in one discount card, high 
user fees, and small discount rate, which implies high income assuming the 
association between strong time preference and low income. This is interpreted 
that a consumer who does not finish one discount card in the time period will prefer 
voluntary prepayment when the premium is lower than the price of one discount 
card. 
On the other hand, when a consumer's health status is likewise relatively high (for 
example, he/she needs one discount card for seeking health care to maintain health 
in the time period), but he/she values an unused coupon high (close to a user fee) to 
intermediate, voluntary prepayment is more likely preferred with a low premium, 
large number of coupons in one discount, card, low discount rate, high perceived 
quality of care, high user fees, large number of illness episodes anticipated 
(implying small number of unused coupons), and weak time preference (implying 
high income). This is interpreted thus: a consumer who is likely to use a small 
number of coupons is more likely to prefer voluntary prepayment. 
As for the relevance to the relationship between a consumer's attitude towards risk 
and the choice of payment mechanism, voluntary prepayments reduce health risk 
and financial risk, and discount cards reduce the risk of health care unavailability 
in addition to health risk and financial risk, as discussed in previous sub-models. 
Therefore, a risk averse consumer with high perceived quality of care is more likely 
to prefer voluntary prepayments_ And a risk averse consumer with low perceived 
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quality of care may prefer discount cards. 
In conclusion, the prediction of this comparison is as follows. In terms of price 
factor, the relative price of the prepayment premium and the price of a discount 
card has an effect on the choice. A low premium compared to a small discount rate 
and large number of coupons in one discount card leads to a preference for 
voluntary prepayment. In terms of income, high income leads to a preference for 
voluntary prepayment when perceived health status is high and the valuation of 
unused coupons is high to intermediate. In terms of perceived health status, low 
health status leads to a preference for voluntary prepayment. In terms of 
perceived quality of care, high perceived quality of care leads to a preference for the 
voluntary discount card when perceived health status is high and the valuation of 
unused coupons is high to intermediate. 
Finally, these three are compared in terms of important factors which are 
considered in the above arguments of coupled comparisons. 
In terms of falling health status, prepayment is more likely preferred than discount 
cards, and discount cards are more likely preferred than user fees. Therefore, the 
order of preference with low health status is ( prepayment> discount card> user 
fees ). 
In terms offalling perceived quality of care, user fees are more likely preferred than 
prepayment and discount cards. And discount cards are more likely preferred 
than prepayment. Therefore, the order of preference with low perceived quality of 
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care is ( prepayment < discount card < user fees ). 
In terms offalling income, if the association between strong time preference and low 
income is assumed, user fees are more likely preferred than prepayment and 
discount card. And discount cards are more likely preferred than prepayment. 
Therefore, the order of preference with low income is ( prepayment < discount card 
< user fees). 
In conclusion, the predictions of the model are as follows. In terms of price factor, 
the relative prices of alternatives have an effect on the choice. The lower one is the 
more likely choice. In terms of income, the order of preference is ( prepayment < 
discount card < user fees). In terms of perception of initial health status, the 
perception of low health status may lead to a preference for prepayment. The 
order is ( prepayment> discount card> user fees). In terms of perception of the 
quality of health care, the perception of low quality may lead to a preference for user 
fees. The order is (prepayment < discount card < user fees). 
6.3.5 CHOICE AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL 
One of the characteristics of the discount card operated in the study fields is that it 
allows sharing between people, for example, a household, while fees and premiums 
are paid by individual users. In this sense, the decision of purchasing discount 
cards can be made by a group of people. In order to incorporate this characteristic 
into the model, let it be assumed that a household chooses one payment mechanism. 
This means that members of the household choose the same payment mechanism. 
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Then, the expected utility is as below. 
EUusr' = EWusr' 
EUpre' = EWpre' + Apre' 
= IW . q*n'*F / ( 1 + t ) 
= IW - h*R + Apre' 
EUdis' = EWdis' + Adis' + Bdis' = IW· k*m*d*F + Adis' + {( k*m . q*n' )*V / ( 1 + t)} 
where n' = expected number of episodes a group of consumers 
(e.g. household) have during a time period 
h = number of persons in the group of consumers 
Prepayment is subscribed instead of paying user fees with a condition as below. 
~EW = EUpre'· EUusr' > 0 
This condition is written: 
( IW - h*R + Apre') . { IW . q*n'*F / ( 1 + t) } > 0 
It is reduced to: 
h*R . q*n'*F / ( 1 + t) < Apre' 
In terms of h, this means that prepayment IS preferred when the number of 
household members is small. 
Discount cards are purchased instead of subscribing to prepayment with a condition 
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as below. 
~EU = EUdis' - EUpre'> 0 
This condition is written: 
[IW - k*m*d*F + Adis' + {( k*m - q*n' )*V / ( 1 + t) }].( IW - h*R + Apre') > 0 
It is reduced to: 
h*R - [k*m*d*F + {( k*m-q*n' )*V / ( 1 + t) }] < Apre' -Adis' 
In terms of h, this means that the discount card is preferred when the number of 
household members is large. 
In short, prepayment is preferred compared with both user fees and discount cards 
when the number of household members is small. 
In order to compare the effect of h between discount cards and user fees, further 
assumption is needed, since h itself does not appear in the expected utilities of them. 
A condition that discount cards are purchased instead of paying user fees is written 
as below. 
~EU = EUdis' - EUusr' > 0 
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This condition is written: 
[IW 0 k*m*d*F + Adis' + {( k*m 0 q*n' )*V / ( 1 + t)}]o (IW·q*n'*F/(I+t»>O 
It is reduced to: 
k*m*d*F 0 { ( k*moq*n' )*V / ( 1 + t ) } 0 q*n'*F / ( 1 + t ) < Adis' 
In order to interpret the effect ofh, let it be assumed that n' increases as h increases. 
This means that larger households tend to experience more illness episodes by 
family members. This is plausible when equal individual risks are assumed. 
Then, as discussed with n in section 6.2.3., discount cards are preferred when n' is 
large. Therefore, discount cards are preferred instead of paying user fees when the 
number of household members is large. 
In conclusion, for smaller households, discount cards are more likely preferred than 
user fees, and user fees are more likely preferred than prepayment. Therefore, the 
order of preference with large households is ( prepayment < user fees < discount 
card). The prediction of the model is that a household being large will lead to a 
preference for discount cards. The order is ( prepayment < user fees < discount 
card ). 
6.3.6 REDUCED FORM OF THE GENERAL MODEL 
The demand function in reduced form from the choice model is written as below. 
168 
faIt = falt{ Calt, 1(t), HS, Q, Zalt) 
where f= whether an alternative is chosen or not 
I = income 
C = cost of health care under an alternative 
Z = a vector of other factors 
f stands for the choice of alternative payment mechanisms. One of them is chosen 
based on utility maximisation. If EU from one alternative exceeds EU from the 
other two, f takes a value of chosen. If not, the value is not chosen. The value 
depends on EU of each alternative, which basically depends on the characteristics of 
an alternative, the characteristics of an individual, and other influencing factors. 
The general model elaborated depicts parts of these three factors. 
The role of the cost of health care under each alternative, as an economic variable, is 
shown in the explanation of EW, so this variable is taken as an independent 
variable in the function f. The model depicts the role of income associated with 
time preference, perceived health status and perceived quality of care, so that these 
three factors are incorporated as independent variables as well. An individual 
may choose a different alternative even when he/she faces the same cost with the 
same initial wealth, health status and quality of care. The choice may be due to 
the other factors or the different shape of utility function. These are called taste 
including risk preference. Z stands for these factors, of which the model fails in 
explaining the relevance. 
If the choice at household level is assumed, this function is written as below. 
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faIt = faIt{ CaIt, Ht), HS, Q, h, ZaIt ) 
6.4 EQUITY CONSEQUENCES 
The equity as an endpoint of this study is derived from the concern about the 
financial barrier to access to health care, especially by the poor section of the 
population created or enhanced by direct payments, introduced in Chapter 1. This 
is about equal access for equal need irrespective of income status. Therefore, 
horizontal equity in health care provision defined as equal access for equal need is 
taken as a definition in this study in Chapter 2. 
Based on the models elaborated in this chapter, the equity consequences of financial 
alternatives according to this definition are discussed in order to answer the third 
research question in this section. 
Health care utilisation in the two demand models is considered as a proxy for access, 
and health status in the choice model is considered as a proxy for need in the 
following discussion. And unequal access to health care according to income status, 
not to need, is considered horizontal inequity as well. 
Additionally, the implications of the two demand models for vertical equity in health 
care financing, defined as unequal payment according to unequal ability to pay, is 
also discussed. 
In terms of horizontal equity in health care provision, both voluntary prepayments 
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and discount cards may facilitate access by a consumer when he/she falls ill in 
comparison with user fees. The variation of these effects by both health status and 
income are not clear in the utilisation model. This implies that both payment 
mechanisms may have a positive impact on horizontal equity if the membership 
coverage is expanded, assuming the deterioration of access by the financial barrier 
created or enhanced by user fees. Even if the membership coverage is limited, the 
prediction of the choice model that high-risk groups may prefer to choose voluntary 
prepayments or discount cards may lead to a positive impact on horizontal equity 
(according to the prediction of the utilisation mode!), since they are considered to 
have the effect of promoting access according to need. With an assumption that 
low income relates to low health status, both prepayment mechanisms may have a 
positive impact on horizontal equity. However, it is suggested that low income 
groups may not choose voluntary prepayments or discount cards. The cost of the 
premium or of discount cards may be too expensive for the lower income group with 
strong time preference. This may result in a negative impact, since both payment 
mechanisms only serve for higher income groups and may widen the gap in access 
across income levels irrespective of need. Voluntary prepayments are superior to 
discount cards in promoting horizontal equity if the quality of care is assured, since 
their facilitation of health care utilisation is larger than for discount cards 
according to the utilisation model. However, given the difficulty of achieving high 
quality of care in the context of the study fields, discount cards may attract more 
individuals, which may bring more positive impact. 
In terms of vertical equity in health care finance, the weakness of the models in 
explaining the effect of income makes discussion difficult. Their failures in 
171 
explaining the costs of seeking health care other than direct price make this worse. 
Since there is no price discrimination for income group, the three payment 
mechanisms may have only marginal effect on vertical equity. Taking the adverse 
selection for voluntary prepayments and discount cards into account, it could be 
argued that frequent users enjoy a relatively cheap price for care. This may have a 
marginal positive impact on vertical equity with an assumption that low health 
status relates to low income. In this sense, voluntary prepayments in which cost is 
unaffected by utilisation may have a more positive impact than discount cards. 
However, if the prices of voluntary prepayments and discount cards are too high for 
the majority of people with strong time preference, this positive impact may be 
cancelled and even become negative. 
6.5 HYPOTHESES DEDUCED FROM THE MODELS 
Hypotheses deduced from the predictions of the models elaborated in the theoretical 
investigation to answer the three research questions are as below. 
In regard to the first research question, 'how do people seek health care under each 
payment mechanism?', the hypothesis is: 
1) The utilisation of health care is facilitated by voluntary prepayments and 
discounted cards compared with user fees. The order of this effect is: 
Voluntary prepayments > Discount cards> User fees 
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In regard to the second research question, 'how do people choose alternative 
payment mechanisms?', the hypotheses are: 
2-a) The pricing of payment mechanisms affects a consumer's choice of alternatives. 
A mechanism with low relative price to each individual will be more likely chosen. 
2-b) Income affects a consumer's choice of alternative payment mechanisms. The 
preference in terms of decreasing income is: 
Voluntary prepayments < Discount cards < User fees 
2-d The consumer's expected number of attendances at health centres due to illness 
based on perceived health status affects hislher choice of alternative payment 
mechanisms. The preference in terms of increasing number is: 
Voluntary prepayments > Discount cards> User fees 
2-d) The consumer's perceived quality of care affects his/her choice of alternative 
payment mechanisms. The preference in terms of decreasing perceived quality of 
care is: 
Voluntary prepayments < Discount cards < User fees 
2-e) The size of the household affects the consumer's choice of alternative payment 
mechanisms. The preference in terms of decreasing size of the household is: 
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Voluntary prepayments < User fees < Discount cards 
In regard to the third research question, 'is equity promoted through the 
introduction of voluntary prepayments or discount cards?', the hypotheses are: 
3-a) If the coverage is expanded, both voluntary prepayments and discount cards 
have a potential positive impact on horizontal equity. 
3-b) People with a large number of expected attendances are more likely to choose 
voluntary prepayments or discount cards, which lead to a positive impact on 
horizontal equity. 
3-c) People with low income are more likely to choose user fees. Since the 
utilisation facilitated by prepayment may be enjoyed by those with high income only, 
this may result in a negative impact on horizontal equity. 
3-d) If the quality of care is assured, prepayments have more potential to improve 
horizontal equity. Given the difficulty of achieving this, discount cards may bring 
a larger positive impact. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS 2 
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 1 
ANALYSIS OF LIVING CONDITIONS MONITORING SURVEY 1998 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the first data source, the Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998 (LCMS98) data set. 
Five points are reported in this chapter. Firstly, the maps of consumers' health 
care service utilisation in the field are constructed. This is to empirically 
demonstrate the distribution of health care service utilisation in the field 
introduced in Chapter 1. There are several types of health facilities in the field 
such as governmental health centres, governmental hospitals, private hospitals, 
industrial hospitals, and traditional healers, for which individuals seek health care 
when they fall ill. The maps show that large volume of health care is consumed at 
governmental health centres compared to the volume of health care consumed at 
the other type of health facilities. Therefore, health centres have significance 
when considering equity in the field. 
Secondly, consumers' choices of payment mechanism in the field are examined with 
two types of index representing choice; one is the choice at the time of utilisation 
and another is the choice before falling ill. This provides a basis for the analysis of 
the hypotheses derived from the theoretical models in the following sections. 
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Thirdly, the hypotheses derived from the utilisation model are tested. This is to 
show the effects of consumers' choice of payment mechanism to facilitate the 
utilisation of health care at the time of illness. 
Fourthly, the hypotheses derived from the choice model are tested. This is to show 
the effects of various factors on consumers' choice of payment mechanism. 
Finally, the consumers' utilisation of health care in terms of income is examined in 
order to examine how payment mechanisms impact on equity. 
7.2 UVING CONDITIONS MONITORING SURVEY 1998 (LCMS98) 
As introduced in Chapter 5, the LCMS98 was a nationwide household survey, in 
which 93,471 individuals in 16,715 households were sampled over 72 districts. In 
this study, the data from the samples within Lusaka district and Kitwe district are 
extracted and analysed. Table 7.1 shows the numbers of household samples and 
individual samples within the two districts. 
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Table 7.1 Number of samples, weighted counts and illness episodes in the last two weeks 
Individuals 
Households 
Infant (0-5) Child (6-15) Adult (16-64) Elderly (65-) Age unknown Total 
Lusaka No. of samples 2,12:3 1,8:35 .1,022 6.484 100 11,442 
Weighted counts I No. of 
309,771 (26.6) 218,524* 192,561 <16.6) 
households and individuals (%) 
650,477 (56.0) 9,583 (0.8) 72 (0.0) 1,162,464** (100.0) 
No. of individuals having illness 
32,362 (29.8) 15,000 (13.8) 60,064 (55.4) 1,080 (I.O) o (0.0) 108,506 (100.0) 
episodes in the last two weeks (%) 
...... 
% of individuals having illness 
-l 1(;.8% 4.8 9.2 11.:3 0.0 9.3 
-l episodes in the last two weeks 
Kitwe No. of samples 560 599 1.023 1,826 31 2 3,481 
Weighted counts / No. of 
households and individuals (%) 
75,657* 78,229(17.4) 128,212 (28.5) 240,061 (53.3) 3,687 (0.8) 307 (0.1) 450,496** (100.0) 
No. of individuals having illness 
9,577 (31.3) 6,344 (20.7) 14,386 (47.0) 298 (1.0) o (0.0) 30,605 (100.0) 
episodes in the last two weeks (%) 
% of individuals having illness 
12.2 4.9 6.0 8.1 0.0 6.8 
episodes in the last two weeks 
* Equivalent to the number of households. ** Equivalent to population. 
The samples examined in the following analysis are 2,123 households and 11,442 
individuals in Lusaka, and 560 households and 3,481 individuals in Kitwe. 
7.2.1 USE OF WEIGHT 
Since a stratified sampling method, in which households are sampled from 
geographical sampling areas used in national census, is used in the LCMS98, 
weights are attached to the samples to ensure an unbiased representativeness at 
the district level (CSO, 1999). Weights are set at the level at which the sampled 
households could represent all the households in their sampling geographical areas, 
so that total weighted counts of sampled households coincide with the population 
enumerated in the latest census in 1990. Table 7.1 also shows the weighted counts 
of household samples, 218,524 in Lusaka and 75,657 in Kitwe, which are equivalent 
to the numbers of households, and the weighted counts of individual samples, 
1,162,464 in Lusaka and 450,496 in Kitwe, which are equivalent to the population 
in each district. The weights are used in the following analysis, and figures such 
as N in all results hereafter are weighted counts in order to make discussion at 
district level unbiased. 
7.2.2 AGE GROUP 
Table 7.1 shows the breakdown of the numbers of individuals by age group. Since 
this study focuses on the health behaviour related to direct payment at 
governmental health centres, child (6 to 15 years old) and adult (16 to 64 years old) 
age groups are analysed, both of which are supposed to pay for health care. 
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7.2.3 ILLNESS EPISODES 
Individuals' illness episodes in the last two weeks of the survey are investigated in 
LCMS98. Table 7.1 also shows the numbers and the percentages of individuals 
who had at least one illness episode in the period. 9.3% of individuals in Lusaka 
and 6.8% in Kitwe report having illness episodes. With regard to the percentages 
of individuals who had illness episodes, child and adult age groups have relatively 
small figures compared with infant and elderly age groups in both districts. 
However, the share of child and adult age groups in the number of illness episodes 
amounts to 69.2% in Lusaka and 68.4% in Kitwe. These age groups are considered 
to bear a significant burden of illness episodes, and the treatment of these illness 
episodes is considered to be important to equity in the health system in the two 
districts in terms of the volume of illness episodes. Child and adult consumers' 
health behaviours upon these illness episodes are to be analysed in the following. 
7.2.4 DISCOUNT CARD 
Since the trials of discount cards at health centres in the two districts are operating 
on a small scale, the sampling frame of the LCMS98 is insufficient to observe 
consumers' choice of discount cards. The choice of discount cards is not 
investigated in the LCl\1S98 questionnaire. Therefore, the following analysis 
using the utilisation model is limited to the effect of low'cost prepayment, and the 
analysis using the choice model is limited to the choice between user fees, low'cost 
prepayments at governmental health centres and other options of payment 
mechanism available at health facilities other than governmental health centres. 
179 
7.3 MAPS OF CONSUMERS' HEALTH CARE SERVICE UTILISATION 
In order to construct the maps of consumers' utilisation of health care in the two 
districts, individuals' illness episodes are analysed with the characteristics of the 
health system and the individuals' background in this section. 
7.3.1 CONSUMERS' COPING BEHAVIOUR UNDER ILLNESS EPISODES 
Table 7.2 shows patients' coping behaviour with illness episodes in child and adult 
age groups. 
Table 7.2 Coping behaviour with illness episodes (%) 
Consulted Used self-administered medicine None Unknown Total 
LUHaka 41.6 37.6 19.8 1.0 100.0 
Kitwe :35.8 :39.0 24.9 0.3 )()o.o 
41.6% of patients in Lusaka and 35.8% in Kitwe who suffered from illness episodes 
in the last two weeks of the survey consulted at health facilities, although using 
self-administered medicines is a popular coping behaviour in the two districts as 
well. 
7.3.2 GOVERNMENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES AS MAJOR PROVIDERS 
Table 7.3 shows the type of health facilities where health care was sought by child 
and adult patients, and demonstrates the role of governmental health centres 
serving the majority of the population, as described in Chapter 1. 
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Table 7.3 Type of health facilities attended (%) 
Governmental Industrial Private Traditional 
institution inst.itution healer Unknown Total hospital health centre 
Lusaka 18.1 59.0 2.1 10.8 1.3 8.7 100.0 
Kitwe 13.2 50.8 28.4 0.0 0.0 7.7 100.0 
More than half of the patients, 59.0% in Lusaka and 50.8% in Kitwe, sought health 
care at governmental health centres in both districts. Thus, health care provided 
at governmental health centres is considered to be significant to equity in the 
health system in the two districts in terms of volume of health care provided. 
In Lusaka, 18.1% of patients sought health care at the governmental hospital. 
This share is second to that of health centres. The total share of governmental 
facilities amounts to 77.1%. Thus, governmental facilities, the hospital and health 
centres, serve as a major health care provider to the population. 
Only 10.8% of Lusaka patients sought health care at private institutions. 
Utilisation of other health facilities such as industrial institutions and traditional 
healers was limited. 
In Kitwe, 13.2% of patients sought health care at the governmental hospital. The 
total share of governmental facilities here amounts to 64.0%. Thus, governmental 
facilities, the hospital and health centres, serve as a major health care provider to 
the population here as well. 
28.4% of patients m Kitwe sought health care at industrial institutions. 
Utilisation of other health facilities such as private institutions and traditional 
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healers was negligible. 
The difference in the utilisation of non-governmental facilities between Lusaka and 
Kitwe is considered to reflect the difference in the distribution of facilities between 
the two districts, as introduced in Chapter 1. More private facilities than 
industrial facilities operate in Lusaka, while more industrial facilities than private 
facilities operate in Kitwe. 
7.3.3 LEVEL OF CARE PROVIDED AT DIFFERENT HEALTH FACILITIES 
Table 7.4a shows the breakdown of child and adult patients' illness episodes by 
diagnosis in the two districts and Table 7.4b shows shares of illness episodes dealt 
with by health facility and by diagnosis. These tables demonstrate the role of 
health facilities in terms oflevel of care as described in Chapter 1. 
182 
Table 7.4a Shares of illness episodes by diagnosis (%) 
Lusaka Kitwe 
Fever/malaria 32.9 40.1 
Cough/cold 13.2 11.6 
Diarrhoea/without blood 3.5 0.0 
Diarrhoea/with blood 0.0 0.0 
Diarrhoea/vomiting 1.6 0.0 
Vomiting 0.9 2.1 
Abdominal pain 8.0 6.3 
Eye infection 2.9 2.3 
Ear infection 0.3 0.0 
Toothache/mouth infection 3.7 5.8 
Headache 3.9 7.1 
Measles 3.3 1.6 
Injury 8.0 9.9 
Other 18.0 10.2 
Unknown 0.0 3.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
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Table 7.4b Share. ofillnes. epi.odes by health facility and by diagnos;" (%l 
Lusaka 
Kitwe 
'. 
Fever/malaria 
Cough/cold 
Diarrhoea/without 
blood 
Diarrhoea/with 
blood 
Diarrhoea/vomit ing 
Vomiting 
Abdominal pain 
Eye infection 
Ear infection 
Toothachel 
mouth infection 
Headache 
Measles 
Injury 
Other 
Unknown 
Total 
Fever/malaria 
Cough/cold 
Diarrhoea/without 
blood 
DiarrhoE'a/with 
blood 
Dianhoea/vomiting 
Vomiting 
Abdominal pain 
Eye mfpcfion 
Ea .. infection 
Toothache/ 
month mfection 
Head,,,:he 
Measles 
Injury 
Other 
l'nknown 
Total 
Governmental 
ho.pital health centre 
8.6 58.7 
28.1 58.7 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 51.9 
0.0 100.0 
11.7 55.0 
45.5 23.3 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 84.7 
0.0 64.5 
60.1 39.9 
18.3 64.4 
32.5 53.1 
0.0 0.0 
18.1 59.0 
8.0 66.0 
7.8 44.7 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 00 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
29.3 31.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 0.0 
00 31.9 
0.0 75.4 
0.0 00 
0.0 47.2 
71.4 0.0 
0.0 100.0 
13.2 50.8 
Industrial 
institutio 
n 
4.2 
0.0 
0.0 
00 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2.1 
19.4 
47.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1000 
:19.6 
0.0 
0.0 
28.1 
0.0 
100.0 
43.4 
28.6 
0.0 
28.4 
Private 
institutio 
n 
11.8 
9.1 
0.0 
0.0 
6.S 
0.0 
18.6 
31.2 
0.0 
15.3 
17.8 
0.0 
8.2 
7.4 
0.0 
10.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
00 
0.0 
00 
0.0 
00 
00 
Traditional 
healer 
1.0 
00 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
17.6 
00 
0.0 
00 
0.0 
1.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
00 
0.0 
00 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Unknown Total 
15.8 100.0 
4.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
41.6 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
7.3 100.0 
0.0 1000 
100.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
3.5 100.0 
7.0 1000 
0.0 100.0 
8.7 100.0 
6.6 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 1000 
0.0 100.0 
40.0 100.0 
24.6 1000 
0.0 1000 
9.4 1000 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 1000 
7.7 1000 
Fever/malaria is the most frequent diagnosis in both districts, accounting for 32.9% 
of illness episodes III Lusaka and 40.1% in Kitwe. Governmental health centres, 
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industrial institutions, private institutions, and traditional healers deal with 
patients with fever/malaria approximately in proportion to their shares in providing 
health care shown in Table 7.3. However, governmental hospitals deal with fewer 
patients with fever/malaria than their proportionate share in all services. This 
pattern is also seen for the second most frequent diagnosis, cough/cold, and another 
relatively frequent diagnosis, injury, as well. This suggests that common illnesses 
are mainly dealt with at governmental health centres, industrial institutions, 
private institutions and traditional healers in the two districts. 
On the contrary, governmental hospitals deal with more patients with illness 
episodes classified as 'other' than their proportionate share in all services. 
Although detailed diagnoses or severities of illness episodes classified as 'other' are 
not specified, they are thought of as less common illnesses, which may need specific 
services beyond the scope of services provided at facilities other than a 
governmental hospital. In this sense, governmental hospitals are considered to 
deal with illnesses that are difficult to treat in the field. Thus, they are considered 
to provide higher care to the population. 
Private institutions in Lusaka and industrial institutions in Kitwe are considered to 
provide higher care in part as well, since they also deal with more than their share 
of patients with illness episodes classified as 'other'. 
7.3.4 PATIENTS' CHOICE OF PAYMENT MECHANISM 
Table 7.5 shows child and adult patients' choice of payment mechanism by type of 
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health facility. 
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Table 7.;; Patients' choice of payment mechanism by type of health facility (%) 
Direct payment Third party payment No payment 
User Prepayments Private Exemption Other Unknown Total 
High·cost 
Employer 
Insurance Diagnosis Low·income fees Low·cost reason 
Lusaka Governmental hospital 25.4 38.9 5.2 20.6 0.0 3.8 0.0 5.9 0.1 100.0 
Governmental health centre 32.0 58.3 1.2 2.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 3.9 1.7 100.0 
Industrial institution 46.7 0.0 0.0 53.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Private institutioll 71.7 0.0 0.0 28.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Traditiollal healer 44.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.6 0.0 100.0 
Unknown 34.5 0.0 0.0 35.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 28.4 100.0 
Total 35.8 41.4 1.7 12.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 4.2 3.5 100.0 
Kitwe Governmental hospital 43.9 19.0 14.0 0.0 0.0 16.2 0.0 0.0 6.8 100.0 
,.... 
Governmental health centre 5().7 28.7 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.6 0.0 100.0 Cl) 
-l 
Industrial institution 15.1 10.3 0.0 61.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 7.6 100.0 
Private institution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Traditional healer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Unknown 45.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.5 100.0 
Total 39.3 20.0 3.4 17.4 0.0 2.1 0.0 10.6 7.2 100.0 
This is to illustrate how patients pay for health care within the payment 
mechanism options available at various health facilities, and the segmentation 
between high-cost departments and low-cost departments at governmental 
hospitals described in Chapter 1. 
7.3.4.1 GOVERNMENTAL HOSPITAL 
In the low-cost department at governmental hospitals, user fees and low-cost 
prepayments are available as options of direct payment, although the latter can be 
used only by patients referred from health centres. Exemptions according to 
governmental guidelines are also practised. In the high-cost department, 
subscription to high-cost prepayments is required in order to receive services. 
25.4% of patients in Lusaka and 43.9% in Kitwe report payment by user fees, and 
38.9% in Lusaka and 19.0% in Kitwe report low-cost prepayments. Including the 
9.7% of patients in Lusaka and 16.2% in Kitwe who were exempted, 74.0% of 
patients in Lusaka and 79.1% in Kitwe attended the low-cost departments. 
5.2% in Lusaka and 14.0% in Kitwe report payment with high-cost prepayments, 
and attend the high· cost departments. 20.6% of patients in Lusaka report 
payment by their employers. These payments are usually made by subscription to 
high-cost prepayments according to observations made during the field work. 
They are assumed to have paid with high-cost prepayments and attend high-cost 
departments. Therefore, coupled with the 5.2% of patients reporting payment with 
high-cost prepayments, 25.8% of patients in total are assumed to attend the 
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high-cost department in Lusaka. 
No patients in Kitwe report payment by their employer at governmental hospital. 
This is probably because those employers in Kitwe affluent enough to pay for 
employees' attendances at the high-cost department own industrial facilities 
themselves and provide health care directly. 
With this analysis, the majority of patients are considered to seek health care at the 
low-cost departments in both districts. 
7.3.4.2 GOVERNMENTAL HEALTH CENTRE 
At governmental health centres, user fees, low-cost prepayments, and high-cost 
prepayments are available as payment options, and exemptions according to the 
governmental guidelines are practised. 
In Lusaka, the majority of patients, 58.3%, report payment by low-cost prepayments, 
compared with 32.0% by user fees. In Kitwe, the majority, 50.7%, report payment 
by user fees, compared with 28.7% by low-cost prepayments. The option of 
payment by low-cost prepayments is exercised in both districts to a considerable 
extent. 
Some patients, 1.2% in Lusaka and 3.1% in Kitwe, attend governmental health 
centres and have access to the high'cost departments at governmental hospitals 
with high-cost prepayments. In addition, a limited number of patients in Lusaka, 
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2.3%, report payment by their employers. No typical financial arrangement for 
these patients whose care is paid for by their employers was found during the field 
work. 
7.3.4.3 EXEMPTION AT GOVERNMENTAL FACILITIES 
With regard to the practice of exemption, patients in both districts were exempted 
from payment on the basis of diagnosis at governmental facilities, both hospitals 
and health centres. No patients report exemption on the basis oflow income, while 
5.9% of patients at governmental hospital and 3.9% of patients at governmental 
health centres in Lusaka, and 17.6% of patients at governmental health centres in 
Kitwe report no payment for other reasons. These may include patients who 
received health care even when they were unable to pay. Such cases are thought of 
as practically "exemption" on the basis of low income. However, this is not clear 
from this survey. 
7.3.4.4 OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
At private institutions in Lusaka, user fees and payment by employer are available 
as payment options. 71.7% of patients report payment by user fees, and 28.3% by 
their employers. No patients report payment with private insurance. 
At industrial institutions in Kitwe, user fees and payment by the employer are 
available as payment options. In addition, some institutions accept low'cost 
prepayment through collaboration with the district health management team. 
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Others are open for non-employees, with user fees levied on them_ 15.1% of 
patients report payment by user fees, and 10.3% by their employer. 5.7% of 
patients were exempted on the basis of unspecified reasons. 
7.3.4.5 TWO DIVISIONS IN GOVERNMENTAL HEALTH CARE PROVISION 
Since there IS segmentation between high-cost departments and low-cost 
departments at governmental hospitals, this should be taken into account in 
constructing the map of consumers' utilisation of health care in terms of patients' 
income status. 
The high-cost departments are considered to serve for the affluent section of the 
population. On the contrary, the low-cost departments at governmental hospitals 
are open in principle for patients referred from health centres, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1. Therefore, health centres and the low-cost departments at hospitals 
are considered to collaboratively serve for the poor section of the population. There 
are some patients who attend the low-cost departments at governmental hospitals 
directly paying user fees. These people are considered to be relatively poor 
compared to those who attend the high-cost departments, since they cannot afford 
to subscribe to high-cost prepayments. 
At health centres, there are a few patients who use high-cost prepayments as their 
payment method, since patients with high-cost prepayments are allowed to attend 
health centres. They are considered to be patients from the affluent section of the 
population who choose to attend health centres instead of visiting the high-cost 
191 
department at a governmental hospital for some reason. These patients need to be 
treated differently from the majority of health centre users in analysing equity in 
terms of income. 
With this analysis, governmental health care provision can be seen as the 
combination of two divisions with the collaboration between health centres and 
hospitals in terms of sections of the population they serve. These are: a low-cost 
division which serves the poor section of the population and consists of a low-cost 
department at hospitals and health centres; and a high-cost division, which serves 
the affluent section of the population with high-cost prepayments and consists of a 
high-cost department at hospitals and health centres. In other words, patients 
with high-cost prepayments attend the high-cost division, and others attend the 
low-cost division. Dividing governmental health care provision in this way rather 
than simply differentiating health centres from hospitals is thought of as useful in 
constructing the map of health care service utilisation in relation to income status 
in the following. 
7.3.5 PATIENTS' INCOME 
Table 7.6 shows child and adult patients' average household income per head by 
health facility taking the above mentioned division into account. 
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Table 7.6 Patients' household income per head by health facility 
Lusaka 
Kitwe 
Governmentallow'cost division 
Governmental high'cost division 
Industrial 
Private 
Traditional healer 
All 
Governmentallow'cost division 
Governmental high'cost division 
Industrial 
Private 
Traditional healer 
All 
Household income per head (IO 
Mean S.D. 
61,902 63,887 
92,688 172,286 
88,035 100,391 
90,507 108,9:35 
39,388 18,058 
67,625 84,543 
83,881 125,228 
44,172 21,555 
1:36,052 164,708 
1:38,977 
In Lusaka, the average income among patients attending the governmental 
high'cost division, K 92,688 per month, is higher than that among patients 
attending the low'cost division, K 61,902, The average income among patients at 
private institutions is also high, K 90,507. These differences in average income 
demonstrate the differences in health facilities in serving different income groups, 
described in Chapter 1. 
On the contrary, In Kitwe, the average income among patients attending the 
governmental high'cost division, K 44,172 per month, is lower than that among 
patients attending the low'cost division, K 83,881. The average income among 
patients attending another major health care provider, industrial institutions, is 
higher than that of patients attending governmental facilities, at K 136,052. The 
lower average income among patients at the governmental high'cost division than 
that of patients at the low'cost division contradicts with the assumed functions of 
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these two divisions. This may result from the bias due to the small number of 
patient samples at the high-cost division. Actually, only 2 sampled individuals are 
observed as high-cost division users in Kitwe, this is due to the limitation of the 
LCMS98 as data source. However, the differences in average income between 
patients at the governmental low-cost division and at industrial institutions 
demonstrate the differences in health facilities in serving different income groups of 
the population_ 
7.3.6 PATIENTS' EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
Table 7.7 shows the employment status of adult patients by health facility taking 
functional division into account, and demonstrates the differences among health 
faeilities in serving different groups in the population, described in Chapter 1. 
Table 7.7 Adult patients' employment status by health facility (%) 
Employed Not employed llnknown Total 
Lusaka Governmentallow'cost division 45.5 52.4 2.2 100.0 
Governmental high'cost division 78.8 21.2 0.0 100.0 
Industrial 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Private 76.6 22.3 1.0 100.0 
Traditional healer 21.6 75.4 0.0 100.0 
Total 52.6 45.6 1.8 100.0 
Kitwe Governmental low'cost division 33.3 66.7 0.0 100.0 
Governmental high'cost division 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Industrial 63.1 :l{U) 0.0 100.0 
Private 100.0 
Traditional healer 100.0 
Total 4:15 5G.5 0.0 100.0 
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The proportions of adult patients attending the governmental high-cost division 
who are employed, 78.8% in Lusaka and 100.0% in Kitwe, are higher than those 
attending the low-cost division, 45.5% in Lusaka and 33.3% in Kitwe. The 
proportion of adult patients attending private institutions in Lusaka who are 
employed is also high, 76.6%. And the proportion of individuals attending 
industrial institutions who are employed is also high, 63.1%. Thus, the 
governmental low-cost division serves the economically worse-off population in 
terms of employment status compared with the governmental high-cost division, 
private institutions, and industrial institutions in the two districts. 
7.3.7 MAP OF CONSUMERS' HEALTH CARE SERVICE UTILISATION 
In summary, the relationships between patients' attendances at health facilities 
and their backgrounds described in the introduction of health systems are 
suggested empirically through the analysis, except for the relationship between 
patients' income status and attendances at the governmental high' cost division in 
Kitwe. 
Figures 7.1a and 7.1b show the map of child and adult consumers' health care 
service utilisation in both districts. 
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Lusaka 
Population 
Age group 
Consultation 
Health care 
service 
9.3% 
ill in 
the last 
2 weeks 
90.7% healthy in the last 2 weeks 
69.2% 30.8% 
children and adults infants and elderly 
--
41.6% 58.4% 
consult at not consult at 
health facilities health facilities 
wurse uff 
individuals better off 
~ individuals governmental health c~ 
used with hit,:h'cost prepaymentil 
,'-
56.9% governmental health centres 2.1% 10.8% 12.1% 
-
private uther 
high'cost department ~7% insti' facilities ut governmental hospital......--- tutions 
13.4% low·cost department at governmental hospital 
T T 
Governmental low'cost division Governmental high'cost division. 
Figure 7.1a Map of consumer's health care service utilisation in Lusaka 
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Kitwe 
Population 
Age group 
Consultation 
Health care 
service 
6.8% 
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the la t 
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93.2% healthy in the last 2 weeks 
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./ 
49.2% guvernmental health centres 1.6[.-. 28.4% 7.6% 
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high"cust department imltitutions facil" 
at g(m:!rnme_ntHLhuspitnl...-- lA ities 
ll.:jO/O governmental hospital 1.8 0 
T T 
Governmentallow"c(JHt division Governmental high"cost division 
Figure 7.1b Map of consumer's health care service utilisation in Kitwe 
The child and adult consumers bear the burden of nearly 70% of illness episodes in 
each district. Around 40% of those who have illness episodes seek health care at 
health facilities in both districts. In Lusaka, a small number of relatively 
better·off consumers with high income or secured employment, about 20%, attend 
the governmental high·cost division or private institutions. In Kitwe, a small 
number of relatively better-off consumers with high income or secured employment, 
about 30%, attend industrial institutions and the governmental high"cost division. 
However, a large number of relatively worse"off consumers with low-income or 
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unsecured employment, about 75% in Lusaka and about 60% in Kitwe, attend the 
governmental low-cost division. Within the governmental low-cost division, health 
centres mainly provide primary care and deal with almost 80% of patients within 
the division in both districts. Patients at governmental health centres pay for 
health care with user fees or low-cost prepayments, and the practice of exemption 
on the basis of low-income is negligible. 
Therefore, health centres are considered to be an access point to health care by the 
majority of the poor section of the population. The financial barrier incurred by 
user fees and low-cost prepayments at health centres is considered to be significant 
for access to health care by the worse-off population, as introduced in Chapter 1 and 
as reviewed in Chapter 2. 
7.4 CHOICE BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF PAYMENT MECHANISM 
In this section, consumers' choice of payment mechanism is analysed in order to 
construct basis for the testing of hypotheses derived from theoretical models, 
detailed in the following sections. 
'l\vo types of choices of payment mechanism are observable in the LCMS98 data set. 
One is the choice made by patients at the time of health care service utilisation; the 
other is the choice made by households in face of the risk of illness episodes that 
may be suffered by household members. 
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7.4.1 PATIENTS' CHOICE OF PAYMENT MECHANISM AT THE TIME OF 
UTILISATION 
Regarding patients who are suffering from illness, an overview of their choice of 
payment mechanism at various health facilities has already been shown in Table 
7.5. It is possible to limit the analysis on the choice made by patients at health 
centres to those within the low·cost division, which is featured in the theoretical 
models of this study. 
Table 7.8 shows patients' choice of payment mechanism within the governmental 
low·cost division. 
Table 7.8 Patients' choice of payment mechanism at health centres within low'cost division (%) 
Direct payment No payment 
Low'cost Exemption by Other Unknown Total User fees prepayments diagnosis reason 
Lu~aka 33.4 58.9 1.5 4.8 1.4 100.0 
Kitwe 52.0 28.2 3.5 14.7 Ui 100.0 
33.4% of patients in Lusaka and 52.0% in Kitwe chose user fees as their payment 
method. 58.9% in Lusaka and 28.2% in Kitwe chose low·cost prepayment. 
7.4.2 CONSUMERS' CHOICE OF PAYMENT MECHANISMS BEFORE FALLING 
ILL 
Payment choice by households is not directly investigated in the LCMS98 
questionnaire. However, an index, which stands for all sampled households' 
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prepayment subscription status, can be generated through estimation using other 
variables, as described below. 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked about household monthly 
expenditures on various items. Among the items related to health care, 
expenditure on prepayments is asked separately, although the differentiation 
between high"cost prepayments and low"cost prepayments is not specified. 
Therefore, it is possible to estimate household subscription to prepayments with a 
criterion that a household is considered as a subscriber of at least low"cost 
prepayments if its monthly expenditure on prepayment covers the total premium 
for low"cost prepayments required for all household members. Other households 
are considered as non"subscribers to prepayments. 
This criterion has two problems. Firstly, it cannot differentiate between high"cost 
and low "cost prepayment subscriber households, with both types categorised as 
prepayment subscribers. Therefore, it is not possible to limit the analysis to the 
choice of patients at governmental low"cost division, which is featured in the 
theoretical models. Secondly, it cannot exclude those households that usually 
attend industrial or private institutions, which are categorised as prepayment 
non"subscribers, since the preferred health facility of individuals or households is 
not investigated in the LCMS98. These cause biases in the estimated index 
affecting the test of hypotheses derived from the theoretical models. Therefore, 
adjustments are made in using this index in the following analysis. 
Table 7.9 shows the proportion of households subscribing to low'cost prepayments 
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according to this index. 
Table 7.9 Proportion of household subscribing low'cost prepayments 
Lusaka 
Kitwe 
% of subscribing household 
among all households 
8.7 
4.7 
% of subscribing household 
among low'cost division users· 
10.7 
6.2 
• Estimated from the share oflow'cost division among patients' utilisation. 
8.7% of all households in Lusaka and 4.7% in Kitwe subscribe to low'cost 
prepayments. Since the numerator of this proportion, subscribing households, 
includes those subscribing to high-cost prepayments (estimated at 14.0% in Lusaka 
and 16.6% in Kitwe according to Table 7.5 and Figure 7.1), and the denominator of 
this proportion, all households, includes potential users of health facilities other 
than the governmental low-cost division (estimated at 29.7% in Lusaka and 39.5% 
in Kitwe according to Figure 7.1), Table 7.9 also shows the percentage of subscribing 
households among potential low'cost division users through an adjustment, in 
which the estimated proportion of high-cost prepayments subscribers is excluded 
from the numerator and the estimated proportion of potential users of health 
facilities other than the governmental low-cost division is excluded from the 
denominator. These are estimated at 10.7% in Lusaka and 6.2% in Kitwe. 
Substantial gaps are observed between the proportions of patients choosing 
prepayments, as shown in Table 7.8, and the proportions of households subscribing 
to prepayments, as shown in Table 7.9. Prepayment as the payment mechanism is 
more popular among patients, 58.9% in Lusaka and 28.2% in Kitwe, compared with 
households, 10.7% in Lusaka and 6.2% in Kitwe. 
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In order to address this gap, the congruence between the choice of patients and the 
choice of households is analysed. Table 7.10 shows the extent ofthis congruence. 
Table 7.10 Coincidence of choice of prepayments between patient level and household level (%) 
Continuous subscriber Subscription starter Total 
Lusaka 37.7 62.3 100.0 
Kitwe 8.5 91.5 100.0 
Patients using prepayments from subscribing households are categorised as 
continuous subscribers and patients using prepayments from non' subscribing 
households as subscription starters. The latter are considered to start the 
subscription when falling ill in the last two weeks, since their household did not 
expend on prepayments covering all household members in the last month. The 
subscription starters amount to 62.3% of health care users who pay by low'cost 
prepayments in Lusaka, and 91.5% in Kitwe. 
If we assume the continuous subscription of the subscription starters after this 
illness episode, 0.84% of children and adults in Lusaka and 1.55% in Kitwe would 
become continuous subscribers in every two weeks. These figures are too large 
considering the low percentages of continuously subscribing households shown in 
Table 7.9. The majority of subscription starters are thought to discontinue the 
subscription after their illness episode. Therefore, the gap is considered to be a 
reflection of the patients' behaviour, as pointed out in a recent review (Daura et al., 
1998) mentioned in Chapter I, where they pay the first premium, which is lower 
than the user fee for one illness episode, and wait for 24 hours before consultation. 
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This type of subscription contradicts the concept of risk sharing by payment in 
advance assumed in the theoretical models. Therefore, due attention and 
adjustment are needed in testing the hypothesis using the data observed through 
the choice by patients. 
7.5 TEST OF THE UTILISATION MODEL 
In order to test the hypotheses derived from the utilisation model, consumers' choice 
of payment mechanism and their utilisation of health care services are analysed in 
this section. 
A hypothesis to be tested in this section is: the utilisation of health care service is 
facilitated by voluntary prepayments compared with user fees. 
The assumption regarding prepayments subscription in the hypothesis from the 
utilisation model is that consumers choose to subscribe to prepayments before 
falling ill. After falling ill, patients with prepayments decide whether to access 
health care services knowing that they face no financial barrier at the time of 
utilisation. A comparison is needed between patients who have sought health care 
services and patients who have not sought health care services. This comparison 
cannot be made from the observation in the LCMS98 on choice of payment 
mechanism by patients who attend health facilities, since information on patients 
who did not seek health care is not available. 
The observations on households' subscription to prepayments can be applied for this 
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comparison, since information on patients who have refrained from seeking health 
care is available. However, the index of subscription status has problems, as 
discussed in the previous section. The problem in applying the index of 
prepayments subscription by household is the inability to separate potential users 
of the governmental low' cost division from the others. Potential users of the 
governmental high·cost division, industrial institutions, private institutions and 
traditional healers do not subscribe to low'cost prepayments not because they prefer 
to pay user fees, but because low·cost prepayments is not an option available to 
them. This causes a bias in testing the hypothesis. 
However, by interpreting the essence of voluntary prepayments subscription as the 
removal of the financial barrier to health care services at the time of utilisation, a 
test of the hypothesis can be made. It examines whether the removal of the 
financial barrier at the time of utilisation by any payment mechanism facilitates 
health care utilisation when falling ilL In this test, it is assumed that high· cost 
prepayments subscribers and individuals whose health care is paid for by their 
employers, in addition to low·cost prepayments subscribers, face no financial 
barriers in the two districts. 
The households subscribing to high·cost prepayments are thought of as mixed in 
with households subscribing to low'cost prepayments based on the criteria 
discussed in the previous section. Whether the cost of health care services is 
payable by the employer is not directly investigated in the LCMS98. However, an 
index that differentiates households where employers' pay for health care services 
can be generated through estimation from the other variables. 
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In the 
questionnaire, whether a household member's employment includes social security 
or not is questioned. Therefore, where a household has at least one member with 
social security through their employment, we would expect the employer to pay for 
the cost of health care services utilisation by that household member. Table 7.11 
shows the percentage of individuals with social security based on this criterion. 
Table 7.11 % of individuals with social security 
% of individuals with social security 
Lusaka 15.9 
Kitwe 12.3 
15.9% of individuals in Lusaka and 12.3% in Kitwe are considered to expect their 
employer to pay for their health care services. These proportions are close to the 
share of employers' payment shown in Table 7.5, 12.4% in Lusaka and 17.4% in 
Kitwe. 
Table 7.12 shows the cross tabulation of the subscription status taking these 
adjustments into account and attendance at health facilities among consumers with 
illness episodes. 
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Table 7.12 Cross tabulation between attendance and financial barrier 
Lusaka Financial barrier (+) Financial barrier (-) Total 
Attendance (+) 19,876 11,351 31,227 
Attendance (-) 34,018 9,047 43,065 
'!btal 53,894 20,398 74,292 
Chi'square = 2139.2 p = 0.000 Odds ratio (95% C.I.) = 2.147 (2.078, 2.219) 
Kitwe Financial barrier (+) Financial barrier (-) Total 
Attendance (+) 6,044 1,379 7,423 
Attendance (-) 11,669 1,574 13,243 
'!btal 17,713 2,953 20,666 
Chi'square = 173.92 p = 0.000 Odds ratio (95% C.I.) = 1.691 (1.563, 1.830) 
Two-districts Financial barrier (+) Financial barrier (-) Total 
Attendance (+) 25,919 12,730 38,649 
Attendance (-) 45,686 10,621 56,307 
'!btal 71,605 23,351 94,956 
Chi-square = 2448.3 p = 0.000 Odds ratio (95% C.I.) = 2.113 (2.050, 2.177) 
In both districts, attendance by subscribers is found to be large, and this is 
statistically significant. The odds ratios are 2.147 in Lusaka and 1.691 in Kitwe. 
This is interpreted that an individual free from financial barriers at the time of 
illness tends to seek health care services 2.147 times more in Lusaka, 1.691 times 
more in Kitwe, and 2.113 times more in the two districts overall, for the time period 
studied. 
There are several factors that may affect patients' attendance other than financial 
barriers. Factors such as income, perceived health status, and perceived quality of 
care are thought of as modifying or shifting the demand curve. Perceived health 
status and perceived quality of care are not investigated or observable in the 
LCl\IS98, but household income per head is. In addition, there is price 
segmentation between the child age group and adult age group at governmental 
health facilities, which is the major health care service provider, as described in 
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Chapter 1. 
Table 7.13 shows the stratified cross tabulation in order to control the effect of these 
factors: income and age group. 
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Table 7.13 Stratified cross tabulation between attendance and financial barrier 
Lusaka Financial barrier (+) Financial barrier (-) 
Child Adult Child Adult 
Quartile of household Quartile of household Quartile of household Quartile of household 
income per head income per head income per head income per head 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total 
Attendance (+) 1,299 346 6H9 1,230 2,414 3,889 5,057 4,027 811 284 362 394 1,830 2,011 2,857 2,458 29,968 
Attendance (-) 1,454 1,872 1,098 1,675 5,207 6,250 7,703 7,876 1.044 136 991 489 1,687 1,095 1,195 2,327 42,099 
Total 2,753 2.218 1,797 2,905 7,G21 10,139 12,760 11,903 1855 420 1,353 883 3,517 3,106 4,052 4,785 72,067 
l\lantel-HaenRzcl method: Chi-square = 2188.8 
~ 
p = 0.000 Common odds ratio (95% C.L) = 2.189 (2.116, 2.263) 
0 
00 Kitwe Financial barrier (+) Financial barrier (-) 
Child Adult Child Adult 
Quartile of household Quartile of household Quartile of household Quartile of household 
income per head income per head income per head income per head 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total 
Attendance (+) 145 172 1,069 784 480 699 1.351 1.344 0 137 0 332 64 302 307 237 7,423 
Attendance (-) 755 1,153 522 700 1,876 2.220 2,983 1,459 169 0 116 224 0 64 397 604 13,242 
Total 900 1.325 1.591 1484 2,356 2,919 4,334 2,803 169 137 116 556 64 366 704 841 20,765 
Mantel-Haenszel method: Chi-square = 96.5 P = 0.000 Common odds ratio (95% C.L)= 1.434 (1.327, 1.550) 
The common odds ratios for attendance at health facilities, 2.189 in Lusaka, 1.434 
in Kitwe, and 2.048 in two districts, are estimated with statistical significance by 
the Mantel-Haenszel method. 
Odds ratio 
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Figure 7.2 Common odds ratio of receiving health care service 
In summary, consumers' access to health care services is facilitated by the removal 
of financial barriers to health care services at the time of illness such as 
subscription to voluntary prepayments. This result supports the hypothesis 
derived from the utilisation model, although the result does not come from 
observation limited to governmental health centres. 
7.6 TEST OF THE CHOICE MODEL 
In order to test the hypotheses derived from the choice model, consumers' 
subscription to prepayments and the effects of income and household size on the 
choice are analysed in this section. 
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Hypotheses to be tested in this section are: income affects consumers' choice of 
alternative payment mechanisms; voluntary prepayments are preferred to user fees 
when consumers' income is high; household size affects consumers' choice of 
alternative payment mechanisms; and voluntary prepayments are preferred to user 
fees when household size is small. 
The choice model produces other hypotheses than those above. However, they are 
not tested in this section, since factors such as perceived health status and 
perceived quality of care are not investigated or observable in the LCMS98. 
Observations on the choice of payment mechanism by both patients and households 
are applicable for the test. Therefore, two analyses are made in turn. 
7.6.1 TEST WITH PATIENTS' CHOICE 
Regarding the choice by patients, subscription starters, who are differentiated from 
continuous subscribers among low·cost prepayments payers in section 7.4, 
contradict the assumption regarding the subscription to prepayments in the 
hypothesis from the choice model that consumers choose to subscribe to 
prepayments before falling ill, since they are considered to choose to pay the first 
premium upon illness and to discontinue the subscription after their illness episode. 
In this sense, their choice is rather user fees (with a 24·hour wait) than low·cost 
prepayments. Therefore, their choices are dealt with as user fees in the following 
test. 
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Table 7.14 shows the backgrounds of patients by the choice of payment mechanism 
at the governmentallow'cost division taking these arguments into account. 
Table 7.14 Backgrounds of patients and choice of payment mechanism at governmentallow·cost division 
Household income per head Household size 
Mean 00 S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
Lusaka User fees 68,341 69,681 16,827 4.53 2.46 17,068 <including subscription starter> 
Low·cost prepayments 39,657 30,892 4,871 1.71 0.45 4,871 (excluding subscription starter) 
Total 61,902 64,210 21,697 3.90 2.48 21,9:39 
t = 41.2 p = 0.000 t = 141.5 p = 0.000 
Kitwe User fees 83,299 126,706 4,389 4.23 2.22 4,289 
<including subscription starter) 
Low·cost prepayments 107,500 0 108 2.00 0 108 (excluding subscription starter> 
Total 83,881 4,497 125,228 4.17 2.22 4,497 
t = ·12.7 p = 0.000 t = 66.4 p = 0.000 
With regard to average income, that of user fee payers in Lusaka (K 68,341) is 
higher than that of low'cost prepayments payers (K 39,657). The income of user 
fee payers in Kitwe (K 83,299) is lower than that of low'cost prepayments payers (K 
107,500). 
With regard to the number of children and adults in households who are supposed 
to pay for health care, that of user fee payers in Lusaka (4.53) is greater than that of 
low'cost prepayments payers 0.71). For user fee payers in Kitwe, the figure IS 
4.23 compared with 2.00 among low'cost prepayments payers. 
The higher average income among user fee payers in Lusaka contradicts with the 
expectation from the hypotheses. Other than this, the averages are consistent 
with expectations. 
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Logit models introduced in Chapter 4 are estimated in order to investigate the 
effects of income and household size on the choice of payment mechanism. Table 
7.15 shows the estimated slopes, which are marginal effects at the average level of 
each variable. 
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Table 7.15 Estimation of logit model: patient's choice of payment mechanism 
Lusaka Kitwe 
Slope (t) l\lean of variable Slope (t) Mean of variable 
Income (01) -4.90x10·;J (-1.54) 6.19 2.13xlO·r; ( 0.00) 8.39 
Household size -4.19x10·~ (-2.27)* 3.85 -7,68xlO'J (-0.67) 4.17 
Age group L68xlO-:1 ( 0.13) 0.82 1.86xl0·2 ( 0.46) 0.66 
District 
Constant 9.94xl0·2 -3,26xl0'2 
N= 21.698 In L = -63.8 N= 4.497 In L= -3.5 
* P < 0.05, ** p <0.01 
Two-districts 
Slope (t) Mean of variable 
-4.26x10·3 (-1.68) 6.57 
-3.70xlO·2 (-2.63)** 3.90 
2.08xlO·:1 ( 0.16) 0.79 
-3.19xlO·2 (-1.77) 0.17 
8.65xl0·z 
N = 26,194 In L = -67.8 
The distinction between child and adult is also taken as an explanatory factor for 
the choice, that is, covariance in addition to income and household size in order to 
take the effects of price segmentation into account. Legit models for the two 
districts are also estimated with dummy variable as well. 
In Lusaka, the sign of slope for income is negative, which suggests that patients 
with low income are more likely to choose low·cost prepayment. This is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. However, the parameter is not statistically 
significant. The sign of slope for household size is negative and statistically 
significant, which means small households are more likely to choose low·cost 
prepayment, with statistical significance. This is consistent with the hypothesis. 
The effect of price segmentation between child and age is not statistically 
significant. 
In Kitwe, the sign of slope for income is positive, which suggests that patients with 
high income are more likely to choose low· cost prepayments, but the parameters are 
not statistically significant. This sign is consistent with the hypotheses. The sign 
of slope for household size is negative, which means small households are more 
likely choose low·cost prepayment. This sign is consistent with the hypotheses. 
However, the parameter is not statistically significant. The effect of price 
segmentation between child and age is not statistically significant. 
For the two districts together, estimated effects of factors are similar to those in 
Lusaka. The dummy variable for the difference between the two districts is not 
statistically significant. 
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In short, the hypothesis on the effect of household size in Lusaka is supported by 
the estimation of logit model with statistical significance. The signs of slopes for 
income and household size in Kitwe are consistent with the hypotheses but 
statistically insignificant. The sign of slope for income in Lusaka contradicts with 
the hypothesis but is statistically insignificant. 
7.6.2 TEST WITH HOUSEHOLD CHOICE 
A similar analysis is conducted for household choice. In this case, the index of 
subscription status has some problems, as discussed in section 7.4. The 
assumption regarding the choice of payment mechanism in the hypotheses from the 
choice model is that households are supposed to pay for health care. Therefore, 
households that expect a member's employer to pay for health care identified 
through the index based on social security in the previous section are excluded from 
the analysis in the following. Households which subscribe to low'cost prepayments 
or high'cost prepayments are compared with households which pay by user fees. 
Table 7.16 shows the backgrounds of households by the choice of payment 
mechanism. 
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Table 7.16 Backgrounds of households and choice of payment mechanism 
Household income per head Household size 
Mean (10 S.D N Mean S.D N 
Lusaka User fee 97.885 237.742 163.435 5.00 2.1810 169.017 
Voluntary prepayment 88.552 227.939 15.595 1.51 0.4998 16.071 
Total 97.072 236.918 179.301 4.70 2.3087 185.088 
Kitwe User fee 70.046 265.473 63.814 5.52 2.4298 63.897 
Voluntary prepayment 109.669 104.455 • 3.129 1.32 0.41299 3.129 
Total 71.898 260.311 66.943 5.32 2.5343 67.026 
With regard to average income, that of user fee payers (K 97,885) is higher than 
that ofprepayments payers (K 88,552) in Lusaka. In Kitwe, that of user fee payers 
(K 70,046) is lower than that ofprepayments payers (K 109,669). 
With regard to household size, that is the number of children and adults, that of 
user fee payers (5.00) is larger than that of low-cost prepayments payers (1.51) in 
Lusaka. Likewise, household size of user fee payers (5.52) is larger than that of 
low-cost prepayments payers 0.32) in Kitwe. 
The higher average income among user fee payers in Lusaka contradicts with the 
expectation from the hypotheses. Other than this, the averages are consistent 
with expectations. These differences are the same as the results from the analysis 
of the choice by patients. 
Logit models are estimated in order to investigate the effects of income and 
household size on the choice of payment mechanism. Table 7.17 shows the results 
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of the estimation. 
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Tahle i.17 Estimation of1ogit model: household's choice of payment mechanism 
Lusaka Kitwe 
Slope (t) Mean of variable Slope (t) Mean of variable 
Income (l!)1) -3.51xlO·K (-0.77) 9.70 1.50xlO·" ( O.OS) 6.75 
Household si:t.e -1.39xl!YI (-2.11)" 4.(j5 -1.5ix10·~ (-4.58)"* 5.14 
District 
Constant 2.42xlO-:! -3.4!Jxl(P 
N= 179.030 In L = -18!).8 N= 66,942 In L= -57.9 
* p < 0_0;), ** P <0.01 
Two-districts 
Slope (t) Mean of variable 
-2.35xlO·6 (-0.78) 9.02 
-9.42xl0-4 (-2.23)* 4.83 
-2.30xl0-4 (-1.72) 0_27 
1.64xlO-3 
N= 245,972 In L= -224.8 
The results of this estimation are similar to the results from the analysis of patients' 
choice in the previous section. 
In Lusaka, the sign of slope for income is negative, which suggests that patients 
with low income are more likely to choose low' cost prepayment. This is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. However, the parameter is not statistically 
significant. The sign of slope for household size is negative, which means small 
households are more likely choose low'cost prepayment; the parameter is 
statistically significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis. 
In Kitwe, the sign of slope for income is positive, which suggests that patients with 
high income are more likely to choose low' cost prepayments. The parameter is not 
statistically significant. This sign is consistent with the hypothesis. The sign of 
slope for household size is negative, which means small households are more likely 
choose low' cost prepayments; the parameter is statistically significant. These 
signs are consistent with the hypothesis. 
For the two districts together, estimated effects of factors are similar to those in 
Lusaka. The dummy variable for the difference between the two districts is not 
statistically significant. 
In short, the hypothesis on the effect of household size in Lusaka and Kitwe is 
supported by the estimation oflogit model with statistical significance. The sign of 
slope for income in Kitwe is consistent with the hypotheses but statistically 
insignificant. The sign of slope for income in Lusaka contradicts with the 
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hypothesis but is statistically insignificant. 
7.7 CONSUMERS' UTILISATION OF HEALTH CARE IN TERMS OF INCOME 
One possible interpretation of the contradiction in the signs for income factor in 
Lusaka, which is observed in the choice by both pat~ents and households, IS an 
underlying association between low income and low health status. 
According to the choice model, consumers with low health status are more likely to 
choose voluntary prepayments. Therefore, income and health status affect the 
choice in opposite directions. Although individual consumers' or households' 
health status is not observable in the LCMS98, the differences in morbidity across 
income groups in the population are observable. Table 7.18 shows the morbidity by 
income groups. 
Table 7.18 Morbidity by income stratum 
Lusaka 
Kitwe 
% of individuals 
having illness episodes 
% of ilH.liviuuuis 
attending health faciliti .. s 
% of individuals 
havlIlg illness episodes 
'X, of individuals 
attending bealth facilities 
Incomtl stratum 
Low income 
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 
8.9 9.0 9.9 
n = 1,106,834 Cbi-square = 298.5 Jl = 0.000 
4.3 3.8 4.6 
n = 1,106,8:15 Chi-square = :1:l7.5 Jl = 0.000 
5.2 6.6 7.8 
n = 4,,0,41:3 Chi-square = 767.5 Jl = 0.000 
1.5 2.7 :1.I 
n = 450,412 Chi'square = 1059.6 Jl = 0.000 
High income Tolal 
4th quartil .. 
9.9 9.4 
4.7 4.3 
7.6 6.8 
3.7 2.8 
Two types of morbidities are shown: morbidity based on self-report. i.e. a proportion 
of those who have at least one symptom during the last two weeks of the survey. and 
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morbidity based on clinical attendance, i.e. a proportion of those who seek 
professional health care to deal with the symptom. There are differences which 
seem to contradict the association between high income and high morbidity in both 
districts. However, similar contradiction has been found elsewhere (e.g. Makinen 
et aI., 2000). It is possible to interpret that richer group is more likely to complain 
symptom and obtain health care when ill, even though there is underlying 
epidemiological association between low income and low health status. Further 
analysis, especially on the effect of another unobserved factor, quality of care, will 
be done in Chapter 9. 
7.8 SUMMARY 
In summary, the analysis of LCMS98 data set shows that significant volume of 
health care in order to consider equity is consumed at health centres; that the 
prediction of utilisation model is empirically demonstrated; and most of the 
predictions of choice model are empirically demonstrated. Table 7.19 summarizes 
the results of statistical tests of choice model. 
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T.\ BLI~ LOCATION 
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TABLE 7. 14 Lusaka Individu a l 
Kitwc Individua l 
T.\BLE 7.15 Lw;a ka Individu a l 
l{i twc Ind ividu a l 
-l\ "o-cll s tri cts Indi"idua l 
TAB LE 7. III Lu~}) k a Hou~eho l d 
Kltwc House hold 
TABLE 7. 17 Lu ~a ka Hou~e ho ld 
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Two-d ist ricts Household 
• :';ta ti s tl ca l Significa nce 
FACTOR 
MODE OF ANALYSIS 
INCOME HOUSEHOLD S IZE 
Un.ivaria te Con trad ict* Su pport* 
Uni va ria te S upport* S up port* 
Logit model Contradict S upport* 
Logit mode l Support S upport 
Logit mode l Contradict S upport* 
U ll ivariate Contra dict* Su pport* 
Univa riate S upport* Support* 
Logit model Contrad.ict S upport* 
Logit model Support Support* 
Logit model Contra dict S upport* 
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ANALYSIS OF RECORDS AT HEALTH CENTRES 
S.l INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the second data source, records 
at health centres. 
Two types of records are analysed in this chapter, as specified in Chapter 5. One is 
the outpatient new attendance registry book at six sampled health centres, which 
records consultations at health centres, and the other is the individual patient's 
outpatient book, which is a medical record of each individual, at one of the sampled 
health centres in Lusaka, Chawama. 
Two points are reported in this chapter. Firstly, the maps of outpatients' choice of 
payment mechanism at health centres are constructed. This is to form the basis 
for the analysis of hypotheses derived from theoretical models in this chapter and 
the next chapter. Secondly, the association between outpatients' choice of payment 
mechanism and their frequency of attendances is examined. This is to test 
hypotheses derived from theoretical models. 
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B.2 RECORDS IN THE OUTPATIENTS NEW ATTENDANCE BOOK 
The outpatient new attendance registry book at health centres records all 
consultations of outpatients with a new illness episode according to the 
governmental guidelines. Since the cost of follow-up consultations is covered by 
the payment at first consultation for each illness episode, all patients' health 
behaviour in the face of direct payments is recorded in these books. Among the 
items recorded in the book, the outpatient's registration number, age, payment 
method, and date of consultation are used in the following analysis, as specified in 
Chapter 5. 
There are limitations in the availability of records due to the variation in record 
keeping practices among health centres, as also described in Chapter 5. Contrary 
to the governmental guidelines, only consultations of outpatients who newly attend 
a health centre (with their first illness episode) are recorded in the new attendance 
registry book at large health centres in Lusaka: Chipata and Chawama. Once they 
are recorded in this book, their subsequent attendances due to separate illness 
episodes are only recorded in their individual medical record, that is, their 
outpatient book, at these health centres. In addition, only four months of records 
are available at Chipata, while a year·round record is available at the other health 
centres. 
Tables 8.la and 8.lb show the number of new outpatient consultations at health 
centres, taking these differences in record keeping practices into account. 
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Table 8.1a Number of consultations by newly registered patients 
Lusaka Chipata 
Chawama 
Number of consultations Observation period 
19,650 
23,021 
4 months 
1 year 
Table 8.1b Number of new illness episode consultations 
Lusaka 
Kitwe 
Kabwata 
Chimwenwe 
Cosetco 
Mwekera 
Number of consultations 
23,097 
19,227 
974 
2,949 
Observation period 
1 year 
1 year 
1 year 
1 year 
In Lusaka, there are 19,650 consultations by newly registered patients during four 
months of observation at Chipata, and 23,021 consultations during one year of 
observation at Chawama; there are 23,097 consultations during one year at 
Kabwata. In Kitwe, there are 19,227 consultations at Chimwenwe, 974 
consultations at Cosetco and 2,949 consultations at Mwekera during one year. 
These records of consultations are to be analysed in the following. 
8.3 PATIENT'S CHOICE OF PAYMENT MECHANISM AT HEALTH CENTRES 
In this section, the maps of outpatients' choice of payment mechanism at six health 
centres are constructed in order to form the basis for the analysis of hypotheses 
derived from theoretical models in this chapter and the next. 
Tables 8.2a and 8.2h show the share of directly paid consultations at health centres. 
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Table 8.2a Share of paid consultations among newly registered patients (%) 
Paid Exempted Unknown Total 
Lusaka Chipata 31.7 66.6 1.7 100.0 
Chawama 57.1 41.9 1.0 100.0 
Table 8.2b Share of paid consultations (%) 
Paid Exempted Unknown Total 
Lusaka Kabwata 53.6 42.6 3.7 100.0 
Kitwe Chimwenwe 33.6 64.8 1.7 100.0 
Coseteo 55.5 43.8 0.6 100.0 
Mwekera 34.9 65.1 0.0 100.0 
Among the recorded consultations, 31.7% involve direct payment by outpatients at 
Chipata, 57.1% at Chawama, and 53.6% at Kabwata in Lusaka. 33.6% of 
consultations involve direct payment by outpatients at Chimwenwe, 55.5% at 
Cosetco, and 34.9% at Mwekera in Kitwe. Most exemptions from direct payment 
are due to age, especially infant outpatients under the age of five at all six health 
centres. Thus, the variation in the proportion of directly paid consultations is 
considered to mainly reflect the age distribution of the outpatients or catchment 
population of each health centre. 
Tables 8.3a and 8.3b show the share by age group of directly paid outpatient 
consultations. 
Table 8.3a Share of direct'payment consultations of newly registered patients by age group (%) 
Lw.:aka Chipata 
Chawama 
Child (6'15) 
11.4 
1:1.0 
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Adult (16'(;<\) 
87.4 
86.7 
Unknown 
1.2 
0.:1 
Tot.al 
100.0 
100.0 
Table 8.3b Share of paid consultations by age group (%) 
Child Adult Unknown Total 
Lusaka Kabwata 20.3 79.1 0.6 100.0 
Kitwe Chimwenwe 23.8 76.0 0.2 100.0 
Cosetco 14.4 85.6 0.0 100.0 
Mwekera 25.7 74.0 0.3 100.0 
Child and adult outpatients amount to 11.4% and 87.4% at Chipata; to 13.0% and 
86.7% at Chawama; and to 20.3% and 79.1% at Kabwata in Lusaka, respectively. 
Child and adult outpatients amount to 23.8% and 76.0% at Chimwenwe; to 14.4% 
and 76.0% at Cosetco; and to 25.7% and 74.0% at Mwekera in Kitwe, respectively. 
At all six health centres, more than 70% of directly paid consultations deal with 
adult outpatients. 
Tables 8.4a and 8.4b show the choice of payment mechanism among directly paid 
consultations. 
Table 8.4a Choice of payment mechanism among paying newly regiHtered patientH (%) 
User fees Low'cost High'cost Discount cards Total prepayments prepayments 
Lusaka Chipata 9.2 90.8 0.0 n.B. 100.0 
Chawama 24.5 n.3 0.1 2.1 100.0 
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Table 8.4b Choice by payment mechanism among paid consultations (%) 
User fees Low-cost High-cost Discount cards Total prepayments prepayments 
Lusaka Kabwata 12.2 87.6 0.0 0.2 100.0 
Kitwe Chimwenwe 80.8 17.3 0.0 1.9 100.0 
Cosetco 7.8 92.2 0.0 n.a. 100.0 
Mwekera 56.6 17.8 0.2 25.4 100.0 
Mwekera excluding 
low-cost prepayment 68.9 n,8. 0.2 30.9 100.0 
In Lusaka, at Chipata, user fee, low"cost prepayment and high"cost prepayment are 
the direct payment options available. 9.2% of outpatients chose to pay by user fee, 
90.8% by low"cost prepayment; no patients chose high"cost prepayment. At 
Chawama, in addition to user fee, low"cost prepayment and high"cost prepayment, a 
discount card is an option for direct payment. 24.5% of outpatients chose to pay by 
user fee, 73.3% by low "cost prepayment, 0.1% by high"cost prepayment, and 2.1 % by 
discount card. At Kabwata, user fee, low"cost prepayment, high"cost prepayment, 
and discount card are the available direct payment options, although discount cards 
were sold only during the first month in the year of the observation. 12.2% of 
outpatients chose to pay by user fee, 87.6% by low " cost prepayment, none by 
high"cost prepayment and 0.2% by discount card. 
In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, user fee, low "cost prepayment, high"cost prepayment, and 
discount card are the options available for direct payment, although discount cards 
were sold only during the first three months in the year of the observation. 80.8% 
of outpatients chose to pay by user fee, 17.3% by low " cost prepayment, none by 
high"cost prepayment, and 1.9% by discount card. At Cosetco, direct payment 
options are user fee, low"cost prepayment and high"cost prepayment. 7.8% of 
outpatients chose to pay by user fee, 92.2% by low "cost prepayment, and none by 
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high-cost prepayment_ At Mwekera, direct payment options are user fee, low-cost 
prepayment, high-cost prepayment, and discount card. 56.6% of outpatients chose 
to pay by user fee, 17.8% by low-cost prepayment, 0.2% by high-cost prepayment, 
and 25.4% by discount card. Since low-cost prepayment is only available for 
pregnant females in Mwekera, and they are required to purchase low-cost 
prepayment here, low-cost prepayment is not chosen at the outpatients' discretion. 
Therefore, the proportions of the choice of payment mechanism excluding pregnant 
females are also shown in Table 8.4b_ With this adjustment, 68.9% of outpatients 
chose to pay by user fee, 0.2% by high-cost prepayment, and 30.9% by discount card. 
Figures 8.1a to 8.lf show the maps of outpatients' choice of payment mechanism at 
the six health centres. 
19,650 
consulta tions 
by newly registered 
patients 
during foUl' months 
6,230 
paid consultations 
by newly registered 
patients 
during foul' months 
-
3 .. 6% 
Paid 
by 
child 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
9.2% 
lJspr 
Fpp 
27.7% 01% ___ 6(;.6% 
Paid Paid Expmpted 
by by age (Mainly undl'r 5 years) 
adult unknown 
Paid (31.7%) Not paid 
Available payment mm:haniHm: 
- User fee 
- Low'cost prepayment 
. High'cost prepayment 
" __ ' ___ 'M ___ '
90.8% 
Low·cost. p''t'paympl1t 
Figure 8.1a l\1ap of the choice of payment mechanism at Chipata 
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Figure 8.lc Map of the choice of payment mechanism at Kabwata 
In Lusaka, low·cost prepayment is chosen by more than 70% of outpatients at the 
three health centres· Chipata, Chawama, and Kabwata. User fee is the direct 
payment mechanism of choice in about 9% to 25% of consultations. Discount cards 
were an available option in the one year of observation at Chawama, but only 2.1 % 
of outpatients chose to pay by them. The shares for high·cost prepayment are 
negligible. The pattern of the choice of payment mechanism in Lusaka is 
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considered to be consistent across the three health centres. 
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In Kitwe, user fees are chosen by the majority of outpatients at Chimwenwe. On 
the contrary, low"cost prepayment is chosen by the majority of outpatients at 
Cosetco. There is a great variation in payment choice between these two health 
centres, at which user fee and low "cost prepayment are mainly available for 
outpatients. At Mwekera, low"cost prepayment is available and compulsory only 
for pregnant females, and discount cards have been available as a direct payment 
option during the year of observation. Here, more outpatients chose to pay by user 
fee than by discount card, although the discount card share is substantial, about 
25%. The shares for high"cost prepayment are negligible. 
At Chimwenwe in Kitwe, the sale of discount cards was discontinued because of 
complaints from the catchment population as described in Chapter 5. They sold 
only discount cards for three months and only low "cost prepayment for nine months 
during the year of observation. Table 8.5 shows the choice of payment mechanism 
by newly registered outpatients by these spans. 
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Table 8.5 Choice of payment mechanism among newly registered patients at Chimwenwe 
during two periods (%) 
Period User fees 
01'Dec'98 to 31·Jan·99 
01·Feb·99 to 30·Nov·99 
n = 5, 290 Chi'square = 13.7 P = 0.000 
87.7 
81.9 
Low'cost 
prepayments 
n.a. 
18.1 
Discount cards Total 
12.3 100.0 
n.a. 100.0 
More outpatients chose to pay by user fee when only discount card was available 
than when only low-cost prepayment was available, which is a statistically 
significant difference. This demonstrates the lower preference for discount cards 
at Chimwenwe as expressed by the complaints. 
8.4 CHOICE OF PAYMENT MECHANISM AND FREQUENCY OF 
ATTENDANCES IN THE OUTPATIENT NEW ATTENDANCE BOOK 
In this section, outpatients' choice of payment mechanism and frequency of 
attendance are analysed in order to test the hypotheses derived from theoretical 
models, employing the records in outpatient new attendance books. 
Since the records at health centres do not contain the background of outpatients, 
such as income, perceived health status or perceived quality of health care, which 
are depicted in theoretical models, it is not feasible to test the hypotheses related to 
these factors. However, outpatients' frequency of attendance is observable by 
tracking outpatient registration numbers in the outpatient new attendance registry 
book at the four health centres which record all new episode consultations. And an 
indirect test of the utilisation model and the choice model is feasible using this 
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observation as argued below. 
The hypothesis to be tested in this section is: outpatients' frequency of attendance 
differs according to the choice of payment mechanism. Outpatients who choose to 
pay by low·cost prepayment are likely to attend health centres more frequently 
than those who choose to pay by discount card, and those who choose to pay by 
discount card are likely to attend more frequently than those who choose to pay by 
user fee. 
This hypothesis is directly predicted neither from the utilisation model nor the 
choice model, but is derived from both models. 
The utilisation model predicts more frequent attendances by ill individuals who 
have already chosen discount card or low'cost prepayment before falling ill, than 
who choose to pay by user fee, since each individual faces different financial 
barriers to health care services ceteris paribus. As argued in section 7.5 in the 
previous chapter, a comparison between ill individuals who attend health centres 
and those who refrain from seeking health care services is needed in order to do a 
precise test of this hypothesis. Therefore, the observation of the frequency of 
attendances from the records at health centres is not appropriate for the precise test 
of this hypothesis, since no information about ill individuals who refrain from 
seeking health care services is available. Yet, from observing individuals' 
attendances in a certain period, it is likely that individuals who choose to pay by 
low'cost prepayment will attend health centres more frequently than those who 
choose to pay with discount card, and those who choose to pay by discount card are 
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likely to attend more frequently than those who choose to pay by user fee, since 
individuals face different financial barriers each time they fall ill. Therefore, the 
hypothesis to be tested in this section is considered to be a hypothesis derived from 
the utilisation modeL 
On the other hand, the choice model predicts that individuals who have low 
perceived health status are more likely to choose discount card or low·cost 
prepayment, expecting more frequent attendances at health centres due to their 
illness episodes. Therefore, if observing individuals' attendances in a certain 
period, it is likely that individuals who choose to pay by low· cost prepayment will 
attend health centres more frequently than those who choose to pay by discount 
card, and those who choose to pay by discount card will likely attend more 
frequently than those who choose to pay by user fee, since individuals face different 
financial barriers each time they fall ill. Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested in 
this section is considered to be a hypothesis derived from the choice model as welL 
In short, both the utilisation model and the choice model predict the association 
between the choice of payment mechanism and the frequency of attendance. The 
difference in the prediction is the direction of causal relationship between the choice 
of payment mechanism and the frequency of attendance. In the utilisation model, 
the choice causes the difference in attendance. On the contrary, in the choice 
model, the difference in attendance, which depends on the difference in perceived 
health status, causes the choice. 
In the analysis of the choice of payment mechanism and the frequency of attendance 
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observed in the records at health centres, these two types of differences predicted by 
the two models cannot be separated. In this sense, the test in this section is a 
precise test of neither the utilisation model nor the choice model. However, both 
models predict the same association between the choice of payment mechanism and 
the frequency of attendance. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that positive 
results from the test of the derived hypothesis support both models, although the 
support is indirect. 
Table 8.6 shows the distribution of outpatients' attendances by number during one 
year of observation at four health centres. 
Table 8.6 Number of consultations by registered patients during one year (%) 
2 3 4 5 and more Tot.al 
Lu!<aka Kabwata 89.4 8.7 1.5 0.3 0.1 100.0 
Kitwe Chimwenwe 88.::! 9.7 1.7 0.2 0.1 100.0 
Cosetco 8(;.5 9.(; :U 0.9 0.0 100.0 
r>lwekera excluding 
78.7 12.6 4.7 2.0 2.0 100.0 low·co,..t prepayment..~ 
At Mwekera in Kitwe, low·cost prepayment, which is available and compulsory only 
for pregnant females, is excluded. More than 10% of outpatients made multiple 
visits at the health centre in the year. 
Outpatients are able to change their choice of payment mechanism each time they 
attend health centres, although it is prohibited to discontinue low·cost prepayment 
according to the regulations. Table 8.7 shows the change in the choice of payment 
mechanism among outpatients who attended health centres more than twice a year. 
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Table H.7 Change of payment mechanil<m among patients with more than one conRultation (%) 
Unchanged 
User LOW·CORt High·cost Discount User 
Total 
fees prepayments prepayments cards fees 
Lusaka Kabwata 1.4 89.5 0.0 0.0 90.9 0.8 
Kitwe Chimwenwe ()i).i) 11.3 0.0 1.6 78.4 6.8 
Coset.co 0.0 !l3.5 0.0 n.a. 93.5 1.6 
11wekera excluding 
52.0 0.0 30.7 82.7 8.7 n.a 
low·cost prepayments 
Changed/final choice 
Low·cost High·cost Discount Total 
Total 
prepayments prepayments cards 
8.3 0.0 0.1 9.1 100.0 
14.7 0.0 0.0 21.6 100.0 
4.8 0.0 n.a. 6.5 100.0 
n.a. 0.8 7.9 27.3 100.0 
The majority of these outpatients, more than 80%, kept the same choice of payment 
mechanism through all their attendances. The rest of them changed their choice. 
It therefore appears that the choice of payment mechanism by outpatients is stable. 
Among outpatients who changed their payment mechanism, more changed to 
low·cost prepayments from the other options at Kabwata in Lusaka, and 
Chimwenwe and Cosetco in Kitwe. At Mwekera in Kitwe, more patients changed 
to user fees from discount cards. 
Table 8.8a shows the average number of consultations for one year by the choice of 
payment mechanism. 
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Tahle 8.8a AVl'rage Iluml",r of conHultations hy choice of payment mechaniHm 
ConHtant choice only Final choice 
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
Lusaka Kabwata U"er fees 1.01 0.11 1.410 1.02 0.13 1.419 
Discount cards 1.00 0.00 20 1.10 0.44 21 
Low'cost prepayments 1.13 0.42 9.606 1.15 0.44 9.704 
F = 60.4 p = 0.000 F= 60.0 p = 0.000 
Kitwe Chimwenwe User rees 1.11 0.38 4,589 1.12 0.40 4,635 
Discount cards 1.12 0.38 109 1.12 0.38 109 
Low'cost prepayments 1.10 0.38 900 1.23 0.54 999 
F = 0.22 P = 0.799 F = 23.0 P = 0.000 
Coseteo User fees 1.00 0.00 38 1.03 0.16 39 
Low'cost prepayments 1.19 0.52 416 1.20 0.53 419 
t-.:) 
t = '7.38 p = 0.000 t=-4.72 P = 0.000 W 
(.0 
r.lwekera excluding User rees 1.22 0.58 436 1.29 0.74 453 
low-cost prepayments Discount cards 1.60 1.30 138 1.75 1.44 150 
t = '3.33 P = 0.001 t=-3.74 P = 0.000 
The average number of attendances is divided into two categories: outpatients who 
do not change their choice of payment mechanism (constant choice), and all 
outpatients according to final choice. Observations according to the final choice 
are added because outpatients are considered to make a more informed choice about 
payment mechanisms after having several attendances, although they faced 
variable financial barriers upon previous attendances. In the observations of 
outpatients' final choice of payment mechanism, the differences in average numbers 
of attendances are consistent with the hypothesis at all four health centres with 
statistical significance. In the observation of outpatients with constant choice only, 
the differences in average numbers of attendances are consistent with the 
hypothesis at Cosetco and Mwekera in Kitwe with statistical significance. The 
differences are not consistent with the hypothesis at Chimwenwe in Kitwe, but the 
difference is statistically insignificant. The smallest average for the discount card 
among the three choices of payment mechanism at Kabwata in Lusaka is not 
consistent with the hypothesis, with statistical significance by one·way analysis of 
variance, but multiple comparisons by the Scheffe method prove that differences 
between the average among discount card payers and user fee payers, and between 
discount card payers and low·cost prepayment payers, are not statistically 
significant, and the difference between user fee payers and low·cost prepayment 
payers is statistically significant, as shown in Table S.Sb. 
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Table 8.8b Multiple comparisons of averages observing 
constant choice only at Kabwata by Scheffe method 
User fees 
User fees 
Discount cards 
Discount cards 
Low'cost prepayments 
Low'cost prepayments 
S.E. p 
0.0089 
0.0011 
0.0087 
0.992 
0.000 
0.316 
These results support the hypothesis. 
8.5 RECORDS IN INDIVIDUAL'S OUTPATIENT BOOK 
The individual's outpatient book is a medical record that records clinical 
information about an individual's illness episodes, such as complaints, symptoms, 
diagnosis, and treatment. An outpatient book is prepared for a newly registered 
outpatient at a health centre, who attends the health centre for the first time, and is 
stored in the registry after the outpatient has left the health centre. Every time 
the outpatient attends the health centre, his/her outpatient book is taken out and 
information on hislher new illness episode is written down. 
The records of attendances III outpatient books are analysed III the following 
section. 
8.6 CHOICE OF PAYMENT MECHANISM AND FREQUENCY OF ATTENDANCE 
IN INDMDUAL OUTPATIENT BOOK 
In this section, outpatients' choice of payment mechanism and frequency of 
attendance are analysed in order to test the hypotheses derived from theoretical 
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models, employing the records in individuals' outpatient books. 
Since it is not possible to track outpatients' attendances during the one year of 
observation at large health centres in Lusaka, individuals' outpatient books are 
investigated to examine the association between the choice of payment mechanism 
and the frequency of attendance at Chawama, one of the large health centres, where 
a comparison among three payment mechanisms is feasible, as described in Chapter 
5. 
According to the outpatient new attendance registry, 70 newly registered 
outpatients chose to pay by discount card (the least popular choice of payment 
mechanism) during the first four months of the observation, from October 1998 to 
January 1999. In order to make the comparison between the three payment 
mechanisms, 73 newly registered outpatients choosing to pay by user fee, and 70 by 
low·cost prepayment, are randomly sampled. And these 213 individuals' 
outpatient books are investigated to see the number of attendances in a full year for 
each individual after their registration, as described in Chapter 5. 
Table 8.9 gives the average number of consultation during one year by payment 
mechanism at Chawama in Lusaka. 
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Table 8.9 Average number of consultations by choice of payment mechanism at Chawama 
Mean S.D N No. of samples 
User fees 1.07 0.26 29 73 
Discount cards 1.34 0.68 35 70 
Low'cost prepayments 1.40 1.33 30 70 
F = 1.23 p = 0.298 
About half of sampled outpatients' outpatient books were available for examination, 
and the rest were missing from the registry. The differences in average numbers of 
attendances are consistent with the hypothesis, but this is not statistically 
significant with one'way analysis of variance. 
8.7 SUMMARY 
In summary, the analysis of records in the outpatients new attendance book and 
individual's outpatient book shows that the association between the frequency of 
attendance and the choice of payment mechanism indirectly support the prediction of 
utilisation model and choice model. 
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CHAPTER 9 
RESULTS 4 
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 3 
ANALYSIS OF OUTPATIENT QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the third data source, outpatient 
questionnaire survey. 
After a brief introduction of the outpatient questionnaire survey, three points are 
reported in this chapter. Firstly, outpatients' choices of payment mechanism at 
sampled health centres are examined. This is to form the basis for the analysis of 
the hypotheses derived from the choice model in this chapter. Secondly, scales 
measuring outpatients' perception of the quality of health care services provided at 
health centres are examined. These are to form the basis for the test of the choice 
model in the following section. Thirdly, the hypotheses derived from the choice 
model are tested. This is to show the effects of various factors on consumers' choice 
of payment mechanism. Specifically, the effects offactors such as perceived quality 
of care and expected number of attendances, of which information is lacking in the 
first and second data sources, are tested. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, it is not possible to test the utilisation model 
with information only on outpatients actually attending health centres. Therefore, 
a test of the utilisation model is not carried out in this chapter. 
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9.2 OUTPATIENT QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
An outpatient questionnaire survey was carried out at six sampled health centres in 
two districts,in October 1999, which was in dry season, and in December 1999, 
which was in rainy season, following the protocol described in Chapter 5. At each 
health centre in each season, the survey is scheduled to obtain the calculated 
sample size, about 50 respondents. It took one day at health centres in Lusaka 
(Chipata, Kabwata, and Chawama), two days at a large health centre in Kitwe 
(Chimwenwe), and 10 days at small health centres in Kitwe (Cosetco and Mwekera). 
All outpatients seen during consultation hours of the survey days who were subject 
to direct payments were asked to answer the questionnaire during the waiting time 
for their consultations. Outpatients who were either in too severe a condition for 
answering the questions or who refused to answer were not included. The 
numbers of non-respondents were also recorded in order to calculate response rates. 
Table 9.1 shows the numbers of outpatients surveyed, the numbers of respondents 
by age group and by season, and the response rates at health centres. 
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Table 9.1 Number of outpatients surveyed 
Number of responding outpatients 
Number of 
Response paying Dry season Rainy season Total 
outpatients Rate(%) 
Adults Children Adults Children 
Lusaka Chipata 194 88 5 67 5 165 85.1 
Kabwata 125 65 9 42 5 121 96.8 
Chawama 169 62 7 GG 4 1:39 82.2 
Kitwe Chimwenwe 120 49 14 49 3 115 95.8 
Coseteo 109 56 51 109 100.0 
Mwekera 104 50 49 4 104 100.0 
In Lusaka, at Chipata, 165 outpatients completed the questionnaire out of 194 
outpatients who were supposed to pay, across both dry and rainy seasons; at 
Kabwata, 121 outpatients responded out of 125; and at Chawama, 139 outpatients 
responded out of 169. In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, 115 outpatients responded out of 
120; at Cosetco all 109 outpatients who were supposed to pay responded; and at 
Mwekera, all 104 outpatients responded. In total, at the six health centres, 753 
patients responded out of 821; the overall response rate was 91.7%. This response 
rate is considered to be reasonably high for the tests of the choice model in this 
chapter. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the seasonality effect of higher morbidity in the rainy 
season than in the dry season in the field, which may affect one of the factors in 
testing the model (expected number of attendances), may cause a bias. Therefore, 
in order to minimise this bias, the responses from outpatients both in the dry season 
and the rainy season at each health centre are put together and analysed together, 
so that the results to be shown are concerning consumers' average behaviour in a 
year, which enables discussion on the equity consequences of alternative payment 
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mechanisms. 
9.3 CHOICE OF PAYMENT MECHANISM 
In this section, the choice of payment mechanism by outpatients is illustrated to 
form the basis for the test of hypotheses in the following sections. 
Table 9.2 shows the percentages for the different payment mechanisms chosen by 
outpatients at health centres. 
Table 9.2 Share of payment mechanisms (%) 
User Low'cost Discount Unable Total fees prcpaymcnts cards to pay 
Lusaka Chipata 10.9 85.5 n.a. 3.6 I ()().O 
Kabwata 7.4 90.1 n.a. 2.5 100.0 
Chawama 9.4 89.9 0.0 0.7 100.0 
Kitwe Chimwenwc 70.4 2(;.1 n.a. 3.5 I ()().O 
Cosetco 31.2 67.9 n.a. 0.9 100.0 
r./wekcra 78.8 4.8 14.4 1.9 )()(l.O 
r.lwekera excluding 
82.8 2.0 100.0 low'cost prepayments n.a. 15.1 
In Lusaka, at Chipata, user fee and low-cost prepayment are available options for 
direct payment. 10.9% of outpatients chose to pay by user fee and 85.5% by 
low-cost prepayment. 3.6% of outpatients were exempted from direct payment 
because they were judged as unable to pay. At Kabwata, user fee and low-cost 
prepayment are available options for direct payment. 7.4(% of outpatients chose to 
pay by user fee and 90.1% by low-cost prepayment. 2.5% of outpatients were 
exempted from direct payment because they were judged as unable to pay. At 
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Chawama, in addition to user fee and low·cost prepayment, discount card is an 
available option for direct payment. 9.4% of outpatients chose to pay by user fee 
and 89.9% by low·cost prepayment. No outpatients chose the discount card. 0.7% 
of outpatients were exempted from direct payment because they were judged as 
unable to pay. 
In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, user fee and low·cost prepayment are available options 
for direct payment. 70.4% of outpatients chose to pay by user fee and 26.1% by 
low·cost prepayment. 3.5% of outpatients were exempted from direct payment 
because they were judged as unable to pay. At Cosetco, user fee and low·cost 
prepayment are available options for direct payment. 31.2% of outpatients chose 
to pay by user fee and 67.9% by low·cost prepayment. 0.9% of outpatients were 
exempted from direct payment because they were judged as unable to pay. At 
Mwekera, user fee and discount card are available options for direct payment. In 
addition, low·cost prepayment is compulsory for pregnant cases. Among all 
payable outpatients including pregnant cases, 78.8% of outpatients chose to pay by 
user fee and 14.4% by discount card. 4.8%, all pregnant cases, paid by low·cost 
prepayment. 1.9% of outpatients were exempted from direct payment because 
they were judged as unable to pay. Since low·cost prepayment is compulsory for 
pregnant cases, female outpatients who are pregnant do not face a choice of 
payment mechanism. Therefore, the shares of payment mechanism excluding 
low·cost prepayment at Mwekera are also shown in Table 9.2. 82.8% of outpatients 
chose to pay by user fee, and 15.1% by discount card. 2.0% of outpatients were 
exempted from direct payment because they were judged as unable to pay. 
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These observed choices are consistent with the observation in the records shown in 
Tables 8Aa and 8Ab in the previous chapter. In Lusaka, the majority of 
outpatients, more than 85%, choose to pay by low'cost prepayment at the three health 
centres. Discount card, which is available in Chawama, is the least preferred 
choice among three options available; no choice of discount card was observed in 
this outpatient questionnaire survey. In Kitwe, the majority of outpatients choose 
to pay by user fees at Chimwenwe. On the contrary, the majority choose to pay by 
low'cost prepayment at Cosetco. The discount card available at Mwekera is a less 
popular choice than user fees, but a substantial proportion of outpatients choose to 
pay by discount card. 
Three points in these results should be considered in order to test the hypotheses. 
Firstly, there are some outpatients who are exempted from direct payment since 
they are judged as unable to pay. They are excluded from the analysis for the test, 
since they do not face the choice of payment mechanism. Secondly, the choice of 
low' cost prepayment at Mwekera is compulsory for pregnant cases, and is not 
available for other outpatients. Outpatients who pay with low'cost prepayment 
are excluded from the analysis for the test, since low'cost prepayment is not chosen 
by them. Thirdly, no choice of discount card is observed at Chawama. This 
results from the low popularity of the discount card, that very few consumers 
choosing to pay by discount card attended the Chawama health centre on the survey 
day. This is a limitation of a cross-sectional survey, which observes consumers' 
behaviour on limited days only and therefore has difficulty in catching rare events. 
In order to obtain responses that enable the analysis of the choice of discount card, 
the period of the outpatient questionnaire survey were extended. However, as 
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shown in Figure 9.1, the sales of discount cards have dropped continuously from the 
beginning of the trial to the month of the outpatient survey in the dry season. No 
discount card was sold in October 1999. 
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Figure 9.1 Sales of di count cards at Chawama 
Taking this decreasing trend into accou nt, the choice of discount cards for direct 
payment wa avai lable but a lmo t neglected by outpatients at the time ofthe survey. 
Therefore, the choice between u er fee and low'cost prepayment is considered as a 
real choice faced by outpatients in Chawama. For the test of the hypotheses in this 
chapter, the choice only between use r fee and low'cost prepayment is analysed, and 
the rea ons for the di coun t card's diminishing popularity will be di cu ed in the 
next chapter. T he test related to the choice of di scount card in thi s chapter is done 
with the data from Mwekera in Kitwe. 
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Among outpatients who choose to pay by low'cost prepayment, the distinction 
between continuous subscribers and subscription starters is explored in the 
questionnaire. Table 9.3 shows the share of payment mechanisms chosen by 
outpatients, taking the distinction between continuous subscribers and subscription 
starters into account, and excluding patients exempted due to inability to pay. 
Table 9.3 Share of payment mechanisms considering continuity of prepayment subscription (%) 
Low'cost prepayments 
User Discount Total fees Continuous Subscription cards 
subscriber starter 
Lusaka Chipata 11.3 50.3 38.4 n.a. 100.0 
Kabwata 7.6 50.0 42.4 n.a. 100.0 
Chawama 9.4 31.2 59.4 0.0 100.0 
Kitwe Chimwenwe 73.0 26.1 0.9 n.a. 100.0 
Co><etco 31.5 63.9 4.6 n.a. 100.0 
t-Iwekera excluding 84.5 15.5 100.0 low'co~t prepayments n.a. n.a. 
In Lusaka, at Chawama, 11.3% of outpatients who pay by direct payment choose to 
pay by user fee, 50.3% by continuous subscription to low'cost prepayment, and 
38.4% by newly subscribed low' cost prepayment. At Kabwata, 7.6% of outpatients 
who pay by direct payment choose to pay by user fee, 50.0% by continuously 
subscribed low'cost prepayment, and 42.4% by newly subscribed low'cost 
prepayment. At Chawama, 9.4% of outpatients who pay by direct payment choose 
to pay by user fee, 31.2% by continuously subscribed low' cost prepayment, and 
59.4% by newly subscribed low' cost prepayment. 
In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, 73.0% of outpatients who pay by direct payment choose to 
pay by user fee, 26.1% by continuously subscribed low' cost prepayment, and 0.9% 
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by newly subscribed low' cost prepayment. At Cosetco, 31.5% of outpatients who 
pay by direct payment choose to pay by user fee, 63.9% by continuously subscribed 
low'cost prepayment, and 4.6% by newly subscribed low'cost prepayment. At 
Mwekera, 84.5% of outpatients who pay by direct payment choose to pay by user fee, 
and 15.5% by discount card. 
The large proportions of subscription starters at the three health centres in Lusaka 
suggest that low'cost prepayment is regarded by many here as a low price user fee 
with a 24-hour waiting time. On the contrary, the small proportions of 
subscription starters at Chimwenwe and at Cosetco suggest that such inappropriate 
use of low'cost prepayment is negligible at these health centres. 
Since low' cost prepayment is supposed to be renewed after twelve months of 
continuous subscription, the average number of months of continuous subscription 
is expected to be six, assuming the randomness of the start of subscription by 
outpatients. 
Table 9.4 shows the average number of months of continuous subscription to 
low'cost prepayment. 
Tahlt: 9.4 Average months of continuous subscription of IOW'Cllst prepayment 
Mean S.O. N 
lusaka Chipata 4.29 3.40 80 
Kabwata 6.42 4.31 59 
Chawama 5.19 4.03 42 
Kitwe Chimwenwe 6.66 3.60 29 
Cosctco 7.64 3.65 69 
252 
In Lusaka, at Chipata, the average number of months of low·cost prepayment 
subscription by continuous subscribers is 4.29. At Kabwata, the average is 6.42 
months. At Chawama, it is 5.19. In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, the average number 
of months is 6.66. At Cosetco, it is 7.64. These observed averages are considered 
to suggest that outpatients classified as continuous subscribers in this survey 
actually pay a monthly premium up to twelve months. 
9.4 SCALES OF PERCEIVED QUAliTY OF CARE 
In this section, the responses to questions on perceived quality of care are analysed 
before hypothesis is tested in the following sections. 
Quality of care in health care often refers to consumers' perceptions of 
provider·patient relationship in terms of the outcome effects of health care on 
health status (Folland et al., 2001). It has a multidimensional nature, for example, 
Donabedian (980) defined quality of care along three stages of health care: 
structure, process, and outcome. In this study, drug availability (one of the most 
commonly discussed aspects of quality of care in the context of health financing 
policy in developing countries) is explicitly picked up in the theoretical modelling in 
Chapter 6, and the other aspects of perceived quality of care are examined 
separately in the following analysis. 
Six dimensions of perceived quality of care identified in a previous study in the field 
CAtkinson et al., 1996) are included in the questionnaire. These dimensions are: 
drug availability, structural aspects, staff behaviour, organisational aspects, 
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technical care provided, and convenience. Outpatients' grading of these SIX 
dimensions is asked using practical, simple questions, which allow four levels of 
grading by the respondents. (The questionnaire is shown in Appendix 3.) In the 
examination, points, on an ordinal scale, are assigned to each grading category in 
the responses to each question, and rank correlations among the six dimensions are 
examined. 
Table 9.5 shows a rank correlation matrix ofthe six dimensions of perceived quality 
of care. 
Table 9.5 Rank correlation matrix among 6 dimensions of perceived quality of care 
Dl D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 
Drug availability (D1) 1.0000 
Structural aspects (D2) 0.2450 1.0000 
StafIbehaviour (D3) 0.2861 0.0759 1.0000 
Organisational aspects (D4) 0.2039 0.1266 0.15()O 1.0000 
Technical care provided (D5) 0.1108 0.1275 0.4335 '0.0121 1.0000 
Convenience (D6) 0.1075 0.0039 0.14G8 0.1284 '0.0283 1.0000 
All correlation coefficients are less than 0.5, which suggests the six dimensions are 
independent rather than internally consistent. Therefore, each dimension needs to 
be treated separately. 
9.5 TEST OF THE CHOICE MODEL 
In this section, In order to test the hypotheses derived from the choice model, 
outpatients' choice of payment mechanism, and the significance of income, expected 
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number of attendances, household size, perceived quality of care and household on 
the choice, are analysed. 
The hypotheses to be tested in this section are as described below. Income affects a 
consumer's choice of alternative payment mechanisms. The preference in terms of 
decreasing income is: voluntary prepayment or discount card are preferred less 
than user fee. Household size affects a consumer's choice of alternative payment 
mechanisms. The preference in terms of decreasing size of household is: voluntary 
prepayment is preferred more than user fee, and discount card is preferred less 
than user fee. The expected number of attendances affects a consumer's choice of 
alternative payment mechanisms. The preference in terms of decreasing expected 
number of attendances is: voluntary prepayment or discount card are preferred less 
than user fee. Perceived quality of care affects a consumer's choice of alternative 
payment mechanisms. The preference in terms of decreasing level of perceived 
quality of care is: voluntary prepayment or discount card are preferred less than 
user fee. 
The choice model produces hypotheses comparing voluntary prepayment and 
discount cards in addition to the above. Yet they are not tested in this section, 
since consumers' choice of payment mechanism between voluntary prepayment and 
discount cards could not be observed in the field at the time of this outpatient 
questionnaire survey, as discussed in the previous section. At the time of this 
survey, after one year of discount card trial, a choice between discount card and 
voluntary prepayment was not offered to consumers except at Chawama in Lusaka, 
and the choice of discount card over voluntary prepayment has become almost 
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negligible even there. 
The observations of outpatients' choice of voluntary prepayment have a problem, 
which contradicts with one of the fundamental assumptions in the choice model. 
As shown in Table 9.3 and argued in the previous section, subscription starters of 
low'cost prepayment in Lusaka are thought to choose low'cost prepayment as a 
lower user fee with a 24·hour delay. They are considered to refrain from 
continuous payment of premiums after their current illness episode. Therefore, in 
the following test of the choice model, the choice by subscription starters of low'cost 
prepayment is regarded as a choice of user fee. However, the proportion of 
subscription starters of low'cost prepayment in Kitwe is small enough to consider 
that they happen to start or renew the subscription of low'cost prepayment upon 
their current illness episode, and they are considered to become continuous 
subscribers. Therefore, all observed choices of low' cost prepayment in Kitwe are 
analysed as they are. 
9.5.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF OUTPATIENT'S CHOICE PAYMENT 
MECHANISM 
Tables 9.6 and 9.7 show the background of outpatients by choice of payment 
mechanism. Table 9.6 shows average household income per head by choice of 
payment mechanism. 
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Table 9.6 Average household income per head by payment mechanism no 
Mean S.D. N 
Lusaka Chipata User fees 33,483 48,371 79 
Low'cost prepayments 32,090 42,486 80 
All 32,782 45,366 159 
t = 0.19 p = 0.847 
Kabwata User fees 75,778 109,737 59 
Low'cost prepayments 81,533 71,261 59 
All 78,656 92,170 118 
t = '0.34 p = 0.736 
Chawama User fees 71,998 121,777 95 
Low'cost prepayments 40,381 37,317 43 
All 62,147 104,010 138 
t = 2.30 P = 0.023 
Kitwe Chimwenwe User fees 62,559 96,157 81 
Low'cost prepayments 48,866 58,769 30 
All 58,858 87,592 III 
t=O.7:1 p=0.467 
C01'etco User fees 27,225 38,189 34 
Low'cost prepayments 59,511 80,98:3 74 
All 49.347 71,771 108 
t = '2.82 P = 0.006 
r.fwekera User fees 56,971 91,217 82 
Discoll n t ca rds 67,292 86,672 15 
All 58,567 90,167 97 
t = '0.41 P = 0.686 
In Lusaka, at Chipata, the average household income per head among outpatients 
who choose to pay by user fee is K 33,483, and the average among those who pay by 
low' cost prepayment is K 32,090. At Kabwata, the average among outpatients 
who choose to pay by user fee is K 75,778, and that among those who pay by 
low' cost prepayment is K 81,533. At Chawama, the average among outpatients 
who pay by user fee is K 71,998, and among those choosing to pay by low'cost 
prepayment it is K 40,381. 
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In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, the average household income per head among 
outpatients who choose to pay by user fee is K 62,559, and the average among those 
who choose to pay by low-cost prepayment is K 48,866_ At Cosetco, the average 
among outpatients who choose to pay by user fee is K 27,225, and among those who 
pay by low-cost prepayment it is K 59,511. At Mwekera, the average among 
outpatients who choose to pay by user fee is K 56,971, and among those choosing to 
pay by discount cards it is K 67,292. 
According to the prediction of the choice model, higher averages among outpatients 
who choose to pay by low-cost prepayment or discount card than among outpatients 
who choose to pay by user fee are expected. The expected higher averages among 
those who pay by low-cost prepayment or discount card are observed at three health 
centres: Kabwata, Cosetco, and Mwekera. The difference in the average at Cosetco 
is statistically significant with a t-test for two independent samples. At the other 
three health centres, Chipata, Chawama, and Chimwenwe, higher averages among 
those who pay by user fee are observed, which contradicts with the prediction of the 
choice model. The difference in the average at Chawama is statistically significant 
with a t-test. These contradictions can be explained by an interpretation of the 
choice model whereby the effects of the factors other than income, such as expected 
number of attendances, perceived quality of care or household size, are strong 
enough to conceal the effects of income. This interpretation will be tested after the 
examination of outpatients' backgrounds, employing the estimation of logit model 
incorporating these factors simultaneously. 
Table 9.7 shows the average number of expected attendances by choice of payment 
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mechanism. 
Table 9.7 Average of expected attendances by payment mechanism 
Mean S.D. N 
Lusaka Chipata User fees 7.2 14.2 75 
Low'cost prepayments 18.1 21.1 79 
All 12.8 18.8 154 
t = '3.77 P = 0.000 
Kabwata User fees 7.6 12.4 57 
Low'cost prepayments 10.6 15.1 59 
All 9.1 13.8 116 
t = '1.19 P = 0.239 
Chawama User fees 6.0 12.3 91 
Low'cost prepayments 19.1 22.0 43 
All 10.2 17.1 134 
t = '3.65 P = 0.001 
Kitwe Chimwenwe U"er fees 6.3 10.6 81 
Low'cost prepayments 12.1 12.9 :i0 
All 7.9 11.5 111 
t = '2.40 P = 0.018 
Cosetco User fees 6.0 9.2 :14 
Low'cost prepayments 11.4 14.5 74 
An 9.7 13.3 10!! 
t = '2 .. 16 p = 0.020 
I\Iwekera User fees 9.8 la.5 82 
Discount card8 9.7 8.4 15 
An 9.8 12.8 97 
t = 0.02 P = 0.984 
In Lusaka, at Chipata, the average number of expected attendances among 
outpatients who choose to pay by user fee is 7.2, and the average among those who 
pay by low'cost prepayment is 18.1. At Kabwata, the average among outpatients 
who choose to pay by user fee is 7.6, and among those choosing to pay by low'cost 
prepayment, it is 10.6. At Chawama, the average among outpatients choosing to 
pay by user fee is 6.0, and among those who pay by low'cost prepayment, it is 19.1. 
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In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, the average number of expected attendances among 
outpatients who choose to pay by user fee is 6.3, and the average among those who 
choose low-cost prepayment is 12.1. At Cosetco, the average among outpatients 
choosing to pay by user fee is 6.0, and among outpatients who choose to pay by 
low-cost prepayment, it is 11.4. At Mwekera, the average among outpatients 
choosing to pay by user fee is 9.8, and among outpatients choosing discount cards, it 
is 9.7. 
According to the prediction of the choice model, higher averages among outpatients 
who choose payment by low-cost prepayment or discount card than among 
outpatients who choose to pay by user fee are expected. The expected higher 
averages among those choosing low-cost prepayment or discount card are observed 
at all five health centres where low·cost prepayment is available: Chipata, Kabwata, 
Chawama, Chimwenwe, and Cosetco. The differences in the average at Chipata, 
Chawama, Chimwenwe, and Cosetco are statistically significant with a t-test for 
two independent samples. At Mwekera, where a discount card is available, there 
is a higher average among those choosing payment by user fee, which contradicts 
with the prediction of the choice model. These findings are considered to support 
the predicted effect of expected number of attendances on the choice of low-cost 
prepayment. Yet, the difference in the average at Mwekera is not statistically 
significant with at-test. These contradictions can be explained by an 
interpretation of the choice model whereby the effects of the factors other than 
expected number of attendances, such as income, perceived quality of care or 
household size, are strong enough to conceal the effects of the expected number of 
attendances. This interpretation will be tested later through the estimation of 
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logit model incorporating these factors simultaneously. 
Table 9.8 shows the average points of perceived quality of care scales m six 
dimensions by the choice of payment mechanism. 
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Table 9.8 Average of perceived quality of care scale by dimension by payment mechanism 
Drug Structural Staff 
availability aspects behaviour 
(DJ) (D2) (D3) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Lusaka Chipata User fees 2.13 1.08 2.32 0.71 2.89 0.95 
Low'cost 1.80 0.97 2.29 0.83 2.93 0.94 prepayments 
All 1.96 1.04 2.30 0.77 2.91 0.94 
t = 2.005 p = 0.047 t = 0.237 p = 0.813 t = '0.260 p = 0.795 
Kabwata User fees 2.15 1.01 1.85 0.74 3.05 0.78 
Low'cost 1.85 0.93 1.88 0.77 2.90 1.00 prepayments 
All 2.00 0.98 1.86 0.75 2.97 0.89 
t = 1.707 p = 0.090 t = '0.224 p = 0.807 t = 0.929 P = 0.355 
Chawama User fees 2.18 0.90 2.46 0.76 2.86 0.87 
Low'cost 
pre payments 1.58 0.59 1.98 0.80 2.65 1.11 
All 1.99 0.86 2.31 0.80 2.80 0.95 
t = 3.987 p = 0.000 t = 0.34:38 p = 0.001 t = 1.108 p = 0.272 
Kitwe Chimwenwe llser fees 1.78 0.84 2.09 0.48 2.77 0.53 
Low'cost 1.77 0.68 2.00 0.26 2.80 0.48 prepayments 
All 1.77 0.79 2.06 0.43 2.77 0.52 
t = 0.065 P = 0.948 t = 1.206 P = 0.231 t=·0.312 p=0.756 
Cosetco lTser fees 2.79 0.77 1.91 0.62 2.91 0.38 
Low'cost 2.69 0.91 prcpayments 1.86 0.58 3.0!) 0.60 
All 2.72 0.86 1.88 0.59 3.01 0.55 
t = 0.585 p = 0.560 t = 0.381 p = 0.701 t=·1.917 p = 0.0,,8 
Mwckera llger fees 2.39 0.84 1.9:3 0.70 3.33 0.67 
Discount 2.67 1.05 1.93 0.70 3.20 0.68 cards 
All 2.43 0.88 1.93 0.70 3.31 0.67 
t = '1.124 P = 0.2()4 t = ,0.0:1:3 p = 0.97·\ t = O.GIlIl P = 0.493 
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Table 9.8 Average or perceived quality or care scale by dimension by payment mechanism - continued 
Organisational Technical Convenience 
aspects care provided (06) (o4l (05) N 
Mean S.O. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Lusaka Chipata User rees 2.33 0.84 3.43 0.59 2.32 0.98 79 
Low-cost 2.35 0.80 3.53 0.66 2.35 1.13 80 prepayments 
All 2.34 0.82 3.48 0.63 2.33 1.05 159 
t = -0.161 p = 0.873 t = -0.955 p = 0.341 t = -0.200 p = 0.842 
Kabwata User rees 2.29 0.85 3.15 0.64 2.61 0.81 59 
Low-cost 2.14 0.90 3.19 prepayments 0.86 2.90 0.89 59 
All 2.21 0.88 3.17 0.76 2.75 0.86 118 
t = 0.946 p = 0.346 t = -0.243 p = 0.808 t = -1.845 p = 0.068 
Chawama User rees 2.24 0.77 3.16 0.64 2.61 0.82 95 
Low-cost 1.98 0.96 3.35 0.92 2.42 1.10 43 prepayments 
All 2.16 0.84 3.22 0.74 2.55 0.91 13B 
t= 1.592 p=0.116 t = - 1.229 p = 0.224 t = 1.027 p = 0.30B 
Kitwe Chimwenwe lTser ree. 2.47 0.57 2.91 0.36 2.BO 0.58 81 
Low-cost 2.4:3 0.50 2.87 0.43 2.BO 0.76 30 J>repa~"m('nts 
All 2.46 0.55 2.90 0.3B 2.BO 0.6.3 III 
t = 0.:302 p = 0.703 t = 0.575 p = 0.556 t = O.OIB p = 0.985 
Cosetco User feps 2.5:3 0.66 3.00 0.25 2.71 0.84 34 
Low-cost 
prppaympnt.s 2A9 0.75 3.0B 0.4:3 3.07 0.93 74 
All 2.~O 0.72 3.06 0.38 2.95 0.91 lOB 
t = 0.288 P = 0.7i4 t = -1.2:39 p = 0.218 t = -1.941 p:::: 0.055 
Mwekera User r"es 2.:38 0.71 :l.:l0 0.51 2.9:3 1.00 82 
Discount 2.60 0.6:3 3.20 0.78 3.60 0.51 15 
canis 
All 2.41 0.70 :3.29 0.56 3.0:3 0.97 97 
t= -1.125 p= 0.26::1 t = 0.667 p = 0.506 t = -2.532 p = 0.013 
In Lusaka, at Chipata, the average points of the drug availability scale (Dl) and 
structural aspects scale (02) among outpatients who choose to pay by user fee are 
larger than the average points among outpatients choosing to pay by low·cost 
prepayment. And, the average points of the staff behaviour scale (D3), 
organisational aspects scale (D4), technical care provided scale (D5), and 
convenience scale (DG) among outpatients who choose to pay by user fee are smaller 
than the average points among outpatients choosing to pay by low-cost prepayment. 
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The difference in D 1 alone is statistically significant in a t-test for two independent 
samples. At Kabwata, the average points of scales D 1, D3 and D4 among 
outpatients who choose to pay by user fee are larger than the average points among 
those choosing to pay by low-cost prepayment. And, the average points of scales 
D2, D5, and D6 among outpatients choosing to pay by user fee are smaller than the 
average points among outpatients who choose low-cost prepayment. The 
difference in D 1 alone is statistically significant in a t-test. At Chawama, the 
average points of D1, D2, D3, D4, and D6 among outpatients who choose to pay by 
user fee are larger than the average points among those choosing low-cost 
prepayment. And, the average point of D5 among outpatients choosing to pay by 
user fee is smaller than the average point among those choosing to pay by low-cost 
prepayment. The difference in Dl alone is statistically significant in at-test. 
In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, the average points of D 1, D2, D4 and D5 among 
outpatients choosing to pay by user fee are larger than the average points among 
those choosing low-cost prepayment. And, the average point of D2 among 
outpatients choosing payment by user fee is smaller than the average point among 
outpatients choosing payment by low-cost prepayment. The average points of D6 
are almost the same. There is no statistically significant difference in all six 
dimensions. At Cosetco, the average points of D 1, D2, and D4 among outpatients 
choosing payment by user fee are larger than the average points among outpatients 
choosing low-cost prepayment. And, the average points of D3, D5, and D6 among 
outpatients choosing payment by user fee are smaller than the average points 
among outpatients who choose low-cost prepayment. There is no statistically 
significant difference in all six dimensions. At Mwekera, the average points of D3 
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and D5 among outpatients who choose payment by user fee are larger than the 
average points among those who choose to pay by discount card. And, the average 
points of Dl, D4, and D6 among outpatients choosing payment by user fee are 
smaller than the average points among those who choose to pay by discount card. 
The average points of D2 are almost the same. The difference in D6 alone is 
statistically significant in at-test. 
According to the prediction of the choice model, average numbers of points are 
expected to be higher in all six dimensions among outpatients who choose to pay by 
low-cost prepayment or discount card than among outpatients who choose to pay by 
user fee. Among the statistically significant differences, the expected higher 
average points among those choosing a discount card is only observed in D6 at 
l\lwekera. Instead, lower average points among those who choose low-cost 
prepayment are observed in Dl at all three health centres in Lusaka. These 
contradict the prediction. 
Taking the statistically insignificant differences into account, the average points in 
Dl among outpatients who choose to pay by user fee are larger than the average 
points among outpatients choosing to pay by low-cost prepayment, regardless of the 
size of health centres, in both districts. Yet, at Mwekera, the average points in D 1 
among outpatients who choose to pay by user fee are larger than the average points 
among outpatients choosing payment by discount card. There is no remarkable 
regularity in the observed differences in D2, D3, D1, D5, and DB at all health 
centres. 
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Although the observed contradiction in regards to D 1 between user fee and low·cost 
prepayment can be explained by an interpretation of the choice model, whereby the 
effects of the factors other than perceived quality of care {such as income, expected 
number of attendances, or household size} are strong enough to conceal the effects of 
perceived quality of care, consistent contradictions are considered to suggest that 
the predicted effect of perceived quality of care on the choice oflow·cost prepayment 
is rejected. This interpretation will be tested later through the estimation of logit 
model incorporating these factors simultaneously. 
Table 9.9 shows averages of household size by choice of payment mechanism. 
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Table 9.9 Average of household size by payment mechanism 
Mean S.D. N 
Lusaka Chipata User fees 3.3 1.8 79 
Low·cost prepayments 3.1 1.8 80 
All 3.2 1.8 159 
t = 0.54 P = 0.591 
Kabwata User fees 4.0 2.3 59 
Low·cost prepayments 3.3 1.9 59 
All 3.6 2.1 118 
t = 1.93 p = 0.056 
Chawama User fees 2.9 1.6 95 
Low·cost prepayments 3.1 1.9 43 
All 3.0 1.7 138 
t = ·0.44 P = 0.664 
Kitwe Chimwenwe User fees 3.1 1.6 81 
Low·cost prepayments 3.5 2.0 80 
All 8.2 1.8 111 
t=·1.01 p = 0.315 
Cosetco User fees 2.7 1.8 :3<1 
Low·cost prepayments 2.5 1.5 74 
All 2.6 1.4 108 
t = 0.61 P = 0.5-U 
I\lwekera User fees 2.8 1.:3 82 
Discount cards :1.1) 1.9 \1) 
All 2.9 1.5 97 
t = ·1.50 p = 0.151 
In Lusaka, at Chipata, the average household size among outpatients who choose to 
pay by user fee is 3.3, and that among those who choose low·cost prepayment is 3.1. 
At Kabwata, the average among outpatients who choose payment by user fee is 4.0, 
and that among those who choose low·cost prepayment is 3.3. At Chawama, the 
average among outpatients who choose to pay by user fee is 2.9, and that among 
those who choose low·cost prepayment is 3.1. 
In Kitwe, at Chimwenwe, the average household size among outpatients choosing to 
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pay by user fee is 3.1, and that among those who choose low'cost prepayment is 3.5. 
At Cosetco, the average among outpatients choosing to pay by user fee is 2.7, and 
that among those who choose low'cost prepayment is 2.5. At Mwekera, the 
average among outpatients choosing to pay by user fee is 2.8, and that among those 
who choose discount cards is 3.5. 
According to the prediction of the choice model, lower averages among outpatients 
who choose to pay by low'cost prepayment than among those who choose to pay by 
user fee are expected. The expected lower averages among those choosing low'cost 
prepayment are observed at three health centres where this method is available: 
Chipata, Kabwata, and Cosetco. Yet, the differences in the average at these three 
health centres are not statistically significant with a t-test for two independent 
samples. At the other two health centres where low-cost prepayment is available, 
Chawama and Chimwenwe, lower averages among those paying by user fee are 
observed, which contradicts with the prediction of the choice model. Yet, the 
differences in the average at these two health centres are not statistically 
significant with a t-test. According to the prediction of the choice model, higher 
averages among outpatients who choose to pay by discount card than among 
outpatients choosing to pay by user fee are expected. The expected higher average 
among those who pay by discount card is observed in Mwekera. Yet, the difference 
in the average is not statistically significant. 
The contradictions at Chawama and Chimwenwe can be explained by an 
interpretation of the choice model whereby the effects of the factors other than 
household size, such as mcome, expected number of attendances or perceived 
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quality of care, are strong enough to conceal the effects of household size. This 
interpretation will be tested later through the estimation of logit model 
incorporating these factors simultaneously. 
9.5.2 SIMULTANEOUS ESTIMATION OF LOGIT MODEL FOR THE CHOICE OF 
PAYMENT MECHANISM 
Tables 9.10a and 9.1Ob show the results of the estimation of logit model for the 
effects of factors such as income, expected numbers of attendances, perceived 
quality of care and household size on the choice of payment mechanism between 
user fee and low'cost prepayment in each district. As a variable of covariance 
representing perceived quality of care, six scales - perceived drug availability, 
structural aspects, staff behaviour, organisational aspects, technical care provided 
and convenience - are employed separately and all at the same time. Since child 
outpatients, aged from 6 to 15, and adult patients, aged from 16 to 64, face different 
fee levels, a dummy variable representing the age group of outpatients is 
incorporated in each model. 
Table 9.1Oa shows the results in Lusaka. 
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Table 9.10a Estimation oflogit model in Lusaka: outpatient's choice of payment mechanism 
Lusaka model D1 Lusaka model D2 LUflaka model D3 Lusaka model D4 
Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) 
Income 0(1) -6.53x10·a H.6;3) -GA8x10'3 (-1.68) -6.66xlO·3 (-1.74) -6.64x10·3 (-1.73) 
Expecting attendance 7.G2xH)"3 ( 4047)** 7.78xl(j"3 ( 4.(2)** 7.73xlO·3 ( 4.58)** 7.77xlO·3 ( 4.62)** 
Drug availability (D 1) -I. O;jx 1 0'1 (-3.65)** 
Structural aspects (D2) -4.38x10·2 (-1.23) 
Staff behaviour (D3) -4.38x10·4 (-0.02) 
Organisational aspects (D4) -2.68x10·2 (-0.86) 
Technical care provided (D5) 
~ 
COllvenience (DG) -J 
0 
Household size -2.7!'ixl0-2 (-1.82) -2.68xl0·2 (-1.81) -2.76xlO-2 (-1.87) -2.76xlO·2 (-1.86) 
Age group 2.93xHP ( 4.09)** 2.95xl0·1 ( 4.12)** 2.90xlO· j ( 3.99)** 2.90xlO·1 ( 4.00)** 
Health centre size -1.68x10·1 (-2.71)** -1.43x10·! (-2.29)* -1.61x10·1 (-2.66)** -l.60x10·1 (-2.65)** 
Season -9AOx10-z (-I.72) -7.92x10·2 (-IA1) -9.85xlO·2 (-I.83) -9.20x10·2 (-1.69) 
Constant 3.07x10·z -1.09xlO·1 -1.69x10·1 -1.14x10·1 
N=404 In L = -24504 InL=-251.7 In L = -25204 In L = -252.1 
* p < 0.0.'), ** p <0.01 
Tahle !l.lOa E,.;timation of logit model in Lusaka: ()utpatient'8 choice of payment mechanislll - continued 
Lusaka model D5 Lusaka model DG Lusaka model All 
Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) Mean ofvariahle 
In(;()me (104) -6.1GxlO·3 ( '1.60) -G.6GxlO·3 (-1.74) -5.76x10·3 ( -1.42) 5.65 
Expecting attendance 8.08x10",l ( 4.72)** 7.73xlO·3 ( 4.(0)** 7.96xlO·3 ( 4.57)** 10.88 
Drug availability (D 1) -l.lGxlO· l (-3.52)** 1.98 
Structural aspects (D2) 2.72.x10·3 (-0.G7) 2.17 
Staff behaviour (D3) -8.53xlO·a (-0.25) 2.90 
Organisational aspects (D4) -5.55xlO·4 (-0.02) 2.25 
Technical care provided (D5) 8.78xl0·2 ( 2.28)* 1.15xl0·1 ( 2.55)* 3.32 
t-:l 
Convenience (D6) 1.88xl0·z ( 0.07) 1.45xl0·2 ( 0.51) -l 2.53 
~ 
House hold size -Z.48xlO·2 ( -1.(7) 2.90xlO·z ( 3.99) -2.39xlO·z (-1.56) 3.26 
Age group 2.99xlO·) (4.23)** 2.90x10·) ( 3.99)** 3.05xl0·1 ( 4.41)** 0.92 
Health centre size -1.77xlO· l (-2.90)** -1.GOxlO· l (-2.62)** -1.8Gx10·) (-2.82)** 0.71 
Season -1.07xlO·\ H.98)* -9.87xlO·z ( -1.84) -1.07xlO·1 (-1.84) 0.45 
Constant -4.75xlO·\ -1.76xlO-\ -3.64xlO·1 
In L= -249.8 In L = -252.4 In L = -241.3 
The slopes for income are consistently negative in all the seven models. This 
means outpatients with low income are more likely to choose to pay by low-cost 
prepayment ceteris paribus. This contradicts with the prediction of the choice 
model, but these parameters are not statistically significant. The slopes for 
expected number of attendances are positive, with statistical significance by t-tests, 
consistently in all the seven models. This means outpatients expecting frequent 
attendances are more likely to choose to pay by low-cost prepayment. These 
findings support the prediction of the choice model. With regard to the slopes for 
the perceived quality of care scales, the slope of the drug availability scale (Dl) is 
negative, with statistical significance, and that of technical care provided (D5) is 
positive, with statistical significance. The former means outpatients with low 
perceived quality of care are more likely to choose to pay by low-cost prepayment. 
This contradicts with the prediction of the choice model. On the contrary, the 
latter means outpatients with high perceived quality of care are more likely to 
choose to pay by low-cost prepayment. This supports the prediction of the choice 
model. Put D 1 and D5 aside, the slopes of D2, D3 and D4 are negative, and D6 is 
positive. in the separate models. The slope ofD2 in the all-in-one model is positive, 
however. But these are statistically insignificant and considered to have little 
implication. The slopes for household size are negative. This means outpatients 
with small household size are more likely to choose to pay by low'cost prepayment. 
This supports the prediction of the choice model, but these parameters are not 
sta tistically significant. 
With regard to controlling variables. which are not incorporated in the theoretical 
models. the slopes for the dummy variable representing age group suggest stronger 
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preference for low·cost prepayment among adult outpatients than among child 
outpatients, with statistical significance. The slopes for the dummy variable 
representing health centre size suggest stronger preference for low·cost prepayment 
at small health centres than at large health centres, with statistical significance. 
The slopes for the dummy variable representing season are statistically 
insignificant except for model D5. These findings suggest that the age group of 
outpatients and health centre size may have implications beyond the theoretical 
models. 
Table 9. lOb shows the results in Kitwe. 
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Table H.I0b Estimation oflogit model in Kitwe: outpatient's choice of payment mechanism 
Ki twe model D 1 Kitwe model D2 Kitwe model D3 Kitwe model D4 
Slope ( t) Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) 
11ll:ome (HII) 4.2GxlO·3 ( 0.85) 4.4i)xlO·3 ( 0.88) 4.62xlO·3 ( 0.92) 4.22xlO·3 ( 0.84) 
Expecting attendance 9.G2xlO·3 ( 2.5.'5)* 9.8GxlO·3 ( 2.59)** 9.72xlO·3 ( 2.59)** 9.5Gx10·3 ( 2.56)* 
Drug availability (D1) 5.1;8x10·3 ( 0.12) 
Structural aspects (D2) 3.5Hx10·2 ( 0.46) 
Staff behaviour (D3) 1.16xl0·\ ( 1.39) 
Organisational aspects (D4) 1.64xl0·3 ( 0.03) 
Technical care provided (D;'» 
~ 
-::J Convenience (DG) ~ 
Household size 1.34xlO·2 ( 0.52) 1.37xlO·2 ( 0.53) 1.51xlO·2 ( 0.58) 1.35xlO·2 ( 0.52) 
Age group 4. 19x1O· j ( 4.54)** 4.23xl0· j ( 4.69)** 4.05xlO· J ( 3.99)** 4. 19x1O·J ( 4.55)** 
Health centre size -4.23xlO· j (-5.36)** -4.33xl0· j (-6.17)** -4. llxlO'\ (-5.76)** -4.27xl0·\ (-6.17)** 
Season -2.10xlO· j (-2.70)** '2. 15xlO· j ('2.75)** -1.98xl0·\ ('2.53)* -2.09xl0· J ('2.70)** 
Constant -4.29xlO· j -4.94xl0· J -7.39xl0· J -4.18x10· j 
N= 215 In L = -116.0 In L = -115.9 In L= -115.0 lnL= -116.0 
* p < 0.0;'). ** p <0.01 
Tahle 9.10h Estimation of IOb>i.t model in Kitwe: outpatient's choice of payment mechanism" continued 
Kitwe model D5 Kitwe model D6 Kitwe model All 
Slope (t) Slope et) Slope (t) Mean of variable 
Income (lO·t) 4.25xl0·3 ( 0.85) 2.7()xlO·3 ( 0.53) 3.48xlO·3 ( 0.6G) 5.52 
Expecting attendance 9.54xl0·3 ( 2.56)* 9.82xl0·3 ( 2.59)** 1.01xl0·2 ( 2.58)** 8.92 
Drug availahility (DD "9.l3xlO·3 ("0.18) 2.25 
Structural alipects (D2) 3.27xlO·2 ( 0.39) 1.96 
Staff behaviour (D3) 1.09xlO·1 ( 1.22) 2.92 
Organisational aspects (D4) "1.75xlO·2 ("0.26) 2.48 
Technical care provided (D:"i) 2.05xlO·2 ( 0.19) "2.l2xlO·2 ("0.19) 2.98 
~ 
Convenience (DG) ( 1.78) ( 1.54) -1 9.37xlO·Z 8.38xlO·2 2.88 
c..' 
How;chold size 1.32xl0·z ( 0 .. 51) 7.53xl0·a ( 0.28) 9.35xlO·3 ( 0.35) 2.89 
Age group 4.20xlO· 1 ( 4.;)7)** 4.32xlO·1 ( 5.05)** 4.20xlO·1 ( 4.43)** 0.93 
Health centre size "4.24xlO·1 ("6.00)** "4.l2xlO·1 ("5.83)** "4.14xlO·1 ("4.96)** 0.50 
Season "Z.09xlO·1 ("2.70)** "2. 11xlO' l ("2.70)** "2.06xlO·1 ("2.58)** 0.48 
Conlitant °4.77xlO· 1 °7.03xlO·1 °9.06xl0·1 
In L = °116.0 In L = °114.4 In L= "113.6 
The slopes for income are consistently positive in all the seven models. These 
results are contrary to the results in Lusaka. This means outpatients with high 
income are more likely to choose to pay by low-cost prepayment ceteris paribus, and 
supports the prediction of the choice model, but these parameters are not 
statistically significant. The slopes for expected number of attendances are 
positive, with statistical significance by t-tests, consistently in all the seven models. 
These results are similar to the results in Lusaka. This means outpatients 
expecting frequent attendances are more likely to choose to pay by low-cost 
prepayment. These findings support the prediction of the choice model. With 
regard to the slopes for the perceived quality of care scales, the slopes for all scales 
from Dl to D6 are positive in the separate models, but the slopes ofDl, D4, and D5 
are negative in the all-in-one model. These results can be interpreted to mean that 
perceived quality of care has little effect on the choice, since all the slopes in the 
seven models are statistically insignificant. The slopes for household size are 
positive. These results are contrary to the results in Lusaka. This means 
outpatients with small household size are less likely to choose to pay by low-cost 
prepayment. This contradicts with the prediction of the choice model. but these 
parameters are not statistically significant. 
With regard to controlling variables, which are not incorporated in the theoretical 
models, the slopes for the dummy variable representing age group suggest stronger 
preference for low-cost prepayment among adult outpatients than among child 
outpatients, with statistical significance. These results are similar to the results 
in Lusaka. The slopes for the dummy variable representing health centre size 
suggest stronger preference for low-cost prepayment at small health centres than at 
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large health centres, with statistical significance. These results are similar to the 
results in Lusaka as well. These findings suggest that outpatient age group and 
health centre size may have implications beyond the theoretical models. The 
slopes for the dummy variable representing season are statistically significant. 
These results are contrary to the results in Lusaka. This finding suggests there is 
seasonality of choice in Kitwe as expected, which is controlled using a dummy 
variable in this statistical estimation. 
Table 9.10c shows the results of the estimation of logit model for the effects of 
factors on the choice of payment mechanism between user fee and low'cost 
prepayment in the two districts together. 
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Tahle ~l.lOc Estimation of logit model in two"districts: outpatient's choice of payment mechanism 
TWo"districts model Dl TwO"distrids model D2 Two " districts model D3 Two"districts model D4 
Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) 
Income 0(1) "4.88xHP ( "1.62) "4.45xlO·3 (-1.53) "4.52xlO·a (-1.55) "4.41xl0·a ("1.51) 
Expecting attendance 8.01xlO·3 ( 5.26)** 8.18xlO·3 ( 5.39)** 8.31xl0-a ( 5.43)** 8.22xl0·3 ( 5.42)** 
Drug availability (Dl) "5.94xlO·z ("2 .. '52)* 
Structural aspects (DZ) "Z.47x10·2 ("0.77) 
Staff behaviour (D3) 1.66xlO·z ( 0.62) 
Organi;;ational aspects (D4) "1.98xlO·z ("0.71) 
t'-J 
Technical care provided (D.5) 
-1 
Convenience (D6) \J) 
Household size "2.48xlO·z H.94) "2.37xlO·z ("1.87) "2.38xlO·2 (-1.88) "2.40xlO·z ("1.90) 
Age group 3.50xlO·1 ( 6.58)** 3.45x10·1 ( 6.36)** 3.43xlO·1 ( 6.30)** 3.42x10·1 ( 6.25)** 
District "5.76xlO·3 ("0.12) "2.13xlO·2 ("0.45) "1.74xlO·2 ("0.37) "1.34x10·2 ("0.28) 
Health centre size "2.73xlO·1 ("6.01)** "2.40xlO·1 ("5.28)** "2.46xlO·1 ("5.51)** "2.48xlO·1 ("5.57)** 
Season "1.25xlO·1 ("2.84)** "1.18xl0·1 ("2.63)** "1.26xlO·1 ("2.89)** "1.23xlO·1 ("2.79)** 
Constant "7.72xl0·1 "1.G6xlO·1 "2.58x10·1 "1.62x10·1 
N=619 In L= "372.5 In L = "375.5 In L= "375.6 In L= "375.5 
* p < 0.05, ** p <0.01 
Table 9.10c E",tim:ltion oflogit model in two-di",tl'ict",: outpatient's choice of payment mechaniHm - continued 
Two-districts model D5 Two-districts model DG Two-districts model All 
Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) Mean of variable 
Income 0(1) -3.84xl0·3 (-1.32) -4.58xl0·3 <-I.5G) -4.37xl0·3 (-1.43) 5.GO 
Expecting attendance 8.50xlO-3 ( 5.51)** 8.22xlO·3 (5.42)** 8.33xl0·3 ( 5.35)** 10_20 
Drug availability (D1) -7.00xl0·2 (-2.65)** 2.07 
Structural aspects (D2) -3.10xl0·3 (-0.09) 2.10 
Staff behaviour (D3) -3.69xl0·3 (-0.12) 2.91 
Organisational aspects (D4) -6.56x10·3 (-0.22) 2.33 
~ 
Technical care provided (D5) 9.68xlO·2 ( 2.68)** 1.15xl0·1 ( 2.82)** 3.20 
-.] 
Convenience (DG) ( 1.03) ( 1.31) (.0 2.47xlO·2 3.24xl0·2 2.65 
Household size -2.lOxl0·2 (-1.65) -2.42xl0·2 (-1.92) -2.24xl0·2 (-1.73) 3.13 
Age group 3.48x10·! ( 6.49)** 3.46xlO·! ( 6.39)** 3.60xlO·1 ( 7.00)** 0.92 
District 1.53xlO·2 ( 0.31) -2.47xl0·2 (-0.52) -2.69xl0·2 ( 0.53) 0.35 
Health centre size -2.55xlO·! (-5.70)** -2.42xl0-! (-5.39)** -2.78x10·! (-5.74)** 0.64 
Season -1.33xlO·1 (-3.02)** -1.27x10· J (-2.90)** -1.31x10·! (-2.86)** 0.46 
Constant -5.44x10·! -2.76xl0· J -5.14x10-1 
In L= -372.1 In L = -375.3 lnL= -366.9 
The slopes for income are consistently negative in all the seven models. These 
results are similar to the results in Lusaka and contrary to the results in Kitwe. 
This means outpatients with low income are more likely to choose to pay by low-cost 
prepayment ceteris paribus, and contradicts with the prediction of the choice model, 
but these parameters are not statistically significant. The slopes for expected 
number of attendances are positive, with statistical significance by t-tests, 
consistently in all the seven models. These results are similar to the results both 
in Lusaka and in Kitwe_ This means outpatients expecting frequent attendances 
are more likely to choose to pay by low-cost prepayment. These findings support 
the prediction of the choice model. With regard to the slopes for perceived quality 
of care scales, the slope for drug availability (Dl) is negative, with statistical 
significance, and that of technical care provided (D5) is positive, with statistical 
significance. These results are similar to the results in Lusaka. The former 
means that outpatients with low perceived quality of care are more likely to choose 
to pay by low-cost prepayment, which contradicts with the prediction of the choice 
model. On the contrary, the latter means outpatients with high perceived quality 
of care are more likely to choose to pay by low-cost prepayment, which supports the 
prediction of the choice model. Aside from D 1 and D5, the slopes of D2 and D4 are 
negative, and D3 and D6 are positive, in the separate models. The slope of D3 in 
the all-in-one model is negative, however. But these results are statistically 
insignificant and considered to have little implication. The slopes for household 
size are positive. This means outpatients with large household size are more likely 
to choose to pay by low-cost prepayment. This contradicts with the prediction of 
the choice model, but the parameters are not statistically significant. 
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With regard to controlling variables, which are not incorporated in the theoretical 
models, the slopes for the dummy variable representing age group suggest stronger 
preference for low·cost prepayment among adult outpatients than among child 
outpatients, with statistical significance. These results are similar to the results 
in both Lusaka and Kitwe. The slopes for the dummy variable representing health 
centre size suggest stronger preference for low·cost prepayment at small health 
centres than at large health centres, with statistical significance. These results 
are similar to the results in both Lusaka and Kitwe as well. These findings 
suggest that outpatient age group and health centre size may have implications 
beyond the theoretical models. The slopes for the dummy variable representing 
season are statistically significant. These results are contrary to the results in 
Lusaka, and similar to those in Kitwe. This finding suggests there is seasonality of 
choice in the two districts as expected, which is controlled using a dummy variable 
in this statistical estimation. 
Table 9.11 shows the results ofthe estimation oflogit model for the effects offactors 
such as income, expected numbers of attendances, perceived quality of care and 
household size on the choice of payment mechanism between user fee and discount 
card at Mwekera in Kitwe. 
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Table ~l.11 Estimation of logit model for discount card: outpatient's choice of payment mechanism 
Di!<count card Di!<count card Discount card Discount card 
model D1 model D2 model 03 model 04 
Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) 
Income (I04) 2.73x10·~ ( O.RO) 2.81x10·3 ( 0.80) 3.41xl0·3 ( 0.96) 1.79xlO·3 ( 0.51) 
Expecting attendance 3.46x10·4 ( 0.13) 2.71xlO·4 ( 0.10) 4.93x10·4 ( 0.18) -1.30x10·4 (-0.05) 
Drug availability (01) 5.fiOx10·2 ( 1.39) 
Stl"Uctllral aspects (02) -1.31x10·2 (-0.24) 
Staff behaviour (03) -4.04xlO·2 (-0.70) 
Organisational aspects (04) G.62xlO·2 ( 1.27) 
t>:l 
Technical care provided (D5) 00 
t>:l 
Convenience (Dr.) 
Household size 4.52xlO·2 ( 2.01)* 4.73xlO·2 ( 2.10)* 4.86x10·2 ( 2.16)* 4.65xlO·2 ( 2.07)* 
Age group 3.29xl0·2 ( 0.28) 9.13xlO·3 ( 0.06) 2.05x10-2 ( 0.15) 4.20xlO-3 ( 0.37) 
Season 8.96x10·2 ( 1.l8) 6.03xlO·2 ( 0.82) 3.09xlO-2 ( 0.38) 7.58x10-2 (1.06) 
Constant -5.84xlO-! -3.89xlO·! -2.86xlO-! -6.05xlO·! 
N= 97 In L = -38.5 In L = -39.4 1nL = -39.2 In L= -38.6 
* p < 0.05, ** P <0.01 
Table 9.11 Estimation of logit model for discount card: outpatient's choice of payment mechanism - continued 
Discount card DiRcount card Discount card 
model D;) model D6 model All 
Slope (t) Slope (t) Slope (t) Mean of variable 
Income (04) 2.9Gxl0·3 ( 0.86) 6.45xl0·4 ( 0.22) 1.19xl0·3 ( 0.03) 5.86 
Expecting attendance -6.93xl0·4 ( 0.25) -8.07xl0·4 (-0.38) -9.60xl0·3 (-0.38) 9.79 
Drug availability (D 1) 5.70xl0·J ( 1.38) 2.43 
Structural aspects (D2) -2.86xlO· J (-0.53) 1.92 
Staff behaviour (D3) -5.38xl0· J (-0.92) 3.30 
Organisational aRpects (D4) 5.24xl0·J ( 0.95) 2.41 
~ 
Technical care provided (D5) (·O.G5) 00 -4.76xl0·2 
w 
-2.64xlO· J (-0.37) 3.29 
Convenience (D6) 1.09xl0· J ( 2.97)** 1.34 ( 2.30)* 3.03 
Houoehold size 4.87xl0·z ( 2.17)* 3.53xl0·2 ( 1.85) 3.92xlO· J ( 1. 77) 2.89 
Age group 7.91xl0·3 ( 0.05) 2.27xlO·z ( 0.23) 2.80xlO· J ( (US) 0.S5 
Season 3.25xlO·J ( 0.41) 5.23xlO·2 ( 0.91) 7.38xlO· J ( 0.88) 0.52 
Constant -2.50xlO·J -6.77x10· J -7.59xlO·J 
In L = -39.2 In L = -35.6 In L = -33.3 
The slopes for income are consistently positive in all the seven models. This means 
that outpatients with high income are more likely to choose to pay by discount card 
ceteris paribus. This supports the prediction of the choice model, but these 
parameters are not statistically significant. The slopes for expected number of 
attendances are positive and negative in the seven models, but these parameters 
are not statistically significant. This means that expected number of attendances 
has little effect on payment choice. With regard to the slopes for the perceived 
quality of care scales, the slope of D6 is positive, with statistical significance. This 
means that outpatients with high perceived quality of care are more likely to choose 
to pay by discount card. This result supports the prediction of the choice model. 
Other than D6, the slopes of D2, D3 and D5 are negative, and D 1 and D4 are 
positive, in the separate models. These are statistically insignificant and 
considered to have little implication. The slopes for household size are consistently 
positive in all the seven models. Statistical significances are found in a few 
separate models. This means that outpatients with large household size are more 
likely to choose to pay by discount card. This supports the prediction of the choice 
model. 
With regard to controlling variables, no statistical significance is found in all the 
seven models. 
9.6 SUMMARY 
Table 9.12a and Table 9.12b show the summary of tests of the choice model using 
outpatient questionnaire survey. 
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Table !) . 12a Summa t"\" of ~ta ll stt ca l tests of Chotce ~ lodelu :i ing outpatIent qucstionnaire survey 
I\ IOU I~ OF 
TABLI~ LOCATIO N CHO ICE 
ANALYS IS I NCOl\1E 
TABLE !U;- Chipata Prepayment/use r fee Uni variatc Contradict 
TABLI~ !J.!) I<abwata Prepayme nt/use r fce Univa ri atc Support 
Chaw<l m<l P repayment/use r fee Ul1Ivariate Co n trad ict· 
Chim we mwe Prepayment/user fee Univa riate Contradict 
Cosetco Prepayment/use r fee Univariate SUPP01't* 
l\lwc kcra Di~co unt ca rd /use r lee Univa riate Support 
TABLE 9.10 Lu saka Prepayment/use r fee Logi t model Contradict 
Kitwe Prepayment/use t' fee Logit model Support 
Two'district Prepayment/use r fee Logit mode l Contradict 
TABLE !.I. l l Mwe kera D iscou nt ca I'd /user fee Logit mode l Support 
* s ta tis ti cal s ignificance 
FACTOR 
HEALTH STATUS HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
Support· Support 
Support Support 
Support· Contradict 
Support· Contradict 
Support* Support 
Contradict Support 
Support* Support 
Support* Contradict 
Support* Contradict 
Unclear Support 
N 
(Xl 
O'l 
Tahle 9. 12h Sum ma ry of ~t"tl s t l c>d tosts of ChoIce i\l odcl us ing outpa llC nl qucbllOnnall'e survey 
:\10DE OF 
'J'. \ 13 LE LOCATIO:--1 CHOICE DlmC 
!\ :-.JA LYS IS 
,\VA ILAB ILlTY 
(0 1) 
T;\13LE9.8 Chlpata Prcp"Ylll c n tlu ~e r fce 1I1l1val"la t e Contradict* 
Kahwata Prepaymentlu"e l' fee Univanatc Cont rad ict 
Chawama Pre pay ment/use r fee Uni var iate Contradict* 
CllImwemwe Prepayment/user fee Uni \'a riate Cont radict 
Cosetco Prepay ment/user fee UllI variatc Con t rad ict 
:\ Iwekera Discount card/use r fee L'nivariate Support 
TABLE 9. 10 Logi t model 
Lusa ka Individual Cont radict 
each dllllc l1s io n 
Lusaka Individua l 
Log it model 
Cont rad ict* 
all dimensIons 
K lh,ve IndIVIdua l 
Logit model 
Support 
each dlnlenslOn 
KltlVc IndiVIdual 
Logit mode l 
Cont radict 
all dimensIons 
'l\\'O ,dlstTlct IndiVIdua l 
Logit mode l 
Cont rad ict' 
each dimension 
'l\\o 'dlstnct IndI VIdual 
Logit model 
Cont radIct ' 
all dImenSIons 
1',\.BLE 9. 11 Lo~ it mod!:1 
;\I\\"eke ra Ind"'ldu ,,1 Support 
each dimenSIOn 
IndiVIdua l 
Logit model 
Support ~ l \\'eke r;1 
all dImenSIOns 
... stall :-, tlca l !-! 1t!" lufica nce 
FACTOR 
QUALITY OF' CARE 
ORGANl ' TECHNI CAL 
STRUCTURAL STAPP CONVE' 
SATIONAL CAR E 
ASPECTS BEHAVIO UR NIENCE 
ASPECTS PROVIDED (02) (0 3) (06) (04) (05) 
Contrad ict Support Support Support Support 
Support Contradi ct Contradict Support Support 
Contradict* Contradict Contradict Support Contradi ct 
Contradict Support Contradict Contradict Unclear 
Contradict Support Contradict Support Support 
Unclear Contradict Support Contraclict Support* 
Contradict Contradict Contradict Support* Support 
Support Contradict Contradict Support* Support 
Support Support Support Support Support 
Support Support Coutraclict Contradict Support 
Contradict Support Contradict Support* Support 
Contrad ict Contradict Contradict Support* Support 
Cont..ad ict Contradict Support Contraclict Support* 
Contrad ict Contradict Support Contradict Support* 
On the choice between low"cost prepayment and user fees, the effect of health status is 
consistently supported by various tests. The tests of effects of income and household 
size have various results. The estimation of logit model in two"districts contradicts the 
predictions of the theoretical model. The observed effect of perceived quality of care is 
various as well. It is worth to note that the effect of drug availability (DO, which is 
featured in the theoretical modelling, contradicts the prediction with statistical 
significance in a few models. 
On the choice between discount cards and user fees, the effect of income and household 
size is supported by the tests; and the effect of health status is not supported by the test. 
These results are contrary to those of the choice between low "cost prepayments and user 
fees. The observed effect of perceived quality of care is various as well. The effect of 
drug availability (D 1) supports the prediction of the theoretical model. 
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10.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the theoretical and empirical findings of the study are discussed 
along with the three research questions specified in Chapter 1, after examining 
background assumptions related to the context of this study. Secondly, the 
strengths and the limitations, and thirdly, the policy implications and the scope for 
further research are discussed. 
10.2 MAPS OF HEALTH CARE UTIUSATION IN THE FIELD 
Before going into the discussion related to three research questions, the background 
of theoretical and empirical investigation of this study is examined in this section. 
This study aims to investigate equity in access to health care through analysing the 
mechanisms for direct payment at governmental health centres. This is only a 
part of health care provision in the field based on the definition of equity in access 
operationalised in Chapter 2: equal access for equal need, observed in terms of 
utilisation. The study also focuses on access to health care, especially by the poor 
section of the population, regarding the concern for the financial barrier created by 
the arrangement of direct payment mechanisms as argued in Chapter 1. In order 
to discuss equity in access in principle, the health care system as a whole, or access 
to health care at every health facility by every person needs to be taken into account. 
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Therefore, underlying assumptions here are that health care, which is subject to 
direct payment, and is provided and consumed at health centres, constitutes a large 
enough share of health care consumed in the health system of the field to discuss 
equity, and that health centres are major providers of health care for the poor 
section of the population. 
These are demonstrated through the construction of health care utilisation maps 
based on LCMS98 data. As shown in Figure 7.1, nearly 70% of health services are 
consumed by children and adults who are subject to direct payment; and as shown 
in Table 7.3, among paying patients, the volumes of health care services provided 
and consumed at health centres are more than 50%. 
In addition, as shown in Table 7.6, health care provided in governmental low-cost 
divisions, which are the predominantly health centres, is consumed by the 
relatively low-income section of the population, although average income among 
governmental high·cost department users in Kitwe is not consistent with this 
conclusion, probably due to small sample size in LCMS98. It is reasonable to say 
that health centres are major providers of health care for the poor section of the 
population. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the arrangement of direct payment 
mechanisms at governmental health centres is most likely to have impact on equity 
in access to health care in two districts in Zambia based on empirical analysis. 
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10.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: CONSUMER'S UTILISATION OF HEALTH 
CARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MECHANISM 
The first research question concerned the relationship between the consumers' 
ex' ante choice of payment mechanism and ex'post utilisation of health care services 
when falling ill. In the theoretical investigation in Chapter 6, the utilisation model 
which explains the difference in the consumers' utilisation of health care services 
when falling ill depending on their choice of payment mechanisms in advance was 
elaborated. It predicted the effect of the subscription of prepayment or the 
purchase of discount cards on the decision whether to seek health care or not. 
In order to explore the appropriateness of the theoretical utilisation model, a 
hypothesis derived from the model as below is tested in the empirical investigation 
in Chapters 7 and 8, using observation data from surveys. 
a) When falling ill, consumers with prepayment are more likely to seek health 
care than those with discount card. And consumers with discount card are more 
likely to seek health care than those with user fees. 
In order to test the hypothesis, it was necessary to use data sets which contained at 
least both variables of ex-ante individual choice of payment mechanism and ex'post 
individual's utilisation of health care service as discussed in Chapter 7. Therefore, 
LCl\1S98 data and records at health centres were employed in testing, while 
outpatient questionnaire data were not used. Those two data sets were made most 
use of in testing the hypothesis. although they are not ideal compared to 
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longitudinal follow-up data of consumers in the community, and have limitations in 
some categories of variables such as the choice of payment mechanism. 
Firstly, direct tests based on samples from the population were carried out using 
LCMS98 data set. The data employed were follow-up data on health care 
utilisation. However, the categories of variable on the ex-ante choice of payment 
mechanism were not specific, lacking in the category for prepayment at health 
centres. Only the aggregation of consumer's status whether they face financial 
barrier or not when falling ill was available. Therefore, these tests are not strictly 
precise in depicting the effect of prepayment on the utilisation of health care 
services at health centres, and are rather depicting the effect of removing the 
financial barrier. As shown in Table 7.12, consumers who did not pay at the time 
of utilisation, for example, subscribers of prepayment or beneficiaries of employer's 
payment, were more likely to seek health care services than those who had to pay at 
the time of utilisation, with statistical significance. Since fee schedule differences 
between children and adults, and income levels are observed among factors which 
are considered to affect these differences in utilisation in the same data set, these 
two factors are controlled in assessing the difference with Mantel-Haenszel test, in 
which statistically significant differences were found. Those without financial 
barriers to health care when falling ill in Lusaka tend to seek health care 2.2 times 
as often as those with financial barriers. In Kitwe, the difference is 1.4 times. 
Although the subjects of test are not limited to the utilisation at health centres 
focused upon in this study, these results show the effect of removing financial 
barriers. And the results of l\lantel-Haenszel tests are considered to support the 
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hypothesis at health centre level, since it means that differences are shown in 
various strata of samples including the low-income section of population. 
Since the sampling frame of LCMS98 did not sample from the catchment areas of 
the four health centres with the discount card trial, it was not possible to carry out a 
similar test related to the effect of the discount card. 
Secondly, indirect tests based on retrospective data of outpatients were carried out 
using records at health centres. The differences in the frequencies of consultations 
by the chosen payment mechanism were analysed. As discussed in Chapter 8, they 
were not precise, since sampling of outpatients is biased in failing to take non-users 
into account and the differences in utilisation observed in these analyses are 
considered to reflect mixed effects of not only the utilisation model but also the 
choice model. 
As shown in Table 8.8, which illustrates the differences in utilisation by the choice 
of payment mechanism at four health centres employing registry book data, the 
results on the differences between prepayment subscribers and user fee payers are 
consistent with the hypothesis with statistical significance at Kabwata and Cosetco. 
Although contradictory results are found at Chimwenwe, this is not statistically 
significant when limiting the samples into those who had not changed the choice of 
payment mechanism through the observed period. 
As to discount card, differences in utilisation between discount card holders and 
user fee payers are consistent with the hypothesis with statistical significance at 
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Mwekera. Although contradictory results are found at Kabwata, this IS not 
statistically significant when multiple comparisons are carried out. 
In order to examine the difference in utilisation between prepayment subscribers 
and discount card holders, it is needed to analyse the data at Chawama, since only 
Chawama offers prepayment and discount card at the same time. Table 8.9 shows 
the differences in utilisation among prepayment discount card holders and user fee 
payers using patients' medical record book data. The average frequencies of 
attendances are consistent with the hypothesis, although the differences are not 
statistically significant. This result is considered to imply the appropriateness of 
the hypothesis. 
Therefore, the results from analyses of records at health centres support the choice 
model, although the tests are indirect. 
In summary, it is reasonable to interpret that the empirical investigation supports 
the theoretical utilisation model in principle. Relatively strong evidence was 
accumulated with regard to the differences in utilisation between prepayment 
payers and user fee payers, while support for the differences in utilisation related to 
discount card holders is relatively weak. 
10.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 2: CONSUMER'S CHOICE OF PAYMENT 
MECHANISM 
The second research question was concerned with consumers' choice of direct 
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payment mechanism in the face of three available alternatives: user fee, voluntary 
prepayment, and pre-purchase discount card. In the theoretical investigation in 
Chapter 6, the choice model which explains consumers' choice of payment 
mechanism is elaborated. It predicts the effect on consumers' choice of price, 
income, perceived health status, perceived quality of health care and household size 
of each consumer. 
In order to explore the appropriateness of the theoretical choice model, four 
hypotheses derived from the model as below were tested in the empirical 
investigations from Chapters 7 to 9, using data from surveys. 
b) In terms of falling income, if the association between strong time preference 
and low income is assumed, user fees are more likely preferred than prepayment or 
discount card. Discount card is more likely preferred than prepayment. 
Therefore, the order of preference with low income is predicted to be (prepayment < 
discount card < user fees). 
c) In terms of falling health status, prepayment is more likely preferred than 
discount cards. Discount card is more likely preferred than user fees. Therefore, 
the order of preference with low health status is predicted to be (prepayment> 
discount card> user fees). 
d) In terms of falling perceived quality of care, user fees are more likely preferred 
than prepayment or discount cards. Discount card is more likely preferred than 
prepayment. Therefore, the order of preference with low perceived quality of care 
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is predicted to be (prepayment < discount card < user fees). 
e) In terms of falling household size, discount card is more likely preferred than 
user fees. And user fees are more likely preferred than prepayment. Therefore, 
the order of preference with household size is predicted to be (prepayment> user 
fees> discount card). 
The effect of price is not tested. Price was constant across districts, preventing the 
test of price effects at the district level. This is one of the limitations ofthe study. 
Series of tests were carried out fully utilising the three available data sets. Table 
1O.la, 1O.lb, 1O.2a and 1O.2b show the summary of statistical tests of the choice 
model in terms of comparisons between prepayment and user fee, and between 
discount card and user fee, respectively. 
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It is impossible to carry out tests comparing prepayment with discount card. This 
is due to the limitation of LCMS98 which lacks data for discount card, and due to 
the low popularity of discount cards among outpatients at Chawama, the only 
health centre where comparison between prepayment and discount card is feasible, 
which results in no observation ofthe choice between prepayment and discount card 
in outpatient questionnaire survey. 
As to the comparison between prepayment and user fee with LCMS98, two levels of 
choice of payment mechanism: individual choice and household choice, are tested 
with two levels of analysis: associations between choice and each factor, and 
simultaneous estimation of logit models, according to the district. With the data 
from the outpatient questionnaire survey, tests with two levels of analysis: 
associations between choice and each factor, and simultaneous estimation of logit 
models, according to health centres are carried out. 
Although each test has its limitations as discussed in Chapters 7 to 9, it seems 
possible to divide the empirically observed effects of factors into two groups: 
perceived health status and household size which are consistent with hypothesis, 
and income and quality of care which have mixed results. 
The effects of perceived health status on choice between prepayment and user fees 
are supported by all tests carried out without exception. And the effects of 
household size on choice are supported by the tests except for four results, which are 
statistically not significant. The choice model is considered to succeed in 
explaining consumers' choice in terms of these two factors in principle. 
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The effects of perceived health status are also supported by the results shown in 
Table 8.8a, in which the association between consumer's choice of payment 
mechanism and frequency of attendances is shown. As discussed in the previous 
section, the association is considered to reflect the effect of perceived health status 
on choice in the choice model as well as the effect of consumers' choice of payment 
mechanism on their utilisation in the utilisation model. 
In contrast, some of the results in Table 1O.la contradict the model's predictions of 
the effects of income on choice. Three results out of eighteen contradict the 
hypothesis with statistical significance, while other three results are consistent 
with the hypothesis with statistical significance. The choice model does not seem 
to succeed in explaining consumers' choice in terms of these income factors. 
However, looking at the summary table with attention to differences between 
districts, the effects of income on choice is supported in Kitwe, in general. 
As to the effects of quality of care, mixed results are found in Table 1O.2a. In 
regards to the choice between prepayment and user fee, among six dimensions of 
quality, results in relation to drug availability tend to contradict the hypothesis 
with statistical significance, while the results of technical care provided tend to be 
consistent with the hypothesis with statistical significance. The results for 
convenience tend to be consistent with the hypothesis without statistical 
significance. And mixed and non "significant results are found in the other three 
dimensions: structural aspects, staff behaviour, and organisational aspects. 
As to the comparison between discount card and user fee, any test is impossible 
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with LCMS98 as discussed previously. In Table 1O.lb, usmg the outpatient 
questionnaire survey data, repeats the two levels of analysis: associations between 
choice and each factor, and simultaneous estimation of logit models, according to 
health centres. 
The effects of perceived health status on the choice between discount card and user 
fee is not consistent with the prediction of the choice model. The results for income 
and household size support the hypothesis in both analyses. The estimated logit 
model also supports the effect of income and household size on choice, while the 
effect of perceived health status is found negligible. 
As to the effects of quality of care, mixed results are found in Table lO.2b, too, which 
are inconsistent with the choice between user fee and prepayment. Among six 
dimensions of quality of care, all results for convenience are consistent with the 
hypothesis with statistical significance. All two results for drug availability, and 
organisational aspects, are consistent with the hypothesis without statistical 
significance, while results for technical care provided contradict the hypothesis 
without statistical significance. Mixed and non-significant results are found in 
relation to structural aspects. 
Since no contradictory results have statistical significance and some supporting 
results are statistically significant, the choice model is considered to succeed in 
explaining consumers' choice in principle. 
In short, the choice model regarding not only the comparison between prepayment 
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and user fee but also between discount card and user fee is supported by empirical 
investigation in Kitwe except for the effects of perceived quality of care. Especially, 
patients' behaviours at Cosetco are well explained. However, the choice model 
seems to fail in explaining choice in terms of income in Lusaka, comparing 
prepayment and user fee. There are differences in the dimensions of quality of 
care, which affect choice with statistical significance. As to the choice between 
prepayment and user fee, technical care provided has a consistent effect, while drug 
availability results contradict the model. For the choice between discount card 
and user fee, the model performs well in predicting the role of convenience. 
These failures in the empirical tests could be explained as below. Firstly, as to the 
failures in the tests of perceived quality of care, patients with perception of low drug 
availability at the time of illness may keep away from heath centres and seek 
health care at other facilities even when they have prepaid. In other words, 
outpatients who attend the health centres and answered the questionnaire have 
bias compared with consumers assumed in the choice model. This is an expected 
issue and already discussed in Chapter 5. The outpatient questionnaire survey 
was the best feasible method. In this sense, this is due to the limitation in the 
study design. Patients perceiving high drug availability may be willing to pay user 
fee when they believe drug is available at health centres, which leads to 
contradictory results to the hypothesis derived from the model. This may be due to 
oversimplification in the modelling process. Yet, plausibility of these explanations 
is unclear within the empirical investigation of this study. Another possible 
explanation of the failures in the tests of perceived quality of care is that consumer's 
expectation for health facility is diagnosis and procedures rather than drug 
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prescription. Once diagnosed, they can select pills and purchase them in the 
market. This explanation seems to be consistent with the generally supporting 
results of tests of technical care provided in the choice between prepayment and 
user fee. 
Secondly, as to the failures in the tests of income in Lusaka, these are considered to 
result from the prevailing misuse of prepayment as cheaper user fee with 24 hours 
waiting, since the model is supported by patients' behaviour at Cosetco, where 
continuation of prepayment is most strongly enforced as shown in Table 8.7, Table 
9.3, and Table 9.4. In Lusaka, waiting time price rationing, which the choice model 
does not assume, seems to affect consumers' choice of payment mechanisms. Given 
this rationing, the fee schedule of prepayment departs from that assumed by the 
choice model. The schedule effectively offers consumers the choice between quick 
but expensive service and cheap but slow service. Then it can be expected that 
consumers with low income are likely to choose cheap but slow service, that is, 
prepayment. The observation of difference in direct payment practice among 
health centres that health centres in Lusaka but not Kitwe, and large but not small 
health centres are likely to fail in enforcing proper use of prepayment have certain 
plausibility in explaining the contradictory results. Another explanation may be 
possible with regard to these contradictory results that the assumption on the 
relationship between income and time preference is erroneous. Arguably, this 
assumption is relatively poorly supported empirically in comparison with the other 
assumptions made in the theoretical modelling. It is also possible to assume that 
there is little difference in time preference depending on income among the poorest 
section of the population. 
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In conclusion, the choice model has shown a certain power in explaining the effects 
of health status and household size on choice through empirical investigation, and 
potential in explaining the effects of income is shown through the extension of 
theoretical interpretation and empirical investigation at a limited numbers of 
health centres. 
10.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 3: EQUITY CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE 
PAYMENT MECHANISMS 
Theoretical investigations in Chapter 6 predict equity consequences of the 
utilisation model and choice model in terms of two types of equity: equity in access 
and equity in financing. 
Horizontal equity, a situation, which realises equal access by equal need is explored 
with the uses of proxies: utilisation for access and perceived health status for need 
as below: 
a) When prepayment or discount card are used as mechanism of payment together 
with user fees, horizontal equity increases if coverage of prepayment or discount 
card is expanded. 
b) If coverage is limited, 
b·l) the effects of perceived health status in the choice model suggest positive equity 
consequence of use of prepayment and discount card together with user fees. This 
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is more fully realised when low health status correlates with low income. 
b-2) the effects of income in the choice model suggest negative equity consequence of 
use of prepayment and discount card together with user fees. 
c) If quality of care is low, the use of discount card together with user fees has 
more positive equity consequences than that of prepayment. 
In the empirical investigation, as shown in Table 9.3, relatively high coverage of 
prepayment excluding misuse is observed at three health centres: Chipata, 
Kabwata, and Cosetco. Since the appropriateness ofthe utilisation model is shown 
in the discussion above, the use of prepayment together with user fees is considered 
to have positive equity consequences according to a) at these health centres. 
Relatively low coverage of prepayment and discount card excluding abuses are 
observed at three health centres: Chawama, Chimwenwe, and Mwekera. Since the 
effects of perceived health status in the choice model is empirically supported, the 
use of prepayment and discount card together with user fees are considered to have 
positive equity consequences at these health centres according to b-1), although the 
correlation between low health status and low income is not shown in Table 7.18. 
Since the effect of income on choice is unclear, the use of prepayment and discount 
card together with user fees are considered not to have negative equity 
consequences at these health centres according to b-2). 
The comparison of equity consequences between prepayment and discount card in C), 
is not discussed in this study because no discount card payer is observed at 
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Chawama, only where c) can be empirically examined. 
In short, both use of prepayment and discount card in a user fee environment in the 
field have positive equity in access consequences. 
With regard to equity in financing, a situation, in which payment is according to 
ability to pay, is explored as below: 
d) If the effect of income in the choice model is relatively small, the effect of 
perceived health status in the choice model suggest marginally positive equity 
consequences of use of prepayment and discount card together with user fees 
through the utilisation model. 
e) The use of prepayment together with user fees may have more positive equity 
consequences according to d) than that of discount card. 
In the empirical investigation, as shown in Table 1O.la and 10.1 b, the effects of 
perceived health status in the choice model are empirically supported and the 
effects of income are not clear, presumably small. Use of prepayment and discount 
cards are considered to have positive equity in financing consequences at these 
health centres according to d). 
The comparison of equity consequences between use of prepayment and use of 
discount card in e) is not discussed in this study because no discount card payer is 
observed at Chawama, the only facility where c) can be empirically examined. 
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In short, both use of prepayment and discount card are concluded to have positive 
equity in financing consequences. 
It should be noted that caution is needed in interpreting the evidence on equity 
consequences from the empirical investigation of this study, however. The 
discussion in this section relies much on the empirical results of two demand models 
according to the study design. It is not directly observed that the difference in the 
distribution of health care services in the population arises because ofthe reform of 
payment mechanism. This would, in principle, be required to produce strong 
evidence on equity. This study, however, fails to present this kind of empirical 
result. Only one cross-sectional observation of distribution of illness episodes and 
utilisation by income stratum under co-existence of user fees and prepayment is 
presented in Table 7.18, which even contains odd gradients in the distribution: the 
higher the income, the more illness episodes and utilisation. Although the 
gradient between income and utilisation, sometimes observed elsewhere (e.g. 
Makinen et al., 2000), seems to imply inequity, it does not reflect the marginal effect 
of intervention such as payment mechanism reform. Therefore, it should be 
interpreted that the gain or loss of equity brought by the introduction or 
enhancement of prepayment or discount card does not undergo strict empirical tests, 
although the empirical results answering the first and second research questions 
implies equity gain. This weakness in the empirical investigation of the third 
research question is due to the limitations of this study, which will be discussed 
later. 
In summary, the empirical answer to the third research question combines 
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theoretical inference with partial empirical evidence rather than a wholly evidence 
based response. 
10.6 STRENGTHS OF TillS STUDY 
There are several features, which make this study strong and original. 
First, the context of this study provides a kind of unique "natural experiment" of 
health financing policy in low-income countries. The context of Zambian health 
financing policy places this study at the heart of the international health financing 
debate, as described in Chapter 1. The institutionalisation of voluntary 
prepayment for health care and its implication for equity in the health system have 
been increasingly discussed, and the need for more empirical findings has been 
pointed out since the time of planning of the empirical investigation (Preker et aI., 
2002; Palmer et aI., 2004; Ekman, 2004; Carrin et aI., 2005, Jiitting, 2005). The 
evidence from Zambian field presented by this study can still inform the current 
health financing policy debate. In addition, the local context of Lusaka and Kitwe 
districts, that is, the trial of pre'purchase discount card as the third mechanism of 
direct payment makes this study original, since discount card has never been 
introduced and studied in health financing in developing countries as reviewed in 
Chapter 1. Therefore, this study is unique in dealing with discount card. It is 
also worth to be noted as one of the strengths of this "natural experiment" that the 
trial is implemented in two districts, both of which have small and large health 
centres, at the same time. This makes the range of comparisons in the empirical 
investigation wider, and deepens the interpretation and the discussion. 
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Second, the approach taken in specifying the research questions makes this study 
original. As reviewed and discussed in Chapter 2, direct payment mechanisms 
such as voluntary prepayment and user fee have been studied mainly in terms of its 
impacts on utilisation of health care by the poor section of population in order to 
discuss equity. Only a few studies have tried to look at people's preference among 
payment mechanisms using a hypothetical willingness·to'pay approach. There 
has been no study which directly investigates people's choice of payment 
mechanism combined with health care utilization other than this study. The latest 
extensive systematic review on voluntary prepayment in low'income countries by 
Ekman (2004) also fails in identifying any study with a similar approach to this 
study. 
The second strength leads to the third one, that is, theoretical rigour. Focusing on 
two types of people's basic choices, choice of health care utilisation and choice of 
payment mechanism, in the specified research questions allows the theoretical 
investigation of this study to build on the law of demand and the expected utility 
maximisation model. The choice of health care utilisation under alternative 
payment mechanisms is clearly modelled on the conventional law of demand; and 
the choice of alternative financing mechanism is soundly elaborated on top of the 
major models of demand for health care (Joseph, 1971; Holtsman and Olsen, 1976; 
Heller, 1982; Akin et aI., 1985) and health insurance (Pauly, 1968; Phelps, 1997; 
Holmer, 1984) in preceding studies. It should be noted as a strength that these 
models are developed on the basis of an explicit use of a modern modelling strategy. 
Furthermore, theoretical exploration of equity consequences of introduction or 
enhancement of direct payment, amalgamating two demand models has never been 
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tried in the literature. 
Finally, the empirical investigation using three data sources by themselves and in 
combination also has its strengths. Availability and the use of LCMS98 data set 
make strong platform for the discussion of equity in the health system by 
illustrating unbiased health care utilization maps. LCMS98 data set enables the 
analysis of ex' ante choice of payment mechanism and eX'post utilization of health 
care, which is quite resource consuming if an individual researcher has to conduct 
data collection independently. The accessibility to and the use of records at health 
centres are the strengths of this study as well. Even when facing the lack of 
records in registry books, supplementary data collection from individual patient's 
medical record is implemented in order to answer the research question. The 
outpatient questionnaire is designed soundly such that questions on perceived 
quality of care are written based on a preceding study of quality (Ruwe, 1996). Its 
implementation is devised to control expected seasonality, for example. The 
combination of these data sets enables empirical tests of most of the hypotheses 
predicted by the theoretical investigation. 
10.7 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
There are several limitations of this study, despite the strengths pointed out in the 
previous section. 
Limitations of this study are discussed focusing on three aspects: study design, 
theoretical investigation, and empirical investigation. 
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With regard to study design, the "natural experiment" context, which provides 
opportunity for this study, also imposes limitations on the study design in two ways. 
First, the protocol of the discount card trial is designed not for the purpose of this 
study, but for policy intervention. In this sense, it is not an "experiment" that the 
investigator is able to plan and control. Therefore, options in designing data 
collection for the empirical investigation are limited. For example, randomised 
assignments of health centres with control, or price setting at various levels for 
evaluation are not feasible. The former makes "adverse selection", which always 
accompanies the choice of insurance or some sort of prepayment, uncontrolled. 
And, the latter results in an inability to test the effect of price predicted in the 
choice model in this study. Since the fieldwork is conducted in parallel with 
discount card trial, comparison such as before· and-after is not feasible as well. 
Second, the break of the protocol of the "experiment" in practice undermines the 
study design as well. For example, the discount card trial operates effectively at 
only one health centre out of four which are originally assigned. Even at this one 
health centre, pregnant women are treated differently from the original protocol. 
These results in limited empirical tests regarding discount card. 
The "natural experiment" context limits the approach taken m specifying the 
research questions, which restricts the study design as well. As discussed in 
Section 10.5, the empirical answer to the third research question is rather 
theoretical inference combining partial evidence than empirically tested evidence, 
which results from the approach. It can be argued that the study does not 
investigate the introduction of alternative payment mechanisms such as 
prepayment or discount card, but investigates the relevance of prepayment or 
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discount card in a health care market where user fees prevail. The time span for 
observation is limited by the context, not at investigator's discretion, so that 
changes of distribution of health services are not observed. Therefore, III 
interpreting or generalising the answer to the third research question, it is 
important to notice that the evidence from this study refers to the role of existing 
alternative payment mechanisms. Caution is needed when discussing the 
introduction of prepayment or discount card. 
Although the use of three data sources in the empirical investigation is discussed as 
strengths in the previous section, each of them is not ideal from a critical viewpoint 
of study design. The limited resources for this study such as money, labour, and 
time, make an ideal data collection with community based follow·up study 
discussed in Chapter 5 infeasible. The combination of three data sources as 
illustrated in Table 5.1 can be criticised as insufficient complementary approach. 
The selection of records at health centres as a data source undermines the sampling. 
Ideal random sampling is replaced by convenient sampling depending on the record 
keeping practice at each health centre. These limit the generalisability of the 
results. 
With regard to the theoretical investigation, the choice of international context to be 
modelled other than Zambian context, (which implies ignoring the fact of the 
misusage of prepayment in Zambia), undermined the models' power in explaining 
the situation in Zambia. Therefore, the empirical tests of theoretical models are 
limited by this discrepancy between international context and Zambian practice 
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such that "prepayment as cheap user fee with 24 hours waiting" is not built in the 
model, undermining the empirical support for theoretical model by the empirical 
investigation. However, modelling the general rather than specific case realises 
the scope for the generalisability of the theoretical models, and opens the scope for 
further research, which will be discussed later. 
With regard to the empirical investigation, the divergence from the ideal study 
design causes difficulty in comparing between ex-ante choice and ex-post choice in 
data analyses, which has been discussed repeatedly. It further requires much 
deliberate interpretation and discussion. As discussed in Chapters 5, 7, 8, and 9, 
three data sets have their own limitations. LCMS98 data set is not detailed 
enough to elucidate the effects of the subscription to voluntary prepayment on the 
utilisation; but the effect of the financial barrier only is tested. It also lacks in data 
on discount cards, frequency of attendance, and perceived quality of care. These 
result in more limited results than intended in the study design. Records at health 
centres lack in data on non-users, income, and perceived quality of care. The 
records are only available like a mosaic even compared to the study design 
depending on convenient sampling. These result in more limited results than 
intended in the study design as well. The outpatient questionnaire survey also 
lacks data on non-users. Although the availability of the data on perceived quality 
of care based on preceding findings is noted as its strength, the measurement with 
four simple levels of grading and assuming the scale as cardinal in the statistical 
analysis leaves room for further research. 
Caution is needed when using and generalising the evidence from this study. 
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10.8 POUCY IMPUCATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
As discussed in 10.6, this study has strengths making it original, which provide a 
certain amount of findings relevant to policy implications, although it encountered 
some limitations as mentioned above. 
The policy context under consideration III this study is whether the use of 
alternative direct payment mechanisms such as prepayment or discount card 
alongside user fees is equitable or not. Concerns for impact on the poor section of 
the population, and whether income related equity loss occurs or not are key issues. 
Theoretical investigation revealed potential both positive and negative equity 
consequences of the two alternative payment mechanisms. In other words, income 
related equity gain or loss are both possible, depending on the condition under 
which the market of payment mechanisms and the market of health care 
equilibrate. 
According to the empirical answer to the third research question as to prepayment 
in Zambian context, income seems to have little impact on the choice of voluntary 
prepayment as a method for direct payment at some health centres where coverage 
is relatively low. At the other health centres, on the contrary, income seems to 
have impact on the choice of voluntary prepayment, while coverage is relatively 
high. Since it is also found that the health care utilisation is facilitated by the 
choice of prepayment, that is, the removal of financial barrier at the time of 
utilisation, the institutionalisation of prepayment as an alternative to user fee bring 
positive income related equity consequences. In this sense, commitment to 
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promote the use of prepayment in the arrangement of direct payment alongside 
user fees is recommendable for policy makers in Lusaka and Kitwe, while efforts to 
improve the implementation such as reducing misuse need to be made in order to 
realise marginal change of equilibria of health care related markets toward equity 
gain. In order to find a solution to improve practice, it may be useful to look into 
the practice at Cosetco health centre, where theoretical bene~t of prepayment 
seems to be realised to a certain extent. It is also advisable that the change of 
distribution of health care utilization should be monitored in order to directly 
observe the equity implications of this policy. 
'!\vo types of hurdles for the policy to introduce or enhance prepayment as a method 
of direct payment have been pointed out in the literature as reviewed in Chapter 1 
and 2: operational problems and quality of care. The fields of this study suffer 
from typical operational problems of prepayment as discussed in Chapter 1. The 
original finding of this study is that use of prepayment even with problems in 
operation could contribute to equity in access. 
An increase of quality of care has been argued to be a prerequisite for positive 
impact from direct payment in the international literature. Quality of care is 
argued to be realised through improving the availability of inputs such as drugs to 
health services. The importance of raising consumer's perceived quality of care is 
also emphasized. Therefore, the relevance of quality of care for equity is 
theoretically explored in Chapter 6. The empirical results of this study suggest 
that the use of prepayment brings about positive equity impact even when the 
association between consumers' choice of payment mechanisms and dimensions of 
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perceived quality of health care services are relatively weak compared perceived 
health status, and even when the relationship between the choice of prepayment 
and perceived drug availability is found inverse. In other words, consumers even 
with low perceived drug availability are more likely to subscribe to prepayment, if 
they themselves are unhealthy, which leads to positive equity impact from the use 
of prepayment. These findings suggest an increase of quality of care is not a 
prerequisite for positive impacts from the use of prepayment together with user 
fees. 
Therefore, the continuation of voluntary prepayment in Lusaka and Kitwe is still 
recommendable taking these hurdles into account. 
As for discount cards, this study succeeds in theoretically clarifying the 
characteristics of the discount card as a payment mechanism, which was invented 
as an intuitive countermeasure to avoid managerial problems with prepayment. 
The theoretical investigation illustrates the potential superiority of prepayment in 
realising equitable conditions, if quality of care is low. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to try to introduce discount cards. 
However, empirical evidence is very limited due to low popularity and the 
abandonment of the trial in several health centres. Compared to prepayment, 
income related equity loss cannot be ruled out, since the observed role of income and 
convenience dimension of quality of care in the choice between discount card and 
user fee suggest the possibility that this payment mechanism facilitate access to 
health care by those who already have had better access. 
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Therefore, it can only be advisable for the policy makers in Lusaka and Kitwe that 
further trial with stricter implementation is needed to expand a policy promoting 
discount cards to test its potential theoretical superiority. 
It is also possible to bring out policy implications for health policy makers other 
than those in Lusaka and Kitwe from this study. Zambia has other urban districts 
without voluntary prepayments or discount cards, but similar to Lusaka and Kitwe: 
Ndola and Livingstone. It is recommendable to consider the introduction of 
alternative payment mechanisms to user fees in these districts by carefully learning 
lessons from practice in Lusaka and Kitwe. In addition to this policy implication in 
the short run, growing urbanisation accompanying the increase of people working 
in the informal sector as seen in Copperbelt area or Mazabuka suggests expansion 
of voluntary prepayment as a payment mechanism is a reasonable option in order to 
assure access to health care by the poor section of population in the long run. 
Existing literature clarifies the difficulties of extending social insurance models to 
that population. 
Since the context specified in the theoretical investigation is not limited to Zambian 
context, policy implications according to the theoretical model is thought of as 
applicable to similar settings such as urban informal sector in other low·income 
countries. It may be worth considering the use of prepayment or the trial of 
discount card as alternative payment mechanism a viable policy option even where 
managerial capacity to maintain quality of care is limited. The empirical findings 
of this study suggest the possibility of realising equilibrium of health care related 
markets where equity increases. 
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10.9 SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There is scope for further investigation expanding this study to answer original 
research questions more precisely. 
With regard to the first and the second research questions, theoretical models 
should be tested and refined. Although the appropriateness of the theoretical 
models is shown to a certain extent in this study, the evidence is limited such that 
price factor is not tested, or relatively weak such that the effects of income factors 
and quality of care in the choice are not clearly demonstrated. Further empirical 
investigation of the models with different data sets and in different operational 
contexts is worth while. With these exercises, equity implications of use of 
voluntary prepayment or discount card together with user fees as direct payment 
mechanisms will be further clarified. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THEORETICAL MODELS OF 
THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
In this Appendix 1, algebraic presentations of the models, which are reviewed in 
Chapter 3, are shown. 
1. Simple Utility Maximisation Model 
The model developed by Joseph (1971) is as below. 
Maximise 
subject to: 
where 
U=U(m, X) 
pm+ qX=y 
U = utility 
m = constant quality units of medical services 
X = a composite of all other goods 
p = price of a unit of medical services 
q = price of a unit of other goods 
y = individual income, which is completely exhausted by 
expenditures on m and X 
The model developed by Acton (1975) is as below. 
Maximise 
subject to: 
U =U(m, X) 
( p + wt )m + ( q + ws ) X ~ Y = y + wT 
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where U = utility 
m = constant quality units of medical services 
X = a composite of all other goods 
p = price of a unit of medical services 
w = hourly earnings 
t = time price per unit of medical services 
q = price of a unit of other goods 
s = time price per unit of other goods 
Y = full income including earned income, unearned 
mcome, and the opportunity cost of home 
production 
y = unearned income 
T= total time available for market work and own 
production 
2. Household Production Model 
The model developed by Holtsman and Olsen (1976) is as below. 
Maximise 
subject to: 
given production 
relationships: 
u = U( D, C) 
( Pdh.1 + tlW )D + ( pcbc + tcw )C = wT + n = Y 
Td= tdD 
Tc = teC 
Xd= bdD 
337 
where 
Xe=bcC 
U = utility 
D = composite of dental hygiene 
C = composite of all other commodities 
pd = fixed price for dental services ( Xd) 
bd = fixed coefficient of production relating the 
market-purchased input, dental services 
( Xd), to the output of home production, 
dental hygiene (D) 
td = the coefficient relating the time input to the 
production of dental hygiene 
w = fixed wage 
be = the coefficient relating the production of 
other commodities to the input of a specific 
market good or bundle of market goods 
pc = fixed price of Xc 
te = fixed time coefficient of production for the 
other commodities 
T = total time available 
B = other income 
Y = 'full' income 
The model developed by HelIer (1982) is as below. 
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Maximise 
subject to: 
+wT 
given: 
where 
u = U( k, x, m' ) 
( TTl + wt )k + ( TT2 + WS )( m + m')+( TT3 + wv )x ~ y = y 
H = H( x, k; A, E, e ) 
m = G( H ) = g( x, k; A, E, e ) 
U = utility 
k = preventive services 
[ Health Status] 
[ Health Need] 
x = composite of other goods and services 
m = necessary level of curative care 
m' = discretionary purchase of medical care 
M = m + m' = total purchase of medical care 
TTl = money price of k 
w = wage rate 
t = time price of k 
TT2 = money price of M 
s = time price of M 
TT:3 = money price of x 
v = time price of x 
Y = full income 
y = unearned income 
T = productive time available 
wT = earned income 
H = health status 
A= age 
E = hygienic quality of home environment 
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e = virulence of disease agents in community 
3. Human Capital Model 
Simplified Grossman's model (1972) is as below. 
Maximise 
subject to: 
given household 
U = U ( <l>oHo, ... , <l>nHn, Zo, ... Zn) 
~[ PiMi + FiXi + Wi( THi +Ti + TL) / ( 1 + r )i] 
= ~[ Win / ( 1 + r )i] + Ao = R 
production relationships: Hi+l - Hi = L - O,Hi 
Ii = l;( Mi, THi; Ei) 
Zi = Zi( Xi, Ti, Ei) 
where U = utility 
<l>i = service flow per unit of health capital in the 
ith time period (healthy days) 
Ho = initial stock of capital 
Hi= stock of health in the ilh time period 
Zi = total consumption of other commodities in 
the itb time period 
Pi = price of medical care 
Mi = quantity of medical care 
Fi = price of market goods used in producing Zi 
Xi = market goods used in producing Zi 
Wi= wage rate 
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TU =time used in producing health 
Ti = time used in producing other commodities 
TLi = time lost due to illness or injury 
r = interest rate 
Q = TWi + THi + Ti + TLi, total amount of time 
available in period i 
TWi = hours of work 
Ao = discounted property income or initial assets 
Ii = gross investment in health 
Oi = rate of depreciation of stock of health 
Ei = stock of human capital 
Grossman derives a fundamental relationship from his model as below. 
where Yi = marginal money rate of return to an investment in health 
(pecuniary return) 
ai = marginal psychic return of improved health (consumption 
return) 
r = interest rate forgone by investing in health capital instead of 
other assets 
TT\-l = percent change in the marginal cost of health investments 
from the last period to the current period 
Oi = rate of depreciation of health stock 
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This states that the marginal cost of investments in health must equal the 
marginal rate of return to those investments. Pure investment model is reduced 
through setting ai = 0, which means an assumption that all return to health come 
from the pecuniary return caused by more healthy days and that there is no 
psychic return to better health. Pure consumption model is reduced through 
letting 'i' in the equation zero. Then the marginal return to healthy days is 
psychic benefits alone. 
4. Discrete Choice Model 
The general model developed by Akin (1985) is almost similar to Acton's model as 
below. 
Maximise 
subject to: 
where 
U=U(H, Z) 
( PH + WTH )H + ( pz + wTz) Z = y + wT 
U = utility 
H = a vector of health services 
Z = a vector or a composite of all other goods and services 
PH = the money price of one unit of health services 
w = the shadow hourly wage, or the opportunity cost of 
one hour of time 
Tw = the amount oftime spent in wage employment 
TH = the amount of time used to consume one unit of 
health services, in hours 
pz = the price of one unit of other goods and services 
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Tz = the time required to consume on unit ofZ 
y = unearned income (rent, profits, interest, gifts) 
T = total time used in market work and in the 
consumption of other goods and services ( TH + Tz 
+ Tw = T) 
However, the characteristics of Akin's model lies in the assumption in utility 
maximisation and the demand system derived from the reduced-form equations_ 
He assumes an individual chooses one provider to consume health care from 
limited alternatives so as to maximise his/her utility. Then, the utility 
maximisation among alternatives is as below. 
U· = max(U) 
where U· = maximum utility 
U = utility from ith alternative provider 
And the demand system derived from the reduced-form equations is as below. 
Qij = M PPUj, Pprj, Ptrj, TpUj, Tprj, Ttrj, Y, Zj ) 
where Qij = whether medical service i was used by the jlh individual 
i = ( public, private, traditional, or no care) 
j = ( all sick or pregnant individuals) 
pUj = Public clinic or hospital serving the j'h individual 
prj = Private clinic or hospital serving the jlh individual 
trj = Traditional healer or midwife serving the jlh individual 
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variables for 
P = vector of cash prices paid for each service 
T = vector of time costs associated with each facility and service 
Yi = household assets for the jth individual 
Zj = a vector of social, demographic, and biological control 
the jth individual 
5. Models for Health Insurance 
The model for insurance in standard textbooks (adopted from Pauly, 1968) is as 
below. 
Maximise 
where 
pU(W· L -TTq + q) + (I - p)U(w -TTq) 
p = probability of losing L 
U = utility 
W = initial wealth 
L = loss 
q = coverage 
TT = premium for unit coverage 
The model developed by Holmer (1984) assumes that an individual family choose 
one health insurance plans among several available ones so as to maximise its 
expected utility. Then, the utility maximisation is as below. 
EU' = max( EU ) 
where EU· = maximum utility 
EU = utility from ith health insurance plan 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE OUTLINE OF LCMS98 
The Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998 (LCMS98) was carried out 
between November - December, 1998. The LCMS98 is a continuation of the Living 
Conditions Monitoring Surveys by Central Statistical Office started in 1991, 
which are intended to be carried out regularly for the purpose of the monitoring of 
living conditions and poverty: Social Dimensions of Adjustment Priority Survey I 
(1991), Social Dimensions of Adjustment Priority Survey 11 (1993) and the Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey 1996 . 
The LCMS98 was carried out nation'wide and covered 16,710 households 
representing a sampling fraction of about 1 household per every 113 households. 
The survey covered 8,487 households in rural areas and 8,223 households in 
urban areas. 
The sample design used is the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) method. 
This entailed allocating the total sample proportionately to each stratum 
according to its population share. Sample selection also followed the PPS 
method. 
The survey covered the following topics: 
, Demographic characteristics 
, l\ligration 
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. Health 
· Has ... been sick or injured during the last two weeks? 
· What was ... mainly suffering from? 
· Did ... consult any health or other institution/personnel for this 
illness/injury or did he/she only use self administered medicine? 
· How much in total was spent on ... .'s medication? 
· How many visits did ........ make to the following institutions in the last 
two weeks? 
· Which health or other institution/personnel did .... visit first for this 
illness/injury? 
· Who attended to ... during this visit? 
· What services did ... receive from the institution on this visit? 
· If .... was admitted to the institution on this visit, how many nights did 
he/she spend? 
· How much was spent on the following, for the first visit? 
· What was the method used for paying for the services of the facility on 
this visit? 
· Why didn't .... pay for the consultation on this visit? 
· Did ..... make a second visit to this or another institution/personnel for 
the same illness/injury? 
· Which health or other institution/personnel did .... visit next for this 
illness/injury? 
· \Vho attended to ..... during this visit? 
· What services did .... receive from the institution during this visit? 
· If .... was admitted to the institution on this visit, how many nights did 
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he/she spend? 
- How much was spent on the following, for the second visit? 
- What was the method used for paying for the services of the facility on 
this visit? 
- Why didn't .... pay for the consultation on this visit? 
· Did ... visit other institutions/personnel for the same illness? 
- Which health or other institution/personnel did .... visit next for this 
illness/injury? 
· Etc. 
· Education 
· Economic Activities 
- Income 
· Under five Children Nutrition (Anthropometry) 
· Access to various facilities & infrastructure 
- Household Assets 
· Expenditure 
· How much was spent on the following during the last 1 month? 
- Medicines 
· Fees to Doctor/Health Assistant/Midwife/Nurse/Dentist, etc. 
· Fees to Traditional healer 
- Payments to hospital/health centre/Surgery 
· Pre-payment scheme 
· Etc. 
- Community Developmental Issues 
. Food production 
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· Poverty 
The above topics are the basis for computing poverty and analysing living 
conditions in Zambia and are based on an internationally accepted list of living 
conditions components. 
The survey used two types of questionnaires to collect data from the field. The 
listing form was used to list all households in the sample enumeration areas, and 
the main questionnaire was used to obtain information on the household and each 
member of the household including questions on ill health episodes and coping 
behaviours experienced by each member during two weeks before the survey. 
(Cited from Report of LCMS 1998 by Central Statistical Office, Lusaka (1999), 
with modification.) 
349 
APPENDIX 3 
SAMPLE OF QUESTIONNAIRE USED 
IN OUTPATIENT QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
Eight types of questionnaires by the district, age group, and discount card trial 
were used as below: 
Lusaka Adult without discount card trial 
with discount card trial 
Child without discount card trial 
with discount card trial 
Kitwe Adult without discount card trial 
with discount card trial 
Child without discount card trial 
with discount card trial 
The following sample of questionnaire is the one used for adults at health centres 
with discount card trial in Lusaka. 
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Date ctInterview: Da:r:_Moath _ . 
IntervieWer: ______ _ 
1/3 
Name of Clinic: Chawama 
Serial No. '_1_1_1 
OUTPATIENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
1 am .. ~ OIl a reseuch to improve health care in Zambia. I would bite you to answer some 
questioDa about J01I., your family eci this cliIIic. Everythiq JOU $&1 will be kept CONFIDENTIAL 
ThaDk J'OU for your co-operaticm. 
01 Do JOIl came to this c:liDic every time you let sick? ,_, yes Oota03 
TICk cme hoses u,lllicable , 1110 00 to 02 
02 In last ODe year, 
Have you visited ditYerent &Q\"emmental clinic or '_I different IOvernmental clinic or 
hospital? hll5pital 
Haw )'Ou visited private clinic or hocpit.al? '_I private clinic or h05pital 
Have you visited tnditional healer? U traditional healer 
HaveTOu visited phumacy? 
TIck ail hoses a1llllicable 
U pharmacy 
03 How often cio you usually come to this clinic? 
Once a month? ,_, more than once a month 
Every ~ months? L I once 11 month 
Once a year? ,_, every three months 
Or do you have recular visits because of Ion, standin, I_I every six months 
~s:? I_I once a year 
,_, less than once 11 year 
,_ I havinC re,war visits, then specify 
diapo;is ( ) 
Tick one box applicable frequency ( I 
04 How far is this clinic from your home? ( ) minute .. 
How many minutes? ,_, 0 -14 minute .. 
,- I 15 - 29 
U 30- 44 
U 45-59 
Record the response or tick one bo.'I: aJ)plicable I I 1 hour or more 
05 How did you come to this clinic? Uwalk 
I_ I bus 
U car 
,_ I other specify 
Tick all boxei applicable ( ) 
06 How much did it cost you to come to this clinic? ( )K 
Record the resllOnse I I none 
B. I will uk .haut your feeImp 011 thiJ clWc. 
07 Do you think drugs are always available at this clinic? 
Always twillabie? ,_ , tUways a,"ailable 
Sometimes available? I_ I sometimes available 
Sometimes not available? ,_ , ~ometime8 not arnilable 
Always not available? ,_ I always not available 
Tick one box applicable 
08 Do you think this clinic doe~ not have enourh medical 
machines? 
Almo~t no machines'? I_ I almost no machine; 
Not enough? ,_ I not enourh 
Enou~? I_I enourh 
Plenty? I _ i plenty 
Tick ODe box applicable 
LIlJ;aka with discounted card 
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2/3 
09 Do you thiDIt the sisters at this c1iDic are nice and kind? 
Very JIice aM bid? 1_' very JIice and mui 
~ice aa.cl kinli? L I mu anli kind 
Sometimes ruile? I_I lIODletimea rude 
Vel'3"rude? U verynade 
Tu:k GII8 boX . le 
10 Do JOU tbiDlt .the lDODey you pay at thia c1iaic is 
capem:ive? 
Very apeDaiw? U very espemive 
UpeJWw? 1_' expeuive 
Cheap? Ucheap 
Verycheap'l Lt very c:1leap 
Ta_box 
11 Do you t1Iink mm; at this dime are rood at eiviDc 
shots and doing tests? 
Verycood? U 'Vel'Y rood 
Good? Lt pd 
Bad? I ,bad 
Verybaci? Cl very bad 
Tu:k GII8 box &l)Dlicable 
12 Do you thiDk this cliDic is far and botherscme to come? 
Very far U veryfar 
Far U far 
Close Lt close 
Very close I_I very clos:e 
Tick ODe box allll1icable 
C. I will uk about JOUr at this ctiDic. 
13 How are you goine to pay for today'; visit, &theme card, I_I scheme card Go to 14 
user charge, or ciiscounted. card? I_I user ch:u'fe Go to 17 
H this is reattendeDCe, how did you pay for your firit I_I discounted card 00to21 
consultation? '_I unable to pay 
Tick ODe box 3DDlicable 
H scheme card 
14 Did you buy a new scheme card for this visit? (within a U yes Go to 16 
couple of days ago) Uno Go to 16 
Tick ODe box allllhcable 
15 How many months have you had thi;deme card? ( ) months 
Record the relOClOnse 
16 Do you know discounted card? I_I yes 
Tick ODe box applicable I lno Go to 24 
H user charge 
17 Have you ever used scheme card? I_I yell 
Tick ODe box aDDlicable I lno 
18 Do you know discounted card? I_I yell 00 to 19 
Tick ODe box applicable Uno 00 to 
20 
19 Have you e\'er used discounted card? U yell 
Tick ODe box aDDlicable I lno 
~O ''''by do you chose to pay user charge instead of scheme I_I not knowing 
card or discounted card? I_I expensive 
1_ I seldom falling ill 
I_ I not h"ing in this district 
I_I cannot waitfor ~4 hours 
I_I other specifr 
( ) 
Tick one box aDtllicable 00 to24 
Lusaka with discounted card 
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3/3 
21 Is t1W; your own discounmd. card? U ye, 
H no, from whom were.)'DU ~vim tbia'l '_'DO'~r~tioDdrip 
T~ .. boX applicabte ( .I 
22 Is t1W; your first tIiscowltecI card? , _, DO, already finished the first 
card.(4 c:oupcIDI) 
If yes, how maDY coupcma have :JU1l lISN in your ,_, 0 (buyinc a DeW card &»r this 
card'Xbefore submittinc a COQpon for toUT. epir;od.e) episocle) 
I_I 1 (3 coupons left) 
U 2 (2 coupons ]eft) 
TJCt GDebox applicable 'I 3 UCOIU)ODS left) 
23 Will :JU1l parchue a Dew Cliac:cnm&ed card when this U~II 
card. is finished.? LIDO 
TJCkODebOK le CJo to 24 
24 When is your birthday? ( ) cl ( lm( )1 
How old ne you? ( ) years olel 
(Check ~lt and. tick ODe box applicable] I I male 
I-I female 
25 Do you work? I_I employed 
What is your job? I_I ;elf employed 
Or are you a student? I_I not workin, but lookin, for 
I_I retired 
I_ I full-time student 
I_I full·time homemaker 
I_I other specify 
Tick OIUI box applicable ( ) 
26 Ufstudent) I_I less than one year 
What is the level of your ;chool attending? I_I primary 
(otherwise) 1_ I ;econdary 
What is the hichest level of !:chool attend.ed? I_ I hi~er 
Prim:uy? 
Secondary'! 
Higher? 
Tick OIUI box applicable 
27 How many children are you living together as a family? ( ) children 
How many ad.ult!: are you li\.mg together al: a family ( ) adults 
includini YOurl:elf? 
Record the response 
28 How many people in your family worked last month? ( ) 
Record the res1Xlnse people 
29 Did you work last month? U yes 
If yes. how much money did you make lASt month? ( ) K 
Tick OIUI box applicable I I no 
30 This is the last question. ( i K 
How much money did your family make last month in U O· 24.999K 
total? 1- I 25,000 - 49.999 
U 50.000 - 99.999 
U 100,000 - 199,999 
U 200,000 - 399,999 
Record the re5DOnse or tick one box applicable I I 400.000 - over 
Thank you for your time . And I hope you will feel better soon. 
Lu~aka WIth mcounted card 
353 
APPENDIX 4 
LIST OF VARIABLES IN THEORETICAL MODELS 
The abbreviations for variables in theoretical models are as below. 
1. Utilisation model 
Cusr = cost of health care with user charge 
Cpre = cost of health care with prepayment 
Cdis = cost of health care with discount card 
Qusr = quantity demanded with user charge 
Qpre = quantity demanded with prepayment 
Qdis = quantity demanded with discount card 
2. Choice model 
alt = ( usr, pre, dis ) 
C = cost of an alternative 
d = discount rate for the price of discount card 
EH = expected consumption of health care 
EU = expected utility 
EW = expected wealth 
F = user fee 
f= whether an alternative is chosen or not 
h = number of persons in the group of consumers 
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HS = current health status 
IW = initial wealth 
k = expected number of discount card purchased 
m = number of coupons in one discount card 
n = expected number of episodes he/she has during the period 
n' = expected number of episodes the group of consumers have during the 
period 
Q = perceived quality of care 
q = probability of receiving appropriate health care 
R = premium of prepayment 
t = private time preference rate 
TCH = total cost of health care 
V = value of one coupon at the point of purchase 
Z = a vector of other factors 
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